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Abstract 
 
Offshore petroleum exploration and production (E&P) activities are faced with both technical 
and environmental challenges. In spite of these challenges, offshore petroleum E&P are on the 
increase globally. These operations have not been accident free even with improved 
technology. Recent incidents like Montara blowout and Deepwater Horizon fire have more 
than ever before raised serious concerns about the safety of offshore oil and gas E&P. Key 
issues are the prevention of major hazards, emergency response and civil liability, and payment 
of compensation. These issues have greater implication when the impact is transboundary. 
There is a general consensus on the need to ensure safety of these operations globally. 
However, the international legal framework needed to achieve the objective is unresolved.  
Looking at the extant international instruments relating to marine pollution from offshore oil 
and gas activities, there is a clear absence of global treaty on safety of offshore operations, civil 
liability and compensation. While there is general consensus on the need for safety of offshore 
oil and gas operations globally, opinions are divided on the necessity for global treaties. This 
thesis looks at the extant international legal framework at both global and regional levels with 
a view to identifying gaps in provisions on safety, civil liability and compensation.  
The thesis finds that even in the post-Macondo era, there are no global treaties in relation to 
safety of offshore petroleum E&P to prevent accidental pollution, and to deal with issues of 
civil liability and compensation. Furthermore, most regional regimes have no specific 
provisions on accidental pollution from offshore operations and liability issues arising 
therefrom. The absence of provisions for civil liability, especially in cases of transboundary 
harm from offshore accidental pollution has created difficulty for affected nations and 
nationals.  
This thesis proffers suggestion for international regulation of offshore petroleum operations to 
prevent accidental pollution, improve emergency response and guarantee prompt settlement of 
liabilities and payment of compensation.  Accordingly, an international legal framework 
involving three levels of legal regimes is recommended as an effective way of preventing 
accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations to protect marine environment and 
also ensuring that liabilities that may arise in the event of a major hazard are adequately 
addressed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background 
 
The oil and gas industry is characterised with high risk and disaster could strike at any time. 
Statistics show that the past three decades have witnessed global occurrence of large scale fatal 
accidents in every two to three years.1 Despite the development of renewable energy there is 
continuous increase in the search for oil and gas. With the depletion of reserves onshore the 
search is increasingly being focused on oceans where there is said to be huge oil and gas 
reserves. Advancement in technology has driven exploration and production (E&P) to 
geographically and geologically complex deep and ultra-deep water environment. Presently, 
there are over 7000 offshore oil and gas installations globally with their ever present 
operational hazards. The Arctic with its extreme weather challenges is also witnessing increase 
in exploration activities.2 The extreme environmental conditions associated with offshore oil 
and gas operations is a challenge to safety. Hence, occurrence of accidents resulting in serious 
marine pollution that could have transboundary impact and harm marine biodiversity remains 
a possibility.  
Offshore E&P has impact on the marine environment through operational discharges that are 
permissible within acceptable level and quantities. These substances with implications on the 
                                                          
1 Health & Safety Middle East, The Three Cs of Oil and Gas Safety, available at 
http://www.hsmemagazine.com/article.php?article_id=761 accessed 20 June 2013; RPS Energy, Preventing 
Major Accidents in the Oil and Gas Industry, P.1 (2010) available at 
http://www.rpsgroup.com/Energy/Services/Advisory/Downstream/pdf/RPS-Final-Hazard-White-
Paper_Nov2010_combined.aspx accessed on 29 Aug. 13 
2 The Arctic is a very special environment with ice and very low temperature that would constitute a great 
challenge to response operations in the event of a major accident. It experiences more darkness and knowledge 
about its geology is still limited. Furthermore, it lacks support infrastructure like deep harbour and airport. See 
recent challenge faced by Shell as reported by Associated Press, ‘Shell awaits damage report on vessel for arctic 
offshore drilling’10 July 2015 http://www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/2015/07/shell-awaits-damage-
report-on-vessel-for-arctic-offshore-
drilling.html?cmpid=EnlDailyPetroJuly132015&eid=290980379&bid=1118774 last visited 04 August 2015 
  
2 
 
environment range from drilling mud, drill cuttings to sewage. On the other hand, accidental 
pollution may occur as a result of pipeline rupture, tanker spillages, blowouts and collision 
with vessels docking platforms to load product as was the case of the Bonga oilfield incident 
in the Gulf of Guinea in November 2011. (See table 1) 
Name of 
Accident 
Country of 
Accident 
Cause Size of Spill Impact 
Santa Babara 
Channel, 28 
January 1969 
California, 
Unites State of 
America 
Blowout caused 
by drilling error 
About 
100,000 
barrels of oil 
Non 
Transboundary  
Chevron Main 
Pass Block 41 
Platform 1970 
Gulf of 
Mexico, 
United States 
of America 
Blow out 65,000 barrels 
of oil 
Non 
Transboundary  
Bravo 
Blowout at 
Ekofisk, 22 
April 1977 
North Sea, 
Norway 
Blowout caused 
by wrong 
installation of 
downhole safety 
valve 
202,380 
barrels of oil 
Non 
Transboundary  
Ixtoc I  
3 June 1979 
Campeche 
Bay, 
Mexico 
Blowout 5,500,000 
barrels 
Transboundary 
impact on US 
waters 
Alexander 
Kielland, 
March 1980 
North Sea, 
Norway 
Capsized due to 
fatigue/fabrication 
defects 
 Non 
Transboundary 
123 persons killed 
Piper Alpha 
6 July 1988 
North Sea, 
United 
Kingdom 
Gas cylinder leak 
explosion ns fire 
Huge fire   Non 
Transboundary167 
persons 
Funiwa No. 5 
well,  17 Jan 
1980 
Nigeria Blowout 200,000 
barrels 
Non 
Transboundary 
Usumacinta 
23 October 
2007 
Bay of 
Compache, 
Mexico, Gulf 
of Mexico 
Collision with 
Kab-101 Platform 
5,000 barrels Non 
Transboundary 
21 killed 
Montara  Well 
27 August 
2009 
Timor Sea, 
Australia 
Blowout caused 
by leak from well 
head 
11.2-9million  
US Gallons 
Transboundary 
impact in the 
Indonesian part of 
the Timor sea 
Macondo Well 
20 April 2010 
Gulf of 
Mexico, 
United States 
Wellhead blowout 4.9 million 
barrels 
Non 
Transboundary 
11 killed 
Frade Field 
November 
Brazil Blowout caused 
by pressure spike 
3,600 barrels Non 
Transboundary 
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Bonga Field 
20 December 
2011 
Gulf of 
Guinea, 
Nigeria 
FPSO collision 
with Platform 
40,000 barrels Non 
Transboundary 
KS Endeavour 
16 January 
2012 
Gulf of 
Guinea, 
Nigeria 
Gas explosion Gas into flame Non 
Transboundary 
2 killed 
Table 1: List of some notable offshore accidents and their causes 
 
The causes of accidents in offshore oil and gas operations are several and are often caused by 
a combination of factors in the operation of the installations. For instance, accidents such as 
blowouts are not usually caused by a single failure or mistake, but by the confluence of a whole 
series or chain of errors.3 According to a study on well operations, “blowout accidents are often 
initiated by errors induced by technical failures, unsafe working actions, or a combination of 
both.”4 The study noted that blowout accidents, by their nature, may be “originated in the 
complexity of the relationships involved with the design, procedures, environment, operations, 
and so forth.”5 The host of factors may be classified into technical, organisational and human. 
Therefore, safety regulations must target technical, organisational and human elements of 
offshore operations. 
Despite the highly technical nature of offshore oil and gas operations, it is believed that about 
80 per cent of causes of major accidents in the industry are not linked to technical factors but 
                                                          
3 In Macondo blowout according to the reports, factors responsible include, inter alia, technical/design failures 
(the blow out preventer (BOP) failed to respond when activated) , individual missteps and oversights, 
institutional failure including regulators’ lack of technical expertise to prevent the missteps, see National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, ‘Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster 
and the Future of Offshore Drilling’, Report to the President, pp114-126 (2011), available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.
pdf   accessed on April 26, 2012 and 
http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/NOAA_related_docs/oil_spills/DWH_report-to-president.pdf accessed 
on 29 Aug. 13  
4 Xiali Haer, Midori Inaba and Kenji, A Study on Human Error in a Blowout Accident in Well Operation, SICE  
Annual Conference 2008, August 20-22, 2008, The University of Electro-Communications, Japan, p.2759 
5 Id. 
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organisational and human.6 In response to human factors identified as responsible for offshore 
accidents, rules and regulations are being put in place, in some jurisdictions, to eradicate the 
culture of complacency. There are also rules and regulations aimed at ensuring that regulators, 
operators and owners of installations, employees and personnel would all be responsible for 
the safety of offshore operations.7 
Similarly, reports on some major hazards listed in table 1 above placed significant amount of 
blame on the regulatory regime at the time of the incident. Thus warranting change in 
legislation. For instance, Norway moved from prescriptive to performance based system in 
response to major hazards like the 1977 Bravo blowout and the loss of the Alexander L. 
Kielland in 1980.8 The commission of inquiry report published in 1981 criticised the 
prescriptive system that was in place. With the coming into effect of the Petroleum Activities 
Act in 1985 the regulatory system was changed to performance based.9 Responsibility for 
safety was placed on the operator while the regulator does ‘supervision’ and grants ‘consents’ 
as opposed to ‘inspections’ and ‘approvals’.10 
Following the Piper Alpha incident of 1988 in the UK Continental Shelf of the North Sea, the 
Lord Cullen Report offered 106 recommendations that were all adopted and implemented. In 
implementing the recommendations of the Lord Cullen Report, the UK transited from 
                                                          
6 DNV, Key Aspects of an Effective U.S. Offshore Safety Regime, p.4, available on line at 
http://www.dnv.com/binaries/1008-001%20Offshore%20Update_Key%20aspects_tcm4-430982.pdf accessed 
on 29 August 2013 
7 In the US a new safety and environmental management system rule (SEMS II rule) empowers employees to 
stop work if they sense risky or dangerous activity without fear of sanctions by their employer and also have 
direct channel of communication with the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) to report 
violations. See Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement,   Safety and Environmental Management 
System rule (SEMS) Fact Sheet, available at  http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Safety-and-
Environmental-Management-Systems---SEMS/Fact-Sheet.aspx accessed on 28 June 2013; See also the 
European Union Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations of 28 June 2013 
8 Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA), “From prescription to performance in petroleum supervision” p.3, 
(hereafter PSA, From Prescription to Performance) available at http://www.psa.no/news/from-prescription-to-
performance-in-petroleum-supervision-article6696-878.html last visited 03 November 2014 
9 Deepwater Horizon Commission Report to the President, p.69 
10 See PSA, From Prescription to Performance, supra note 8  
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prescriptive form of regulations primarily under the Mineral Working (Offshore Installations) 
Act 1971 to the safety case system of goal setting regulations.11 Lord Cullen observed that the 
then existing regulations did not adequately consider the need to promote effective 
management of health and safety. He concluded: 
“Many existing regulations are unduly restrictive in that they are of the type which 
impose ‘solutions’ rather than ‘objectives’ and are out of date in relation to 
technological advances. This poses a clear danger that compliance takes precedence 
over wider safety considerations; and that sound innovations are discouraged.”12 
Also, the Montara Commission of Inquiry identified regulatory lapses as a contributory factor 
for the Montara blowout of 2009.13 On that basis the National Offshore Petroleum Safety 
Authority (NOPSA) that was established in 2005 was transformed into the National Offshore 
Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) on 1 January 
2012.14 This was to ensure that a single regulator was in charge of offshore safety & 
environment and well management. The Montara Commission of Inquiry made it clear that it 
“does not support a return to a prescriptive approach” as it can unjustifiably smother innovation 
and new technologies.15 
                                                          
11 Rob Grant, Q.C., Will Moreira, Q.C. and David Henley, ‘Potential for Performance-based Regulation in the 
Canadian Offshore Oil and Gas Industry’, 44 Alta. L. Rev. 1, 4 2006-2007; See also Deepwater Horizon 
Commission Report to the President, pp.68-69 
12 U.K., Department of Energy, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (Chair: Lord Cullen) 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office) para. 24 (1990) [Cullen Report] cited in Rob Grant, Q.C., et al, supra 
not 11, p. 4  
13 Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, p. 16-17 10 June 2010 [Hereafter Montara Report] 
14 Jane Cutler, NOPSEMA, ‘Safety in the Australian Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Post-Piper – A Regulator 
Reflection’ CEO Presentation at the Piper 25 Conference, Aberdeen, Scotland, p.3 20 June 2013 available at 
https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CD8QFjA
E&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.oilandgasuk.co.uk%2Ftemplates%2Fasset-
relay.cfm%3FfrmAssetFileID%3D3305&ei=qxJQVI_7EcGQPMLogdgO&usg=AFQjCNGLyj4dBWvZE--
ycLTo4kDivddrOA&bvm=bv.78597519,d.ZWU last visited 29 October 2014 
15 Montara Report, p.17 
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Similar sentiments were expressed against the extant regulatory system following the Macondo 
blowout in 2010. As part of measures to improve safety of offshore operations, the Deepwater 
Horizon Commission in its report advised as follows: 
“Government agencies that regulate offshore activity should reorient their regulatory 
approaches to integrate more sophisticated risk assessment and risk management 
practices into their oversight of energy developers operating offshore. They should shift 
their focus from prescriptive regulations covering only the operator to a foundation of 
augmented prescriptive regulations, including those relating to well design and 
integrity, supplemented by a proactive, risk-based performance approach that is specific 
to individual facilities, operations, and environments. This would be similar to the 
“safety case” approach that is used in the North Sea, which requires the operator and 
drilling rig owners to assess the risks associated with a specific operation, develop a 
coordinated plan to manage those risks, integrate all involved contractors in a safety 
management system, and take responsibility for developing and managing the risk 
management process.”16  
In the aftermath of the Macondo blowout the US immediately made administrative changes to 
the regulation of offshore operation to improve institutional capacity and oversight. The EU 
also adopted Directive 2013/30/EU on Safety of Offshore oil and gas operations and amending 
Directive 2004/35/EC Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore operations.17  
Furthermore, the issue of international rules on responsibility and liability for damage arising 
from offshore oil and gas E&P remains undefined. For instance, the transboundary impact of 
                                                          
16 Deepwater Horizon Commission Report to the President pp. 251-252 
17 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on Safety of Offshore 
oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC 
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the Montara spill on Indonesian waters is still unresolved despite attempts by the Indonesian 
government to get the operators to compensate Indonesian victims of the spill. 
The international community has always responded to major disasters with treaties and 
agreements to improve on safety and existing standards to forestall a repeat occurrence. Such 
response is evident in the area of protection of the marine environment, especially from 
maritime activities. Most offshore incidents have raised concerns about the safety of offshore 
operation and how best to prevent such accidents, emergency preparedness and response, and 
liability and compensation. The situation has also raised questions as follows: How best can 
the international community respond to issues of accidental pollution? Should international 
regulations be global or would regional agreements alone suffice? Various factors would 
influence the choice of regulatory option but any options that takes into consideration the 
protection of the marine environment and its biodiversity as a ‘common concern’ and achieve 
sustainable development18 of offshore petroleum operations would do. The 1992 Biodiversity 
Convention affirms that “conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of 
humankind”.19 It is also reflected in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC),20 which acknowledges that ‘change in the earth’s climate and its 
adverse effects are a common concern of humankind’.21 The term ‘common concern’ is 
relatively recent, considering that under the 1979 Bonn Convention conservation of wild 
animals is “for the good of mankind”22 while resources of the sea bed, ocean floor and subsoil 
                                                          
18 According to the World Commission on Environment and Development, sustainable development is 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” – WCED, Our Common Future (Oxford, 1987) 43 
19 Preamble of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 ILM 818 (1992) 
20 1771 UNTS 107, adopted on 9 May 1992 and inforce on 24 March 1994 
21 UNFCCC, para. 1 of preamble; See also UNGA Res. 43/53 (1988), 44/207 (1989) and 45/212 (1990) which 
acknowledged that climate change is a ‘common concern of humankind’ and rejecting Malta’s original proposed 
draft which described global climate as the ‘common heritage of mankind’ 
22 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 19 I.L.M. 15 (1980), preamble 
  
8 
 
are “the common heritage of mankind”.23 With increase in E&P activities in deep and ultra-
deep water around the globe and possibility of accidental pollution with transboundary 
consequences there is a real threat to marine biological diversity. Hence, the need for a strong 
international approach to the regulation of these activities and make them sustainable.  
Transboundary pollutions with global consequences are of ‘common concern’ to all States and 
call for the active participation and cooperation of all States.24  
 
1.1 Safety and Prevention of Accidents 
 
Accidents are mostly a product of poor safety observance. Regulations, guidelines and 
standards established by government and professional institutions are primarily focused on 
ensuring best practice and promoting safety of the operations of an industry. The essence of 
safety practices is to prevent accident and avoid damage to individuals, property and the 
environment. Hence, companies take seriously issues of safety in their operations. Safety 
breach which could be termed human error is responsible for some major accidents in the 
offshore industry.25 Where safety rules are breached, the operator would be held liable for any 
consequences and may be sanctioned by regulatory bodies.  
 
The liability that arises from a breach of safety rules or regulation is primarily based on the 
simple act of breach of statutory provisions, guidelines or industry best practices irrespective 
                                                          
23 UNGA Res. 2749 (XXV) of December 1970, 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and now the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS. See generally 
Philippe Sands, The Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edn, Cambridge) 286-287  (2003)   
24 Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law, (Ashgate Publishing, 2003) p. 5. 
Development in treaties and other instruments after the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development seems to reflect an acceptance of the fact that the protection of the environment and achieving 
sustainable development are “common concerns of humankind”. The IUCN in article 3 of its Draft Covenant on 
Environment and Development states that the “global environment is a common concern of humanity.” See 
David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy, (2nd edn, 
Foundation Press, 2002) p. 397-398 
25 Examples are the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster, 2009 Montara blowout. 
  
9 
 
of the level of damage caused by the breach. In which case same sanction for breach of safety 
regulations may be applied irrespective of the magnitude of pollution or environmental damage 
caused. However, there are instances where the breach of safety regulations may have 
implication on the amount of fine imposed for a particular breach. An example is the provision 
of fines under the US Clean Water Act26 where the fine would be increased for every barrel of 
crude spilled if the operator is found liable for gross negligence. Safety is enforced by the State 
which may impose criminal fine, suspend licenses and in some extreme cases withdraw 
licenses for its breach.   
 
There are acts that may have damaging effect on the environment but are acceptable as part of 
safety measures in offshore oil and gas operations. For instance, gas flaring which is a source 
of air pollution is accepted as important safety measure in offshore oil and gas production.27 
Acts undertaken as safety measures in operations may not be viewed as act of misconduct but 
operational pollution.  
 
Regulations aimed at preventing accidental pollution are predominately safety measures aimed 
at ensuring there are no major hazards. In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon, the EU 
adopted Directive 2013/30/EU on offshore Safety to prevent major hazards in offshore 
operations and minimize the consequences in the event of any occurrence. A breach of safety 
rules may lead to major hazards requiring emergency response and raise issues of liability and 
compensation. Hence, safety concerns are key in the regulation of accidental pollution from 
offshore petroleum E&P. 
 
                                                          
26 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1972), it allows penalties up to $1,100 per barrel, and up to $4,300 per barrel in the 
case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct. 
27 See World Bank Group, Environment, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 
April 2007, para 1.1, p.3 
  
10 
 
1.2 Accidental Pollution  
 
There is no one size fits all definition of pollution. Treaties on various subjects define or give 
an indication of what amounts to pollution in the context of that environment, activity or trade. 
In relation to marine environment, different instruments provide various definitions of 
pollution. At the global level the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)28 defines pollution of marine environment as:  
“the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious 
effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance 
to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment 
of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities.”29  
The basic element of expressed definition lies on the view point that substances that produce 
deleterious effects are introduced directly or indirectly into the marine environment. But the 
implication relates to its biodiversity and legitimate uses. Oil is a substance that can cause 
devastation to the environment and an accidental release of it would result in harmful effects, 
destroy marine biodiversity and distort its legitimate uses.  
The above definition is a reflection of Principle 7 of the 1972 United Nations Declaration on 
the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) 30  that calls on States to “take all possible 
steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human 
health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other 
legitimate uses of the sea.”  
                                                          
28 21 ILM 1261 (1982) 
29 UNCLOS, Art.1(4) 
30 11 ILM 1416 (1972), UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 59 (Stockholm Declaration) Principle 7 
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Regional treaties contain similar definitions of pollution. For instance the 1976 Convention for 
the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona Convention) 31 defines 
pollution as: 
“the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment, including estuaries, which results, or is likely to result, in such deleterious 
effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance 
to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment 
of quality for use of seawater and reduction of amenities.”32  
 
The 1994 Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and Subsoil33 (Offshore 
Protocol) provides no separate definition independent of that provided by the Convention. 
Similar definition is provided by the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (1992 Helsinki Convention).34 Under the 1992 Convention 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-east Atlantic (OSPAR 
Convention),35 pollution “means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances 
or energy into the maritime area which results, or is likely to result, in hazards to human health, 
harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other 
                                                          
31 1102 UNTS 27 (1976) entered into force on February 12, 1978 and was revised in 1995. When the revised 
one came into force 9 July 2004 it became referred to as Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean  
32 Barcelona Convention, Art.2(a) 
33 Adopted on October 14, 1994 and entered into force on March 24, 2011 ( commonly referred to as the 
Offshore Protocol) 
34 9 April 1992, came into force 17 January 2000 with ten state parties. Art. 2(1) defines it as “introduction by 
man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the sea, including estuaries, which are liable to create 
hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine ecosystems, to cause hindrance to legitimate uses 
of the sea including fishing, to impair the quality for use of sea water, and to lead to a reduction of amenities.”  
35 2354 UNTS 67 (1993) (entered into force on March 25, 1998) 
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legitimate uses of the sea.”36 Interestingly, the key elements of the definitions at global and 
regional levels are similar.  
  
The EU Directive on safety of offshore operations does not provide a definition of pollution. 
Conversely, it defines ‘major environmental incident’ which means ‘an incident which results, 
or is likely to result, in significant adverse effects on the environment in accordance with 
Directive 2004/35/EC.37 “Significant adverse effects” is termed ‘environmental damage’ and 
defined in Directive 2004/35/EC as, inter alia, “damage to protected species and natural 
habitats, which is any damage that has significant adverse effects on reaching or maintaining 
the favourable conservation status of such habitats or species.” In relation to water it means 
any damage that adversely affects the ecological, chemical and/or quantitative status and/or 
ecological potential of the waters concerned significantly.38 Accordingly ‘damage’ means “a 
measurable adverse change in a natural resource or measurable impairment of a natural 
resource service which may occur directly or indirectly”.39 
 
Accidental pollution in offshore oil and gas operations are mainly a product of major accidents. 
These represent incidents involving explosion, fire and loss of well control leading to blowouts, 
or release of oil, gas or dangerous substances with significant damage to environment, serious 
personal injury and sometimes fatalities.40    
In the context of this research, accidental pollution is the unintentional release of oil and gas 
substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely 
to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to 
                                                          
36 1992 OSPAR Convention, Art. 1(d) 
37 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.2(37) 
38 EU Directive 2004/35/EC, Art. 2(1) (a)&b) 
39 EU Directive 2004/35/EC, Art. 2(2) 
40 See definition of “major accident” in EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.2(1)  
  
13 
 
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the 
sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities. Consequently, 
emergency release of oil and gas or other dangerous substances as part of safety measures in 
offshore operation would not be considered as accidental pollution. 
 
1.3  Coastal State Jurisdiction over Offshore Resources  
 
States have right of permanent sovereignty over natural resources within their territories41 and 
the freedom to exploit them is well established.42 The 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf43 gave right to coastal States to construct, maintain and operate installations 
and other devices necessary for exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the 
continental shelf. A 500 metre safety zone is to be established around every installation with 
appropriate measures taken to protect living resources of the sea from harmful agents from the 
installation. However, the right over living and non-living resources, especially in the exercise 
of right to exploit natural resources of the seabed, and the corresponding obligation to protect 
and preserve the marine environment must be exercised within the ambit of international law. 
These natural resources include mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and 
subsoil.44 The rights over the seabed in the exclusive economic zone are defined in relation to 
the regime governing the continental shelf. But the economic importance of the continental 
shelf is underscored by the fact that irrespective of the absence of an exclusive economic zone, 
                                                          
41 Id., UNGA Res. 1803 (XVIII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources   
42 See UNGA Res. 626 (VII), Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources, text contained in 
Rauschning, Wiesbrock and Lailach (eds.) Key Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1946-1996 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) p. 318 (1997) 
43 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, 499 UNTS 311, in force 10 June 1964 
44 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 21 ILM 1261 (1982), Art.77 
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there can still be a continental shelf. On the contrary, there cannot be an exclusive economic 
zone without a corresponding continental shelf.45  
Presently, issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction over various areas of the sea are governed by 
the UNCLOS. Under UNCLOS a coastal State has competence to legislate in relation to, inter 
alia, the safety of navigation, the protection of navigational aids, cables and pipelines, the 
conservation of living resources, the preservation of the environment and the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution, as well as fiscal and immigration matters46 in the territorial 
sea.47 Within a zone contiguous to the territorial sea, which may extend no further than 24 miles 
from the baseline, coastal States may exercise control in relation to customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws.48 In the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that is not more than 
200 miles from the baseline49 a coastal State has sovereign rights over both living and non-
living natural resources. It has jurisdiction over the construction of artificial islands and 
installations, marine scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.50  
In relation to protection and preservation of the marine environment, a coastal State has both 
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction in respect of dumping,51 vessel pollution52 and 
pollution from sea-bed activities.53  
Sovereignty or sovereign rights are arguably not absolute. Countries must act within the limits 
of its international law obligations and by their sovereign status they have a corresponding duty 
                                                          
45 Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 ICJ Reports 4, 33, para. 34, see also Centre 
For Ocean Law and Policy, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. II, 
Nordquist (ed.) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) p.825-827 (1993) 
46 UNCLOS, Art 21(1) 
47 The territorial sea is 12 nautical miles from the baseline, see Art. 3 of UNCLOS 
48 Id, Art 33 
49 Id, Art. 57 
50 Id, Art. 56 
51 Id, Art. 210 (5) 
52 Id, Arts. 211(5) &(6), 220 and 234 
53 Id, Art, 208, 214 
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to respect the interest of other sovereign States.54   The sovereignty over living and non-living 
resources in a country’s territorial waters, EEZ and continental shelf expressed in the principle 
of permanent sovereignty of nations over their natural resources and wealth is also not absolute. 
It is subject to the State’s obligation not to cause environmental harm to the environment of 
others States or areas beyond national jurisdiction.55  
Offshore petroleum E&P is undertaken in a good number of countries and regions of the world. 
The Arctic environment that could face severe consequences in the event of any major hazard 
and pollution has also witnessed gradual increase in exploration activities.56 However, the 
adequacy of international regulation of these offshore activities to guarantee protection of 
marine environment within State jurisdiction and areas beyond national jurisdiction is not 
certain. The magnitude of the Macondo spill has challenged the efficacy of existing legal 
regimes in ensuring adequate safety in offshore petroleum operations and effective emergency 
response in the event of a major hazard. The question is, how protected is the ecosystem and 
biodiversity of the marine environment as more States in exercise of their right to resources in 
the continental shelf authorise more deep and ultra-deep water petroleum E&P? Also, in the 
event of a major hazard resulting in transboundary pollution, what are the remedies in 
international law for affected individuals and States as no State has yet successfully made claim 
for transboundary pollution from offshore petroleum operations?  
                                                          
54 See Corfu Channel Case, Merit Judgement, (1949) ICJ Reports 4, 39, 43 where Judge Alvarez observed that 
“We can no longer regards sovereignty as absolute and individual right of every state, as used to be the case 
under the old law founded on the individual regime, according to which states were only bound by the rules 
which they had accepted. Today owing to social interdependence and to the predominance of general interest, 
states are bound by many rules which have not been ordered by their will.” 
55 The locus classic case is the Trail Smelter Arbitration 3 RIAA 1907 (1941) which declared that “Under the 
principles of international law… no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as 
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties of another therein, when the case is of 
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.” This judicial 
pronouncement was amplified subsequently in Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration), 31 ILM 874 (1992) 
56 See Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska, 
Managing for the Future of a Rapidly Changing Arctic: A Report to the President (2013) on Arctic oil and gas 
developments in Alaska and the challenges 
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1.4 The Research Question  
 
From the foregoing the two part question for consideration in this research is: 
Whether the extant international legal regime adequately provides for prevention of accidental 
pollution, response to emergencies and liability and compensation arising from offshore 
petroleum exploration and exploitation activities? If not, what form of international legal 
framework might be deployed to remedy this gap in the legal regime on offshore petroleum 
exploration and production?  
The conjecture is that on the basis of a review of existing international law, it does not 
adequately address issues of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum exploration and 
exploitation. Therefore, there is need to put in place an international framework that will 
substantially and effectively address issues relating to or connected with accidental pollution 
from offshore petroleum operations. 
 
1.5 Aims of the Research 
 
The research is focused on achieving two things. First, through a comprehensive analysis of 
the international legal regime governing offshore petroleum E&P in the global context and in 
major regions like the North-East Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea and Baltic Sea identify gaps in 
provisions for prevention of accidental pollution, emergency response and liability and 
compensation. With the global increase in offshore petroleum E&P and the realities of an ever 
present possibility of disaster associated with offshore operations a comprehensive study of the 
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international legal regime to identify shortcomings is important. Especially, when the 
regulatory framework has been a contributory factor to the occurrence of offshore accidents.57  
Based on identified gaps in international law, the second aim is to proffer options for effective 
international legal framework for prevention of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum 
E&P, emergency response and liability and compensation. The international legal framework 
should take into consideration developing and small resource rich countries and regions which 
lack political will and institutional capacity to enact firm regulations and enforce them against 
rich and influential international oil companies (IOCs). They should also be guided by the need 
to protect marine biodiversity as a common concern of all States.   
 
1.6 Significance and Justification of the Research 
 
This investigation has become relevant and timely as the echoes of the Macondo blowout signal 
a new round of regulatory and contractual changes in a bid to improve safety of offshore 
petroleum operations to prevent similar occurrence; minimise consequences of major hazards 
through improved emergency preparedness and response; and provide a workable liability and 
compensation regime. In the circumstance, action should be focused on having a robust 
international legal framework.  
 
1.6.1 Safety and Prevention of Accidental Pollution 
Preventing accidents in industrial activities involves a great deal of deliberate and consistent 
actions to ensure safe operations. Some of these actions are environmental monitoring, 
                                                          
57 See the Deepwater Horizon report, Chapter Three pp.67, 72-78, 84-85 and Chapter Four pp.126-127; the 
Montara Commission report, pp 113-114, 126 (para 3.255), 128 (para.3.262), 121-123, 138-147 and most 
especially, pp.148-149 
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environmental auditing, environmental performance evaluation (Industry based initiatives), 
major hazard reporting58 and the requirement to carry out environmental impact assessment 
that are relevant for the prevention of pollution59. Other environmental standards are – 
Environmental Management Plan and Environmental Information reporting and the minimum 
parameters for doing these are essential.  
International regulations similar to what is obtainable in other industries like maritime are 
necessary in providing global minimum standards60  for the offshore petroleum industry. Such 
international standards could be set through regional or global instruments. While a global 
instrument might have a wider coverage for sustainable protection of the marine environment 
there is the concern that concrete commitment to safety might be lost in an attempt to 
accommodate numerous interests in the establishment of a global minimum. On the contrary, 
regional treaties are easier to negotiate as there are fewer parties and the circumstances of 
countries in the region are alike. In that case having higher standards as a minimum is 
achievable. While this may be true of regions with predominantly developed countries same 
may not be the case in developing regions. Some regions may end up without a negotiated 
agreement or treaty on the subject. Therefore, an act of balancing is needed to determine the 
best option for international regulation of offshore petroleum E&P to achieve the desired 
robustness.  
Issues of safety and prevention of accidental pollution from offshore oil and gas operations 
have become key following recent series of disasters. Some States have made changes to the 
                                                          
58 The major hazard reporting requirement is being introduced by the European Commission following the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster of April 2010.  
59 Pulp Mill on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) case, ICJ Report (2010), para. 204 
60 A global minimum should be that standard of operation below which would be unacceptable for offshore oil 
and gas operations worldwide. Such global minimum standards could be set through the application of defined 
‘best available technique’, ‘best environmental practice’ and by reference to acceptable international best 
practice, guidelines and recommendations of respected professional institutes such as the American Petroleum 
Institute (API), British Standard Institute (BSI) and International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
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conditions for authorisation of offshore operations and regulations on health, safety and 
environment.61 For instance, in response to the findings contained in the Montara Commission 
report, Australia enacted the Offshore Petroleum and Green House Gas Storage Amendment 
(Compliance Measures) Act No. 11 of 2013 (Compliance Measures Act No.1).62 The Act aims 
to strengthen the offshore petroleum regulatory regime with respect to compliance, safety, 
integrity and environmental management objectives. In particular the Act enables NOPSEMA 
inspectors to access offshore facilities without prior notification for inspections relating to 
compliance, operational and environmental standards (Schedule 1 part 2, Clause 4).63 The 
European Commission emphasised the need for international cooperation and adopted the 
Directive on safety of offshore operations. It also concluded Union approval of accession to 
the 1994 Offshore Protocol to the Barcelona Convention on behalf of members of the Union 
within the Mediterranean region.64 
Based on the 2009 Montara and 2010 Macondo incidents the present study looks at the 
international regulatory framework, assesses their adequacy and recommends options for 
improved regulation of offshore operations globally for sustainable protection of the marine 
environment and related interests. A fair level of parity in standards of operation that guarantees 
adequate safety globally is desired. The challenge is whether it is achievable and how to strike 
                                                          
61 Some of these are the US Offshore drilling safety rules 2012 that will reduce the risk of blowouts but 
estimated to cost the industry additional US$130.7 million annually ( rules released on 15 August 2012), the EU 
Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore operations, UK Offshore Petroleum Activities (Oil Pollution 
Prevention and Control) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, Regulations relating to Health, safety and the 
Environment in the Petroleum Activities and at Certain Onshore Facilities (The Framework Regulation) 2011 
and the Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill 2012 
62 Was passed on 28 February 2013 and assented to on 14 March 2013, Act available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2013A00011 
63 NOPSEMA, Recent Changes to Legislation available at http://www.nopsema.gov.au/legislation-and-
regulations/recent-changes-to-legislation/ 
64 Brussels, 27.10.2011, COM(2011) 690 final, 2011/0304 (NLE), “Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the 
accession of the European Union to the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution 
resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil” available on 
line at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0690:FIN:EN:PDF accessed 16 
August 2012. 
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the balance in a world where nations are more protective of their economic interest than global 
environmental protection. 
 
1.6.2 Emergency Response 
 
Following the Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989, the 1990 International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC)65 was adopted. The Convention 
has ample provisions to encourage international response to marine pollution. But to some 
extent the needed response is subject to the judgement of individual nations.66  Considering the 
fact that not every country and region has the necessary personnel and requisite equipment to 
contribute and respond to emergencies this may lead to inconsistencies in response quality. For 
example, while the US, Norway and UK are focused on improving safety and emergency 
response in their offshore industries, developing countries, like Nigeria in the gulf of Guinea, 
seem to focus on ways to attract investors in the oil and gas sector.67 There are some regional 
agreements on emergency response such as the Bonn Agreement68 under the OSPAR regime 
which is applicable whenever there is grave and imminent danger of pollution of a 
transboundary nature.69 There is an expected level of coordination and cooperation in case of 
possible transboundary pollution.70 
However, given the magnitude of the Macondo spill and the challenges that confronted rescue 
efforts, the provisions on emergency response under the OPRC might need review to adapt 
                                                          
65 30 ILM 733 
66 Id, Arts 6(2) and 7 as an example uses the phrases “within its capability” and “subject to their capability and 
the availability of relevant resources.” See also Art 9(2) 
67 In a bid to encourage offshore E&P Nigeria granted IOCs 10 year free royalty period for deep water 
operations. Nigeria’s current focus in the oil and gas industry is the passage of a new petroleum industry bill 
into law and hoping that the law will boost foreign investment in the oil and gas sector of the economy and 
environmental protection is not prioritised. 
68 Available at http://www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/welcome.html  accessed on 25 May 2012 
69 Bonn Agreement, Art. 1 
70 Ibid, Art. 32 
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better to major hazard in offshore oil and gas E&P. This research provides the needed analysis 
of existing emergency response provisions to determine their relevance and efficacy in a post-
Macondo era and provides options for improvement. The outcome will enhance determination 
of improvements that might be needed in future agreements in this regard.   
 
1.6.3 Liability and Compensation 
 
Liability could be absolute, strict or fault based. Regimes dealing with dangerous activities and 
substances impose strict and or absolute liability on parties responsible for accidental 
pollution.71 However, in relation to accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operation, 
there is no global instrument clearly providing for the type and channelling of liability. More 
so, liability cap and equal access to justice that guarantees prompt payment of compensation. 
These issues also vary from region to region and from country to country. The 1977 Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation 
of Seabed Mineral Resources (CLEE)72 which establishes a legal framework on liability failed 
to receive the required assent to come into force. Boyle argues that the fear of possible radical 
changes to national tort law is a reason for the reluctance.73 In the apparent void, there is the 
Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL),74 an industry initiative that provides for key 
elements of a good liability regime- strict liability, compulsory insurance, liability cap and easy 
claim process. But how far OPOL can go as a private initiative remains an open question.  
                                                          
71 Nuclear substances and space activities are unanimously seen as dangerous activities but oil and gas activities 
seem not to have gained universal acceptability as very dangerous activity.  
72 16 ILM 1451 (1977) Not in force 
73 Boyle, A. E., Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of national and International Law, Vol.17 
(1) J. Env. L. 3 (2005) 
74 It currently has the 2010 version that is available at http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/opol-agreement-
oct10.pdf  accessed 26 may 2012. 
  
22 
 
While it is trite that transboundary harm is prohibited under international law, the extent to 
which a State may be held responsible and the nature and level of the operator’s liability when 
the harm is transboundary is not settled.75 Article 235 of UNCLOS creates a distinction 
between a State’s liability for failure to fulfil its obligation to protect the marine environment 
and liability attached to natural or juridical person for marine pollution. In practice, States are 
hardly held liable for transboundary environmental damage resulting from activities in their 
territories and there is almost no state practice. An exercise of due diligence by taking all 
necessary and appropriate steps to secure effective compliance with the provisions of the 
Convention seems to be all that is needed.76 However, States owe a duty to the international 
community to provide recourse for victims to be adequately compensated by the individuals or 
entities responsible for the damage.77   
The absence or lack of uniform liability requirements create uncertainty for both operators and 
victims of accidental pollution. For instance, while BP was confronted with the possibility of 
being fined about US$20 billion for spilling about 5 million barrels of oil in the Macondo 
incident, Chevron was initially faced with a threat of US$10 billion fine for spilling about 3000 
barrels in Brazil.78 For victims, especially in a transboundary context, it is a tortuous venture 
to claim against the country of origin or the private operator. Furthermore, despite Indonesia’s 
desire to get compensation for her citizens affected by the 2009 Montara spill it has not been 
able to file any formal claim against PTTEP Australasia, the operator responsible for the 
                                                          
75 Brunnee, J., Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as Tools for 
Environmental Protection, ICLQ 351 p.353  (2004) 
76 UNCLOS, Art.139. See Birnie, P., Boyle, A. and Redgwell, C., International Law and the Environment, 3rd 
ed. (Oxford University Press) p.430 (2009) 
77 UNCLOS, Art. 235(2) 
78 Chevron finally paid a US$17.3 million fine, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/28/chevron-pays-fine-for-oil_n_1922950.html#slide=1255346 
accessed on 30 October, 2012. BP under a plea bargain settled for a fine of US$4.5billion, see BP Announces 
Resolution of All Criminal and Securities Claims by U.S. Government Against Company Relating to Deepwater 
Horizon Accident, available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7080497 
accessed on 21 November 2012 
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incident. Complaints filed by Indonesia in 2010 were disputed79 and PTTEP alleged that the 
facts were inconsistent.80 Though Indonesia in 2014 formally requested the cooperation of 
Australia in resolving the dispute over liability for damage to Indonesian waters, Australia 
appears not keen on giving the necessary cooperation.81  
Some countries like Nigeria lack adequate domestic legal regime to hold offshore operators 
accountable for accidental pollution. This paves way for arbitrary imposition of fines and award 
of damages by both the regulators and the legislature which, more often than not, are challenged 
by the IOCs.82 While BP has spent billions of US dollars in settling claims arising from the 
Macondo spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Shell in Nigeria has not paid any sum to individuals and 
communities affected by the 2011 Bonga spill in the Gulf of Guinea.83 Also, in the Ixtoc I 
blowout though there was damage to United States environment Mexico refused to accept 
responsibility and complaints were eventually resolved in civil claims.84 Thus the issue of legal 
standing to bring a claim and the proper defendant to sue is fundamental in the case of 
transboundary harm.      
                                                          
79 Indonesia Plans to Litigate the Montara Oil Spill Incident to the International Court of Justice, English 
Hukum 2 September 2010 available at http://en.hukumonline.com/pages/lt4c7e9fb17dbbe/indonesia-plans-to-
litigate-the-montara-oil-spill-incident-to-the-international-court-of-justice, see also The Jakata Globe, Indonesia 
Demands $2.4 billion Payout over Montara Oil Spill available at 
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/indonesia-demands-24-billion-payout-over-montara-oil-spill/ 
80 PTTEP Australasia, PTTEP AA remains committed to reaching a mutually agreed resolution with the 
Government of Indonesia, Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.au.pttep.com/media/20778/government%20of%20indonesia%20compensation%20claim.pdf  
81 George Roberts, ‘Montara oil spill: Indonesia requests Australia’s cooperation on resolving dispute over 
impact on coastal communities’, ABC News, 30 September 2014, available on line at 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-29/indonesia-pleads-for-australias-cooperation-on-montara-oil-
spill/5777840 last visited 03 February 2015; Australian Lawyers Alliance, ‘Five years on- and still no justice on 
Montara oil spill’ available at http://www.lawyersalliance.com.au/news/five-years-on-still-no-justice-on-
montara-oil-spill last visited 03 February 2015  
82 For instance the Nigerian House of Representative directed Shell to pay US$3.6 billion for Bonga spill, see 
Asoko Insight, 28 November 2014, available at  http://asokoinsight.com/news/2011-bonga-oil-spill-reps-ask-
shell-pay-3-6-billion-compensation-penalty-nigeria/ last visited 13 September 2015 
83 Nigerian Tribune, FG Battles Shell over non-payment of Bonga spill fine, 19 August 2015, available at 
http://tribuneonlineng.com/fg-battles-shell-over-non-payment-bonga-spill-fine last visited 13 September 2015 
84 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, supra note 76, p.431. See also Smith, Brian D., State Responsibility and the 
Marine Environment (Clarendon Press, Oxford) p.117 (1988) 
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Generally, the research examines the extent to which international law has responded to recent 
incidents like Montara blowout and Deepwater Horizon. It will ascertain if those changes 
actually address the needed regulatory challenges for offshore petroleum E&P as operations go 
further to deep and ultra-deep waters. The research takes a path that is seen by many 
contributors to be a closed or unnecessary route as they posit that offshore oil and gas activities 
are better regulated by regional agreements and national laws only. Those contributors lay less 
emphasis on the crucial role a global regulatory framework could play in improving safety and 
preventing accidental pollution from offshore petroleum installations in many developing 
regions of the world and delicate environments like the arctic.  
Developed regions and States may effectively regulate offshore petroleum operations to ensure 
safety in the absence of global regulations. Same may not be applicable in developing States 
and regions such as Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea that lack political will, institutional capacity 
and legal framework needed to ensure the safety of offshore operations, protect the 
environment and guarantee justice for affected individuals.  
 
1.7 Analytical Framework 
 
A cardinal reason for regulating activities that have negative impact on the environment is to 
make it safe and prevent environmental disasters.  The focus of legal regimes for offshore oil 
and gas E&P is to promote safety and prevent accidents/major hazards. Therefore, the 
analytical framework is built around the principle of prevention. Prevention in global context 
entails cooperation, environmental monitoring, environmental auditing and environmental 
performance evaluation (Industry based initiatives) and major hazard reporting. Also, the 
requirement to carry out environmental impact assessment, environmental information 
reporting and environmental management plan are relevant to prevention of pollution.  
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While regulation of business activities is imperative to safeguard public health, safety and 
environment, there is the fear of having unreasonable regulation and its attendant harmful 
effect. Bardach and Kagan theorised during the pro-regulation movement era of 1970-80s that 
increased amount of protective regulation can bring about unexpected consequences that work 
against the regulatory goal.85 But they posit that some level of regulation is necessary as 
“neither market pressure, the desire for good public image, nor the ‘voice’ of safety and 
environmental engineers is entirely sufficient to produce regulatory compliance.”86 Moreover, 
Bardach and Kagan acknowledged that though some companies might self-regulate effectively 
but, typically, regulatory schemes cover a range of companies having widely disparate 
resources that affect their ability to self-regulate.87  
Also, companies’ attitudes are different in relation to regulatory compliance.88 Accordingly 
“good apples” are inclined to comply with regulations because they have a long-term interest 
in maintaining a positive corporate image, preventing lawsuits, and avoiding the stigma of 
being labelled a company that flouts safety or environmental standards.89 On the contrary, “bad 
apples” are guided by short-term interests and resist regulation because of the cost or 
inconvenience of compliance.90 Bardach and Kagan conclude that while good apples may act 
just the same without regulatory oversight, some level of oversight is necessary to set a 
minimum standard for bad apples’ behaviour.91 
Though, Bardach and Kagan’s hypothesis is based on domestic regulations and the implication 
on national companies, it could be applied to the context of international regulation of offshore 
                                                          
85 Eugene Bardach and Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness 
(Temple University Press, 1982) IX 
86 Ibid, p.62 
87 Ibid, p.62 
88 Ibid, p.64 
89 Ibid  
90 Ibid, p.65 
91 Ibid  
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petroleum activities. There are countries that will always put in place considerable level of 
safety regulations to prevent accidents from offshore petroleum installation in the absence of 
global and or regional binding instruments. On the other hand, there are some nations whose 
legal systems, regulatory institutions and enforcement mechanisms are so weak that without 
global and regional binding instruments that set basic standards, operators may exploit such 
weaknesses for economic gains to the detriment of the marine environment and population. 
This may expose offshore operations to catastrophic incidents that are ordinarily avoidable.   
Therefore, relevant global treaties and regional agreements together with regulatory response 
by EU in response to recent offshore incidents would be analysed with the parameters of the 
principle of prevention to ascertain their adequacy. Also, provisions on emergency 
preparedness and response and liability and compensation would be reviewed at global and 
regional levels. This is to determine the level and nature of international regulatory framework 
that will sufficiently and effectively address accidental pollution in offshore petroleum 
operations.92 
At the global level, hard and soft law instruments were critically analysed. There are a few 
regional sea conventions, most of which were facilitated by UNEP. But the research focused 
on the Northeast Atlantic, Baltic Sea and Mediterranean Sea regions as examples of developed 
regional regimes on offshore petroleum operations as bench mark of regional regulations. The 
reason being that, first, offshore petroleum activities take place in the territories of many of the 
member States of these regions; second, these regional sea agreements all date back to the 
1970s and have undergone amendments in response to growing environmental awareness; and 
third, most of the State parties to these regional agreements are developed countries and many 
are members of the European Union (EU) and subject to EU regulations and directives. The 
                                                          
92 Hall, L., Calling on experts: industry's perspective on the regulatory response to the BP blowout, IELR. (2012) 
95, 107 
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EU Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore petroleum operations would be analysed 
alongside these regional agreements to give an indication of what recent legal regime in a post 
Macondo era offers in relation to prevention of accidents, emergency response and liability and 
compensation.   
The EU Directive is very relevant in the analysis as it is the only detailed international 
instrument successfully negotiated and adopted in response to the Macondo blowout of 20 
April 2010. Moreover, it is an instrument that covers more than a single sea region. The EU 
Directive on safety of offshore operations is applicable to all Member States of the Helsinki 
Convention except Russia. By implication, a great proportion of the Baltic Sea would be 
influenced by regulations that reflect the desired standard and goal of the EU Directive. Twelve 
of the fifteen OSPAR Convention member States are also members of the European Union.93 
Of the three non EU members, Norway that has serious offshore petroleum activities is known 
to have effective legal regime. In the Mediterranean Sea region, eight of the contracting parties 
to the Barcelona Convention are EU Member States94 that are required to implement the EU 
Directive. But, parties to the Barcelona Convention who are not members of the European 
Union, are not bound by the EU directive.95 
Private industry initiatives in addressing some of these issues will also be explored. A good 
example is OPOL in the North Sea. 
In addition to the principle of prevention, elements of polluter pays and precautionary 
principles would be brought to bear on the analysis. This is because curtailment of 
environmental risk is the common denominator of the polluter pays, prevention and 
                                                          
93 The three non EU members are Iceland, Norway and Switzerland  
94 The EU Member States are Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovenia and Spain 
95 The non-EU members are Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Monaco, 
Monaco, Morocco, Montenegro, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.  
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precautionary principles and as such may be applied in the same regime.96 Ordinarily, a 
regulatory regime could be made to be anticipatory, preventive and curative in its approach to 
protection of marine environment.  
 
1.8  Methodology  
 
The research seeks to identify gaps in the international legal framework in relation to accidental 
pollution from offshore petroleum operation and suggest how to achieve a robust international 
legal regime at all levels to fill such lacuna as regards prevention, emergency preparedness and 
response, and liability and compensation. To this end, the research would involve analysis of 
relevant global legal instruments and regional agreements, especially those that are binding and 
in force.   
The account is analytical in its detailed and critical examination as well as appraisal of the 
major issues and trends. Vertically the research is focused on three issues; prevention of 
pollution from offshore installation, emergency response to accidents and liability and 
compensation for pollution damage. These vertical issues will be analysed at the global and 
regional levels using the preventive, polluter pays and precautionary principles as analytical 
tools.  
The research methodology is based on the jurisprudential approach of deductive logical 
reasoning, combining qualitative and explanatory case-studies. Furthermore, there would be 
analysis by analogy to the shipping industry’s regulation of oil tankers and other regimes 
governing dangerous activities such as nuclear energy. This is to aid the process of identifying 
regulatory regimes that could be guide to development of robust international legal framework 
                                                          
96 De Sadeleer, Nicholas, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford Press) 
p.369 (2005) 
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on safety and prevention of accidents in offshore petroleum E&P, emergency response and 
liability and compensation.  
 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The research is an examination of the extant international legal regime with a view to 
determining the adequacy or efficacy in addressing issues related to and arising from accidental 
pollution. These are prevention, emergency response, and liability and compensation. The 
thesis is structured in seven chapters.  
Chapter one is the general introduction that presents the background and problem of the 
research. It introduces the research question, the analytical framework and methodology 
employed in resolving the research question. Also, the chapter gives the aim, significance, 
justification and expected academic contribution of the research.  
Chapter two is a synopsis of the existing international legal regime on offshore petroleum 
operations, thus providing an idea of the current state of international regulation on the subject. 
It also sets out the parameters of the analytical tools- prevention, precautionary and polluter 
pays principles and a mention on the legal status of offshore installations. Chapter three is an 
overview of the technical and environmental aspects of offshore petroleum operations, 
including the impact of operational discharges such as chemicals, drilling cuttings and 
associated pollutants on the marine ecosystem and biodiversity. It also provides concise 
description of offshore petroleum installations used in various depth of water, the devastating 
consequences of accidental pollution on marine biodiversity, persons and businesses dependent 
on marine environment.  
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Chapter four addresses in detail the fundamental issue of prevention of accidental pollution 
from offshore petroleum installations. In view of the obligation of States to prevent harm to the 
marine environment within jurisdiction and to areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 
relevant international treaties are examined to ascertain the extent of regulations in place for 
prevention of pollution from offshore petroleum activities and gaps identified. Identification of 
basic elements of prevention in the treaties is done to ascertain their adequacy in relation to 
offshore petroleum E&P.  
Chapter five focuses on emergency preparedness and response in the event of accident in an 
offshore installation. The preventive element of cooperation, notification and expertise 
necessary for emergency response are analysed in global and regional instruments. The 
adequacy of the OPRC in response to spill in the magnitude of Macondo spill is examined, 
limitations are identified and possible areas of improvements are suggested.  
Accidents have impact on environment, businesses and individuals which raise issues of 
liability and compensation. Therefore, chapter six takes a broad look at these issues in offshore 
petroleum E&P, especially when there is transboundary harm. The extent of State 
responsibility for accidental pollution resulting in transboundary damage is also examined. Key 
aspects of liability like nature of liability, cap on liability and insurance/guarantee and their 
adequacy in the prevailing circumstances of offshore operation is analysed in relation to the 
extant international legal regime. Furthermore, an appraisal of OPOL and its relevance as a 
private industry initiative in addressing liability arising from offshore petroleum operations is 
done.  
Based on the findings from the analysis of issues in chapters four to six and the identified 
strengths and weaknesses of the extant international legal framework, chapter seven provides 
recommendations for achieving robust international regulation of offshore petroleum activities 
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to improve safety and prevent accidental pollution globally. Also, regulatory options for 
improved emergency response and liability regime, especially in a transboundary context are 
proposed. This includes ways to make OPOL or its concept have wider international 
application than it does presently.   
Chapter seven also contains the general conclusion which sums up the thesis. It would 
accentuate the need for a robust international legal framework that addresses safety to prevent 
accidental pollution in offshore petroleum E&P, ensure effective response and access to justice 
that guarantees adequate and prompt payment of compensation even in transboundary cases.  
 
1.10 Expected Contribution  
 
This research would expand the existing body of knowledge by first making a novel strong 
case for global treaties to regulate offshore petroleum operations. Secondly, it would establish 
that unlike the shipping industry where international regulations may solely be used to address 
safety of shipping and maritime claims, independent of the flag State, offshore petroleum E&P 
could be different. It would need a cooperative and effective domestic legal regime backed by 
capable and credible domestic institutions with highly skilled and motivated personnel to 
guarantee safety of offshore petroleum operations and prevent accidental pollution. Also, an 
international legal framework must guarantee equal access to justice and ensure adequate and 
prompt settlement of liabilities in the event of accidental pollution, especially in a 
transboundary context. Third, a robust international legal regime would require all three levels 
of legislation- global, regional and national to be effective in addressing accidental pollution 
in a growing global industry and ultimately guarantee protection of the marine environment 
and its biodiversity.
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CHAPTER TWO 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON 
ACCIDENTAL POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE PETROLEUM 
OPERATIONS 
 
2.0 Introduction  
 
The Rio+20 Summit recognized that “oceans, seas and coastal areas form an integrated and 
essential component of the Earth’s ecosystem and are critical to sustaining it”.1 Pollution is one 
of the identified threats to this vast marine environment.2 There are many sources of marine 
pollution among which is offshore petroleum E&P.3 Though many chemicals are used in 
offshore petroleum operations, the main pollutant that arises from such operations is oil.  
As petroleum E&P activities progress further into deep and ultra-deep waters, such operations 
have become increasingly challenging and present a continuous threat to the marine 
environment. A range of international treaties are in place at global and regional levels to 
protect the marine environment against pollution from various sources.4 The beginning of 
                                                          
1 Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (20-22 June 2012), The Future We Want 
A/Conf.216/L.1, Paragraph 158 (2012) 
2 Other identified threats to marine environment are climate change, overfishing, habitat loss and introduction of 
invasive species. See Nellemann, C., Hain, S. and Alder, J. (eds.), In Dead Water – Merging of Climate Change 
with Pollution, Over-Harvest, and Infestations in the World’s Fishing Grounds (UNEP) p.26 (2008); 
International Programme on the State of the Ocean, Implementing the State of the Oceans Report, p.14-19 
(2011);  Sands, Philippe and Peel, Jacqueline, with Fabra, Adriana and MacKenzie, Ruth, Principles of 
International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition)p. 342 (2012) 
3 Others are land based sources, untreated sewage, eutrophication, hazardous substances like persistent organic 
pollutants (POP), siltation, invasive species, heavy metals and radioactive substances and acidification. See  
Sands, P., et al, supra note 2, p. 346 
4 Pollution from dumping, see the 1972 London Dumping Convention (adopted 29 December 1972 and into 
force 30 August 1975, 11 ILM 1294 (1972)) and 1996 Protocol to the London Convention (adopted 7 November 
1996 and in force 24 March 2006, 36 ILM 1 (1997)) and Annexes IV and V of MARPOL 73/78; Pollution from 
land-based sources including through the atmosphere, see Agenda 21, UNCED Report, A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 
(Vol.1) (1993), Chapter 17, paras. 17.24 – 17.29; 1974 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
Land-Based Sources 13 ILM 352 (1974) (adopted 4 June 1974, in force 6 May 1978), 1992 OSPAR Convention 
and other regional sea conventions including UNEP Regional Sea Protocols; on Pollution from vessels, see 
MARPOL 73/78  and 2001 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ship 
(AFS) (adopted 5 October 2001 and in force 17 September 2008) AFS/CONF/26, 2004 International 
Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (adopted 13 February 2004, 
not in force) IMO Doc. BWM/CONF/36 and 2009 International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally 
Sound Recycling of Ships (adopted in Hong Kong 15 May 2009, not in force)   
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international initiative to regulate marine pollution from oil might be traced to the 1926 
Washington Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution in Navigable Waters.5 The conference 
produced a document that metamorphosed into the 1954 International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil.6   
In 1958 three conventions relevant to marine pollution were adopted. Namely, the 1958 High 
Seas Fishing and Conservation Convention;7 Continental Shelf Convention8 and High Seas 
Convention.9 The Continental Shelf Convention stipulates 500 metres safety zone for 
installation on the continental shelf. To ensure that installations do not constitute hazard to 
navigation and prevent accident or marine collision, the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention 
provides that due notice must be given of the presence of any installation on the continental 
shelf and complete removal of abandoned and disused installations.10 This is to ensure that they 
do not constitute hazard to navigation. Article 24 of the High Seas Convention makes it 
obligatory for States to have legislation “to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil 
from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its 
subsoil” in consonance with any existing convention on the subject. In addition, States are to 
cooperate with the competent international organisations to prevent pollution from activities 
involving radioactive materials and other harmful agents.11 
                                                          
5 See Report of the Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution in Navigable Waters, 8-16 June 1926(US 
Government Printing Office) (1926) ; Sands P., et al, supra note 2, p.348    
6 327 UNTS 3, (came into force on 26 July 1958) as amended in 1962, 1969 and 1971 
7 559 UNTS 285 adopted on 29 April 1958 (came into force on 20 March 1966), Article 1(2) provides that “all 
States have the duty to adopt, or to cooperate with other States in adopting, such measures for their respective 
nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.” 
8 499 UNTS 311 (adopted 29 April 1958 and came into force on 10 June 1964). It defined the continental shelf 
“as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the 
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits 
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine 
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.”  
9 450 UNTS 82 (adopted on 29 April 1958 and came into force 30 September 1962) 
10 Id., Art.5(3) and (5)  
11 Id., Art. 25(2) 
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In response to major sea disasters, mostly in the shipping industry various legal instruments 
were adopted12 at international and regional levels to protect the marine environment from oil 
pollution. But there was no global or regional convention that specifically and directly 
addressed pollution arising from offshore petroleum E&P before the 1990s. However, a 
number of treaties attempted to address pollution from offshore installations and artificial 
islands without detailed and specific focus on petroleum E&P structures.13 
There are international instruments that provide non-binding obligations to protect the marine 
environment against pollution from offshore oil and gas activities. For instance, the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration called on States to “take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the 
seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources 
and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.”14 
There was a close succession of events that followed the Stockholm Declaration at the global 
and regional levels.15 The United Nations Environment Programme established its Regional 
Seas Programme in 1976. These events culminated in the 1982 adoption of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which addressed, with some level of 
comprehensiveness, the issue of pollution of the marine environment by establishing 
framework rules and standards of global application in Part XII.16   
                                                          
12 The 1969 Intervention Convention was adopted in response to the 1967 Torrey Canyon accident. This 
Convention metamorphosed to the 1971 Civil Liability Convention and Fund Convention and finally to the 
1992 Civil Liability Convention and Fund Convention following incidents like the Amoco Cadiz in 1978, the 
Exxon Valdez in 1989 while the ill-fated Prestige incident of 2002 prompted various amendment to MARPOL 
73/78 and the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) 
13 MARPOL 73/78 and UNCLOS which provides some framework provisions in Part XII are among such 
international treaties. 
14 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 7 
15 In December 1972 a global Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter (1972 London Convention) was adopted, 1046 UNTS 120, in force 30 August 1975; regional 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (1972 Oslo Dumping 
Convention), 932 UNTS 3, into force on 7 April 1974. IMO saw through the adoption of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships in 1973 (MARPOL 73) and a Protocol in 1978, with a 
combination of both referred to as MARPOL 73/78.  
16 Sands, P., et al, note 2, p.349 
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The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,17 though a soft law, has over 
time influenced the content and interpretation of other international environmental law 
instruments. It contains important declarations on the protection of the environment that are 
applicable to marine pollution resulting from offshore oil and gas E&P. There are institutional 
guidelines and standards and private agreements that are also very relevant. These are 
instruments such as World Bank Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Offshore 
Oil and Gas Development, UNEP Environmental Law Guidelines and Principles on Offshore 
Mining and Drilling, and industry guidelines and standards of professional institutions like 
American Petroleum Institute (API). 
This chapter gives an overview of global and regional legal regimes currently in place to 
address the issue of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum exploration and exploitation. 
It will be viewed from the angles of binding instruments and non-binding but persuasive 
instruments. These instruments are analysed on the basis of their relevance to prevention of 
accidental pollution in offshore petroleum operations and the consequential issues of 
emergency response, liability and compensation. Hence, the environmental principle of 
prevention and the twin principles that aid pollution prevention -polluter pays and 
precautionary principles would be the analytical tools.   
 
2.1 The Principle of Prevention  
 
The principle of prevention in international law can be traced to the Trail Smelter Arbitration18 
ruling that was re-echoed in Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of Rio 
                                                          
17 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 31 ILM 874 (1992) 
18 Handl, G, ‘Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International Law’1 YbIEL 1 
(1990); Lammers, J.G., ‘International and European Community Law: Aspects of Pollution of International 
Watercourses’ in W. Lang, H. Neuhold and K. Zemanek (eds), Environmental protection and International Law 
(London: Graham and Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff) 117 (1991) 
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Declaration. The principle of prevention has now assumed the status of customary international 
law.19 Thus States are bound to observe due diligence to prevent transboundary pollution.20 
As a customary rule, the principle of prevention originates from the due diligence that is 
expected of States in their territories and is closely connected to procedural requirements such 
as the need for environmental impact assessment.21 The diligence obligation demands not just 
the adoption of appropriate rules and measures but equally a given level of vigilance in their 
enforcement. Also, the employment of administrative controls applicable to both public and 
private operators, such as supervision of activities by operators to protect other parties and 
public interests.22  
The principle of prevention may manifest itself in different forms, including penalties and 
application of liability rules.23 It is supported by a wide range of domestic environmental 
protection regulations that establish procedures for authorisation, and also international and 
national environmental standards.24 Practices like environmental monitoring, auditing and 
performance evaluation, major hazard reporting25 and the requirement to carry out 
                                                          
19 Kiss, A. and Shelton, D, International Environmental Law (London: Graham & Trotman) 130 (1991); Taylor, 
P., An Ecological Approach to International Law (London: Routledge) 88 (1998) 
20 Zemanek, K., ‘State Responsibility and Liability’ in W. Lang, H. Neuhold and K. Zemanek (eds), 
Environmental protection and International Law (London: Graham and Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff) 192 (1991) 
21 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 45-46, paras. 101 
and 204, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf last visited 13 January 2015 
22 Id., para. 197 
23 The IMO has over the years championed the use of liability and compensation as tools for the prevention of 
marine pollution which is a very significant contribution from the IMO, See Mensah, Thomas A., “Prevention of 
Marine Pollution: The Contribution of IMO” in Pollution of the Sea – Prevention and Compensation, Basedow, 
Jurgen and Magnus Ulrich (eds), Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, Vol.10 (Springer Link) 41 at 59-60 
(2007). According to Wolfrum, there are two perspectives of looking at liability for pollution damage. One as a 
means to enforce environmental standards or supplement existing enforcement mechanisms, and  two, to 
balance various economic interest in the use of maritime space. Hence, most liability regimes did not provide for 
payment of compensation for purely environmental damages, that is, when the pollution did not result in 
economic loss or damage to property, see Rudiger Wolfrum, “Marine Pollution- Compensation or Enforcement” 
in  Pollution of the Sea – Prevention and Compensation, Basedow, Jurgen and Magnus Ulrich (eds), Hamburg 
Studies on Maritime Affairs, Vol.10 (Springer Link) (2007) p.129 
24 Sands, P., et al., supra note 2, pp. 201-202 
25 Following the Deepwater Horizon disaster of April 2010, a strict major hazard reporting requirement has been 
introduced by the European Commission under the EU Directive 2013/30/EU on Safety of Offshore Operations 
in Articles 12 and 13  
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environmental impact assessment are relevant to prevention of pollution.26 Other tools 
employed to prevent environmental harm include environmental management plan and 
information reporting. 
Cooperation which is emphasised by UNCLOS is also an effective prevention tool. 
Cooperation enables global or regional action in developing rules against pollution and helps 
in the actual act of implementation and enforcement of rules and standards which, in effect, 
deters further breach of international law.27 According to the International Tribunal on the Law 
of the Sea (ITLOS), the duty to co-operate is a fundamental norm in the prevention of pollution 
of the marine environment in Part XII of UNCLOS and general international law.28 
The principle of prevention focuses on eliminating or minimizing environmental damage. 
Hence, States while enjoying their right of sovereignty must anticipate pollution or 
environmental damage and take preventive actions.29 This would involve the enactment of 
regulations that require the application of basic environmental law principles including the 
precautionary and polluter-pays principles;30 the use of the best available technique (BAT);31 
best environmental practice (BEP),32 and clean technology. The meaning and scope of BAT 
                                                          
26 See Pulp Mills case, para. 204 
27 For instance, while declining the request for provisional measures by Ireland in the Mox Plant Case, the 
ITLOS advised parties to cooperate to prevent harm to the marine environment. See The Mox Plant Case 
(Ireland v United Kingdom) Order on request for provisional measures, Para.89,  available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/Order.03.12.01.E.pdf last visited 13 January 
2015 
28 The MOX Plant case, Case no. 10, 41 ILM 405 (2002), Application of 25 October 2001, para. 33, The Mox 
Plant Case (Ireland v United Kingdom) Order on request for provisional measures, para.82  available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/Order.03.12.01.E.pdf last visited 13 January 
2015 
29 De Sadeleer, Nicholas, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford Press) p.64 
2005 
30 Id., pp.82-89 2005 
31 For instance under the EU Directive 2008/1/EC Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) 
“installations are to operate in such a way that all the appropriate preventive measures are taken against 
pollution, in particular through the application of best available techniques”, available athttp://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:024:0008:0029:en:PDF , see also Pollution Control 
Handbook 2009, The Essential Guide to UK and European Pollution Control Legislation (Environmental 
Protection UK) p. 45 (2009). This is also a requirement under the Barcelona Convention and its Offshore 
Protocol, OSPAR Convention and1992 Helsinki Convention 
32 OSPAR Convention and 1992 Helsinki Convention 
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and BEP may differ in different legal instruments and regimes. EU Directive 2008/1/EC which 
focuses mostly on emission control defined BAT as “the most effective and advanced stage in 
the development of activities and their methods of operation which indicates the practical 
suitability of particular techniques for providing in principle the basis for emission limit values 
designed to prevent and, where that is not practicable, generally to reduce emissions and the 
impact on the environment.”33 In the OSPAR Convention, BAT is defined as “the latest stage 
of development (state of the art) of processes, of facilities or of methods of operation which 
indicate the practical suitability of a particular measure for limiting discharges, emissions and 
waste” while BEP means “the application of the most appropriate combination of 
environmental control measures and strategies.”34  
The main use of the preventive principle is in issuing authorisation that set out the conditions 
for administrative controls, use of fiscal measures and criminal penalties in some cases. 
Prevention may also be carried out using fiscal measures. These ‘economic instruments’ 
referred to as eco-taxes are meant to encourage polluters to curb their releases.35 
The principle of prevention rests on a certain mastery of environmental risk and the higher the 
risk, the greater the diligence required from the polluter.36 For the preventive principle to be 
effective its scope should be given a precise definition. The precautionary principle may help 
in this regard to support the preventive principle by providing grounds for authorities to act in 
                                                          
33 EU Directive 2008/1/EC, Art. 2(12). Art.2(12)(c),(a) and (b) provides that “Best” in relation to techniques 
means “the most effective in achieving a high general level of protection of the environment as a whole”, 
“Techniques” includes both the technology used and the way in which the installation is designed, built, 
maintained, operated and decommissioned” and “available techniques” means those techniques which have been 
developed on a scale which allows implementation in the relevant industrial sector, under economically and 
technically viable conditions, taking into consideration the cost and advantage, whether or not the techniques are 
used or produced inside the Member State in question, as long as they are reasonably accessible to the operator.”  
34 OSPAR Convention, Appendix 1. Similarly, being terms with no universal definition, BAT in the Helsinki 
Convention means ‘the latest stage of development (state of the art) of processes, of facilities or of methods of 
operation which indicate the practical suitability of a particular measure for limiting discharges’, see Helsinki 
Convention, Regulation 3 of Annex II 
35 De Sadeleer, N, supra note 29 at p.72-73  
36 Id., p.80  
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the absence of a conclusive proof. Also of collaborative value and importance to the 
effectiveness of prevention is the polluter pays principle.37 The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommended that the polluter pays principle be taken 
into consideration when calculating cost of prevention of oil spills at sea.38 
There are circumstances when the constraint posed by preventive measures may range between 
notification of obligations and absolute requirement and. Activities with some level of emission 
are permitted as the factors of production that generate economic wealth and social wellbeing 
is reconciled with the need to guarantee an environment of high quality.39 For offshore 
petroleum operations, improved safety to prevent major hazard is the focus of regulatory 
instruments and not the freezing of such operations. 
 
2.2 The Polluter Pays Principle 
 
The polluter-pays principle was first adopted in the 1972 OECD Council Recommendation on 
Guiding Principles concerning International Aspects of Environmental Policy. Initially, the 
principle was not intended to eliminate all forms of pollution but focused on allocating cost of 
pollution prevention and encouraged rational use of limited environmental resources.40 By 
virtue of an OECD 1989 Recommendation the Polluter-pays principle became applicable to 
accidental pollution.41 The principle was set out in the First Environmental Action Programme 
(1973-76) of the European Community and procedures for the application of the principle were 
stated in Recommendation 75/436 of 3 March 1975. Recommendation 75/436 provides that 
                                                          
37 Id., p.90  
38 OECD, Combating Oil Spills (OECD Publication, Paris) (1982), cited in Patricia Park, International Law for 
Energy and the Environment, 2nd ed. (CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group) 96 2013 
39 De Sadeleer, supra note 29, p.78 
40 C(74) 223 (Final), OECD, 1974 
41 Recommendation on the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental pollution, C(89) 88 (Final), 
OECD, 1989 
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“natural or legal persons governed by public or private law who are responsible for pollution 
must pay the cost of such measures as are necessary to eliminate that pollution or to reduce it 
so as to comply with the standards or equivalent measures.” Furthermore, Article 174(2) of the 
Single European Act (SEA) provides that “action by the Community relating to the 
environment shall be based on the principle that the polluter should pay.”  
According to the OECD the Polluter-Pays Principle is “to be used for allocating cost of 
pollution prevention and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental 
resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and investment”. Also, the polluter 
should bear the expenses for carrying out measures required by the regulator to ensure a safe 
environment.42 The 1991 OECD Recommendations on the Use of Economic Instruments in 
Environmental Policy called for the cost of environmental damage caused by polluters, as well 
as the cost of preventing and controlling pollution to be covered by the polluter pays principle.43  
The role of the State is to use standards and charges to put the polluter pays principle into 
effect.44 The principle in its strict sense or ‘standard’ includes cost of pollution control 
equipment, cost of government provision of pollution removal infrastructure and services, 
administrative cost of government in overseeing pollution control and sometimes include cost 
of clean up after accidental spill or long term routine pollution.45 It requires the polluter to take 
responsibility for the external cost of his pollution. Hence, the principle is an economic rule of 
cost allocation whose source is embedded in the theory of externalities. The polluter (a 
combination of producer and consumer) is to wholly take responsibility for all the cost of 
pollution without shifting any cost of pollution to the community. Apart from the preventive 
function of the polluter pays principle, it also has the economic integration, redistribution and 
                                                          
42 C(72) 128 (Final), OECD, 1972  
43 Id., p.38. See also de Sadeleer, supra note 29, p.37  
44 de Sadeleer, supra note 29, p.28 
45 Beder, Sharon, Environmental Principles and Policies: An Interdisciplinary Approach (University of New 
South Wales Press) p. 37 2006  
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curative functions.46 The polluter pays principle is a widely accepted principle as many 
countries have adopted it in international agreements and applied it in their domestic laws.47  
 
2.3 The Precautionary Principle 
 
The first reference to the precautionary principle in international law was in the 1984 Bremen 
Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea.48 
Parties declare that “conscious that damage to the marine environment can be irreversible or 
remediable only at considerable expensive and over long periods and that, therefore coastal 
States and the EEC must not wait for proof of harmful effects before taking action...” It got 
universal recognition at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development as all three 
documents adopted at the conference (the Rio Declaration, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biodiversity) contained the 
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle has been applied by international courts 
like the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case it was applied 
to justify a suspension of dam work on the Danube for fear it may cause significant or 
irreversible damage.49 The ITLOS also applied the principle in the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
cases50 where based on scientific uncertainties the tribunal ruled that urgent action be taken to 
avert deterioration of southern blue tuna stock.  
Precautionary principle or action is required where the nature and extent of risk and damage 
are uncertain. Uncertainty may not only be the probability of the occurrence of a serious event 
                                                          
46 Beder, supra note 45, pp 34-37 
47 Beder, S., supra note 45, p. 34   
48 de Sadeleer, supra note 29, p.94 
49 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia) ICJ Rep 7 (1997), judgement para. 52 
50 See Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand v. Japan),  Provisional measures, Order of 
27 August 1999 (ITLOS Case no. 3 & 4 
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but may also be the seriousness of the consequences.51 Once the risk is known then a preventive 
action is required.52 The application of the precautionary principle is based on scientific 
evidence of harm to avoid a situation where concerns would be seen as irrational which aim at 
unrealistic zero risk level which may affect technological innovations and lead to paralysis and 
industrial stagnation.53 The principle is believed to have steadily expanded its dominion in the 
area of marine pollution where there is no sufficient understanding of the abundant ecological 
data on pollution but there is much concern.54 The caution being applied to authorisation of oil 
and gas E&P in the Arctic is an expression of the precautionary principle.  
The principle is contained in most conventions for the protection of the marine environment 
such as the 1976 Barcelona Convention,55 1992 Helsinki Convention,56 1992 OSPAR 
Convention57 as well as the 1990 OPRC.58 It is also reflected in other international 
environmental treaties like the 1992 UNFCCC, 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1992 UN Convention on Biodiversity and 2001 Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs). Interestingly, the 1995 UN Agreement 
on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks applied the principle to 
                                                          
51 Id., p.54; Sands P., et al, supra note 2, pp. 218-219 
52 Id., p.47 
53 Id., p.52 
54 De Sadeleer, supra note 29, p.94 
55 Art.4(3)(a) provides that the contracting parties shall apply, in accordance with their capabilities, the 
precautionary where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage and not use lack of full scientific 
certainty as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
56 In Art.3(2) agreed to take ‘preventive measures when there is reason to assume that substances or energy 
introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may cause herm to human health, harm living 
resources and marine ecosystem, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even where 
there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between inputs and their alleged effects’ 
57 Parties obligation in Art.2(2)(a) is to apply ‘the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive 
measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, 
directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human health, harm living 
resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even 
when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects’. 
58 The ‘importance of precautionary measures and prevention in avoiding oil pollution in the first instance’ and 
to take ‘account of the polluter pays principle as a general principle of international environmental law’ was 
emphasised in the preamble. 
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conservation, management and exploitation measures.59 It provides in Article 6(2) that “States 
shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of 
adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take 
conservation and management measures.”  
Dealing with environmental risk is the common denominator of the polluter pays, 
precautionary and prevention principles and as such they complement each other and should 
operate together.60 Thus, a regulatory regime could be made to be anticipatory, preventive and 
curative in its approach to protection of marine environment. The question is how well 
international law has applied these principles to offshore petroleum operation? Before 
proceeding to the overview of international legal instruments a brief note on the legal status of 
offshore installations would be made. 
 
2.4 Legal Status of Offshore Installations 
 
The legal status of offshore oil and gas installations is not entirely clear and opinions on this 
issue in legal literature are divided. The question is if offshore installations should be regarded 
as vessels for the purpose of global and regional treaties that deal with marine pollution from 
ships? There are certain basic characteristics of “a ship” which can be distilled from various 
municipal laws and dictionary definitions. These are: movability, seagoing, navigability and 
being used for transport of passengers and or goods.61  
                                                          
59 Nelson, D. ‘The Development of the Legal Regime of High Seas Fisheries’ in Boyle, A. and Freestone, D. 
(eds.) International Law and Sustainable Development (Oxford University Press) 128 (1999) 
60 De Sadeleer, supra note 29, p.369 
61 UK Merchant Shipping Act 1995, c.21 Part XIII s. 313 available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/21/section/313 ; Nigerian Merchant Shipping Act, s.445 available at 
http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/nig92406.pdf ; Collins English Dictionary, Millennium Edition (HarperCollins 
Publishers) p.1418 (1999); The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Lesley Brown 
(ed.) Vol.2 (Clarendon Press, Oxford) 2828 (1993); Random House Unabridged Dictionary, Stuart Berg Flexner 
(ed.) (Random House New York) 1766 1983 
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Based on these characteristics, MODUs may meet the definition of ship but a fixed oil 
installation may not be considered a ship. However, a MODU may cease to be a ship at the 
point of being stationed and engaged in drilling activities.62  
International law and its commentators do not provide uniform definition or single view on the 
status of offshore installations63 as they are at times classified as a ship in some conventions.64 
Over and above all, the legal status of anything is determined by law. Therefore, the status of 
an offshore oil and gas installation within the context of a convention will be determined by 
the provisions of that convention.65 For instance, while fixed platforms may not actually be a 
ship or vessel, they are assumed to be ship for the purposes of some provisions of MARPOL 
73/78 and the 2001 International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems 
on Ship.66 
The Helsinki Convention defines “ship” to “mean a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in 
the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, 
floating craft and fixed or floating platforms”.67 In the absence of express exclusion, offshore 
oil and gas installations may be regarded as “ship” and governed by the Convention. This is 
especially the case when “offshore activity” is defined as “any exploration and exploitation of 
oil and gas by a fixed or floating offshore installation or structure including all associated 
                                                          
62 For a detailed consideration of the legal status of offshore oil rigs see Esmaeili, Hossein, The Legal Status of 
Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law, 50 RHDI 107 (1997); Kashubsky, Mikhail, Offshore Petroleum Security 
Threats, Target Attractiveness, and the International Legal Framework for the Protection and Security of 
Offshore Petroleum Installations, Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, Faculty of Law University of Wollongong, 
Target 2011, available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3662  accessed on 18 November 2013  
63 Esmaeili, Hossein, Id., p.121-122 
64 An example is the 1992 Helsinki Convention, that defines “ship” to mean “a vessel of any type whatsoever 
operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating 
craft and fixed or floating platforms” (Article 2) 
65 Id., p.137; In the UK a boat propelled by oars is not considered a ship according to section 742 of the 
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. However, it is a ‘ship’ within the definition of the Shipbuilding Industry Act, 
1967 
66 See Art. 2(9) which defines “Ship” as “a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment 
and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft, fixed or floating platforms, 
floating storage units (FSUs) and floating production storage and off-loading units (FPSOs)” 
67 Helsinki Convention, Art. 2(3) 
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activities thereon”, while “offshore unit” means “any fixed or floating offshore installation or 
structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities, or loading or 
unloading of oil.”68   
If offshore installations are accepted as ship for all intent and purposes under international law 
their regulation, at least in terms of safety and pollution related issues, would be undertaken by 
the International Maritime Organisation. In which case, regulations and treaties like the civil 
liability conventions would become applicable to offshore installations and operations. Also, 
the IMO may in line with its mandate adopt regulations relating to offshore installations, 
enforce them and apply sanctions where necessary.    
 
2.4.1 The IMO Draft Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial 
Islands and Related Structures 
 
The IMO attempted at some point to develop an instrument dealing with offshore oil and gas 
installations. The process commenced in 1977 when the IMO requested the Comite Maritime 
International (CMI) to draft a convention relating to oil rigs and pollution.69 The CMI came up 
with a ‘Draft Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft’ in 1977, known as the “Rio Draft”.70 This 
document was reviewed in 1994 and became known as the “Sydney Draft”. A working group 
was set up to produce a more comprehensive document to address deficiencies in the Sydney 
Draft.71 
                                                          
68 Id., Annex VI, Regulation 1(1) and (2); Annex VI is on prevention of Pollution from offshore activities. Each 
Offshore unit is to have an approved pollution emergency plan and a reporting obligation imposed on operators 
of offshore units, see regulations 6 and 7 of Annex VI 
69 Kashubsky, Mikhail, Marine  Pollution from the Offshore oil and Gas Industry: Review of Major Conventions 
and Russian Law (Part 1) 151 Maritime Studies 1, 5 (2006) 
70 CMI Documentation, vol. 1, 28 (1977); vol. III, 124 
71 White, Michael, Offshore Craft and Structures: A Proposed International Convention, 18 Aust. Mining and 
Pet.  Law Journal 21, 22 (1999) 
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The Rio Draft clarifies the extent to which existing rules apply to structures that might not be 
considered as ships. It did not address issues of accidental pollution and disasters. On the other 
hand, the Sydney Draft took a look at existing maritime conventions on issues of collision, 
salvage, arrest and limitation of liability with a view to applying them to “mobile craft” as 
defined. This approach was criticised by Canadian Maritime Law Association (CMLA) on the 
ground that it attempts to apply existing circumstances, designed for ships, to structures which, 
in its opinion, are not ship. 
The initiative to have a convention on MODUs was opposed by the International Association 
of Drilling Contractors (IADC) and the United States Maritime Law Association who saw no 
need for comprehensive international treaty for oil rigs.  Also, the IMO and CMI on their part 
failed to speed up the process.72 Nevertheless, in 2001 the CMI working group and the CMLA 
came up with a “Draft Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures 
used in the Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources 2001” 
(Canadian Draft). This draft was published and discussed at the 2004 CMI Conference in 
Vancouver.73 It received overall support at the conference with the understanding to work 
towards an improved document. But this effort is yet to be conclusive.     
The Canadian draft of May 2001 provides for all offshore units to have nationality and 
ownership registered in line with the laws of the State it is domiciled or in accordance with the 
provisions of the convention.74 In relation to safety, owners of Artificial Island and Related 
Appurtenances operated in physical association with an Offshore Unit shall be required to 
maintain a quality assurance management and operations system that are compatible with ISM 
                                                          
72 See Allen, Jacqueline, A Global Oil Stain-Cleaning Up International Conventions for Liability and 
Compensation for Oil Exploration/Production, 25 Austl & N.Z Mar L.J 90, 91 (2011).  
73 The Canadian draft is quite comprehensive as it addresses various aspects of offshore oil and gas exploration, 
like the issue of liability. See Allen, J, Id 
74 Canadian Draft, Arts.3.1 & 3.5 
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Code requirements applicable to the said Offshore Unit.75 Also, the operator of an Offshore 
Unit shall be required by the flag State to appoint a single individual to be in command of the 
unit to direct safety operation, order movement or evacuation of the Unit without prior 
reference to owner, licensee or other management or government authority.76 Moreover, to 
guarantee good and safe working environment, coastal States are to adopt laws or licencing 
terms that allow workers of offshore units to have confidential communication with regulatory 
authorities.77 Though the Canadian draft required owners of offshore units to maintain 
insurance or other financial security,78 it failed to provide requirements for design, 
construction, equipment and personnel for such units engaged in exploration and exploitation 
of petroleum and seabed mineral resources.           
 
2.5 Global Regulation of Offshore Accidental Pollution 
 
There are two binding international treaties with global coverage which apply to offshore 
petroleum operations. These are the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Cooperation (OPRC). Most provisions of UNCLOS are regarded as having attained the 
status of customary international law because they reflect general practice of States as its 
principles and provisions are constantly referred to by other treaty regimes at global and 
regional levels.79   
                                                          
75 Id., Art.8.1  
76 Id., Art.8.2. From the lessons of the Macondo blowout, this is very essential as it could break the 
organisational bureaucracy that delays emergency decision making in times of a looming disaster.  
77 Id., Art.8.5(ix) 
78 Id., Art.14.1 
79 Sands, P., et al, supra note 2, p. 350. Examples are 1992 OSPAR, Agenda 21, para. 17.1 and 17.22 
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However, legal commentators such as McConnell and Gold have argued that the provisions of 
Part XII are guiding or interpretative principles as opposed to standard setting principles 
because they assume the existence of agreed standards, rules and practices external to 
UNCLOS. The provisions more or less serve as “blueprint” or “umbrella” for other more 
locally or contextually responsive legislation or regime.80 Klein views standards and language 
used in provisions such as Articles 200, 204, 207, 208, 210 and 212 as flexible and refers to 
them as “soft law”. But Klein admits that the mandatory language employed in the provisions, 
makes them binding, mandatory and unqualified obligations.81 But the provisions of UNCLOS 
are “hard law”.  
 
2.5.1 Prevention of Accidental Pollution 
 
In the EEZ, coastal States have exclusive right to authorize and regulate the construction, 
operation and use of artificial islands, installations and structures for the purposes of exploring 
and exploiting its natural resources.82 They have similar sovereign rights over the continental 
shelf83 where they can authorize and regulate drilling for all purposes.84 Article 56(1) of 
UNCLOS confers on a coastal State the sovereign right to explore and exploit resources in its 
EEZ and a responsibility to protect and preserve the marine environment.85 
States are required to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution. Part XII identifies and 
makes detailed provisions on various sources of marine pollution in addition to other 
                                                          
80 McConnell, Moira L. and Gold, Edgar, ‘The Modern Law of the Sea; Framework for the Protection and 
Preservation of the Marine Environment?’ 23 Case W. Res Int’l Law 83, 88 (1991) 
81 See Klein, Natalie, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University 
Press) pp.151-152 (2005); see also Kimball, Lee A., ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Marine Environment 
Protection’, 7 Geo Int’l Envtl L. Rev, 745, 746 (1995) 
82 UNCLOS, Art. 60(1) 
83Id., Art. 77(1)  
84 Id., Art. 81  
85 This includes other economic use such as production of energy from the water, currents and winds, the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures and marine scientific research. 
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obligations imposed on coastal States, port States and flag States. It establishes rules on 
information sharing, scientific research, monitoring, environmental assessment, emergency 
response, enforcement and liability.86  
UNCLOS reaffirms the long established principle that States have the sovereign right to exploit 
their natural resources based on their own environmental policies and a corresponding 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.87 Also, States are to prevent 
transboundary pollution arising from activities within their maritime jurisdiction.88 These 
obligations apply to pollution from offshore petroleum operations and States are required to 
put in place measures to address pollution from oil exploration and exploitation activities. This 
obligation is contained in Article 194(3)(c) which states:  
“3. The measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources of pollution of 
the marine environment. These measures shall include, inter alia, those designed to 
minimize to the fullest possible extent: … 
(c) pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of the 
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular measures for preventing 
accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and 
regulating the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of such 
installations or devices;”89 
                                                          
86 Id., Arts 21(1)(f), 42(1)(b) and 54 
87 Arts 192 and 193 of UNCLOS 
88 Art 194(2) reiterates the principled laid down in the Trail-Smelter Arbitration. The article provides: “States 
shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as 
not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that pollution arising from incidents 
or activities under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign 
rights in accordance with this Convention.”  
89 According to Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, the reference to seabed and subsoil exploration includes the 
continental shelf, see Niels-J-Seeberg-Elverfeldt, State responsibility for Transjurisdictional Oil Pollution 
Damage Resulting from the Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf, 2 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & 
Comp L. 1 (1980-1981) 
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The above provision requires States to “minimize to the fullest possible extent” pollution from 
installations and devices used in offshore operation; put in place “measures for preventing 
accidents and dealing with emergencies”. This imposes an obligation to prevent accidental 
pollution from offshore petroleum operations and prepare for emergency response.90  
Second, the measures they are obligated to apply, by the provisions of Article 194(1), is the 
“best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities”. This 
subjective provision gives room for all States to do their best to prevent marine pollution. 
Though commentators like Klein are sceptical about the effectiveness of such framework 
provisions in UNCLOS.91 While the umbrella nature of UNCLOS provision might be positive, 
the absence of definite standards established by subsequent conferences is the undoing in the 
increasing threat of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations.  
In addition to the general obligation on all States to prevent marine pollution more specific 
provisions directed at coastal States in respect of activities on the seabed are contained in 
articles 208 and 214. Article 208(1) reads: 
“Coastal States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed activities subject 
to their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures under their 
jurisdiction, pursuant to articles 60 and 80.”  
                                                          
90 There is no clear mention of offshore oil and gas operations but the reference to “exploration or exploitation 
of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil” encapsulates both mining of mineral and oil and gas E&P. To 
Nordquist, the installations and devices referred to signify something of a “more permanent character”; See 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol.4 (Nordquist, Myron H., ed.) 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) p.67 (1991). What is of a “more permanent character” is debatable. Certainly all 
types of installations and devices used in exploration and exploitation activities offshore are of permanent 
character while the operations last.   
91 Klein observed that “an examination of UNCLOS provisions in terms of protection and prevention of marine 
environment shows little detail as to the substance of the duty imposed by the convention. Rather it emphasises 
co-operation and or the establishment of international or regional standards in the future”. See Klein, N., supra 
note 81, p.149 (2005) 
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This obligation seems broader and progressive than that imposed by Article 207 that deals with 
marine pollution from land based sources. Article 207(1) imposes obligation on States to adopt 
laws and regulations while “taking into account internationally agreed” rules and standards. To 
take into account does not necessarily mean ensuring that the laws or rules must be as effective 
as international ones. But Article 208 makes it mandatory for laws and regulations adopted by 
States not to be less effective than international rules and standards.92 Obligation is also 
imposed on States to cooperate and establish global and regional rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures regarding pollution from seabed activities. This could 
be actualised through competent international organisations or diplomatic conferences. Thus 
allowing for flexibility in the absence of a specific international organisation with exclusive 
competence over offshore operations.93 The territorial sovereignty in the territorial sea gives 
right to ‘sovereign rights’ over the continental shelf as provided in Article 77.94 Article 208 
applies to all seabed and activities within a coastal State’s jurisdiction and develops further the 
general obligations for all States as provided in Article 194.   
In relation to inherently dangerous activities like offshore petroleum E&P, Article 204(2) 
makes it mandatory for States to monitor their risk or effects of pollution. They are to keep 
under surveillance activities they permit to determine whether they are likely to pollute the 
marine environment. By this provision States are generally expected to, as part of safety 
measures, constantly monitor and keep under close watch offshore operations as they 
increasingly progress into very challenging deep and ultra-deep waters. This provision is a 
further codification of Principle 15 of Stockholm Declaration which calls for proactive, 
                                                          
92 UNCLOS Art. 208(3) 
93 UNCLOS Art. 208(5); Nordquist, Myron H., supra note 90, p.130   
94 Article 77 of UNCLOS confers right on coastal States to exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf 
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of the natural resources therein. See Nordquist, Myron H., supra 
note 90, p.147   
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precautionary and preventive action to avoid pollution. But the obligation is with much 
discretion as States are to “endeavour, as far as practicable” to fulfil the obligation.95  
The above UNCLOS provisions reflect the prevention, precautionary and polluter pays 
principles and together they integrate that of sustainable development that should be considered 
by States in the exploitation of marine resources. In effect, regulations of offshore petroleum 
E&P and environmental protection from accidental spills should be addressed in an integrated 
method.   
The OPRC recognised “the serious threat posed to the marine environment by oil pollution 
incidents involving ships, offshore units, sea ports and oil handling facilities”.96 They 
emphasised the importance of precautionary measures and prevention in avoiding oil pollution 
in the first instance, and the need for strict application of existing international instruments 
dealing with maritime safety and marine pollution prevention.97 The need for international 
cooperation with the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility 
was also accentuated in the preamble of the OPRC.  
 
2.5.2 Emergency Response  
 
While there is no global convention specifically on emergency response to accidental pollution 
resulting from offshore petroleum exploration and exploitation, the 1990 OPRC is relevant to 
such operations. Its definition of “ship” as “a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the 
marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, and 
floating craft of any type”; and “offshore unit” as “any fixed or floating offshore installation or 
                                                          
95 UNCLOS Art. 204(1); See Nordquist, Myron H., supra note 90, p.115  
96 OPRC, preamble   
97 Id. 
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structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities, or loading or 
unloading of oil” applies to offshore operations.98 
The level of response in the event of an emergency is subject to the judgement of each State99 
which may not guarantee a uniform standard of implementation of the Convention. This is 
because it is not every region or country that has the necessary personnel and equipment to 
contribute and respond effectively to emergencies. Moreover, priorities of countries and 
regions differ. For example, developed countries are focused on improved safety of operation 
aimed at preventing the occurrence of major hazards. Conversely, developing countries like 
Angola and Tanzania in East Africa and Nigeria and Ghana in West Africa may be focused on 
attracting investors to their offshore petroleum industry.100 This may include lax environmental 
regulations that undermine health, safety and environment.  
The OPRC was not adopted with the possibility of a disaster, involving oil and gas production 
facilities, in the magnitude of the Macondo blowout. It was adopted following the Exxon 
Valdez incident of 1989. The volume of oil leaked into the marine environment is not 
comparable to the millions of gallons of oil that oozed into the environment in the Macondo 
blowout. The Convention may need a review to guarantee effective, prompt cooperative 
response to a Macondo kind of disaster. Detailed analysis and possible areas of amendments 
are discussed in chapter five.   
 
 
                                                          
98 “Ship” and “offshore unit” are defined in Art. 2(3)&(4) of the OPRC 
99 Id, Arts. 6(2) and 7 as an example uses the phrases “within its capability” and “subject to their capability and 
the availability of relevant resources.” See also Art. 9(2) 
100 Nigeria’s current focus in the oil and gas industry is the passage of a new petroleum industry bill into law and 
hoping that the law will boost foreign investment in the oil and gas sector of the economy and environmental 
protection is not prioritised. 
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2.5.3 Liability and Compensation for Accidental Pollution 
 
An aspect of offshore accidental pollution of great concern is liability and compensation, 
especially when the damage is transboundary. Liability which is seen as making reparation or 
other forms of compensation is consequential to a failure to act appropriately by act or 
omission.101 Responsibility requires States to comply with all international conventions and 
regulations on protection of the marine environment. Article 235 of UNCLOS provides for 
responsibility and liability for failure to protect and preserve the marine environment. While 
Article 235(1) relates to State responsibility in international law for failure to fulfil its 
international obligation of pollution prevention, Article 235(2) relates to ensuring that private 
civil liability laws are in place and enforced against institutions and individuals who pollute 
the marine environment. 
UNCLOS while being unequivocal on the obligation of States to take preventive measures 
aimed at averting marine pollution102 neither imposes nor advocates any specific form of 
liability regime. States are mandated to cooperate in the implementation of existing 
international law and advance the development of international law of responsibility and 
liability.103 This is a safeguard provision to accommodate later developments. In that regard it 
anticipates the development of non-legal procedures like internationally managed insurance 
schemes, and remedies for assessing damage and compensation for it.104 Article 235(3) also 
places emphasis on “assuring prompt and adequate compensation” for damage caused by 
pollution of the marine environment, and the obligation of States in this regard. But, the 
responsibility to “further development of international law relating to responsibility and 
liability for the assessment of and compensation for damage, and the settlement of related 
                                                          
101 Nordquist, Myron H., supra note 90, p. 412  
102 See Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, supra note 89 at p.43; See UNCLOS Arts 207- 212 
103 UNCLOS, Art. 235(3) 
104 Nordquist, M. H., supra note 90, p.412 
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disputes” is not within the exclusive competence of any international organisation or 
diplomatic conference. This is one factor that has implication on the gradual development of 
rules and regulations governing offshore petroleum at the global level. 
 
2.6  Regional Regulation of Offshore Accidental Pollution 
 
Regional instruments are very important in the protection of marine environment. The three 
regional sea conventions under review have varying level of regulation of offshore petroleum 
operation. 
 
2.6.1 Prevention 
 
OSPAR Convention is applicable to offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation and 
obligates parties to “take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate marine pollution” and in 
appropriate situation restore damaged marine environment.105 It provides for the application of 
polluter pays and precautionary principles in addressing marine pollution,106 including 
pollution from fixed and floating offshore platforms.107 
In addition to the Convention and Bonn Agreement, there are decisions and recommendations 
of the meetings of the parties that all form part of the OSPAR regime.108 For instance, OSPAR 
                                                          
105 1992 OSPAR, Arts 2(1) and 5. The obligation to ‘eliminate’ marine pollution in this convention is a positive 
improvement on UNCLOS which used the word ‘control’. 
106 1992 OSPAR Annex I, Art. 2(2). These obligations are much more mandatory and binding than the 
provisions of UNCLOS in view of the use of the word ‘shall’.  
107 Id., Art. 5. See generally annex III that addresses prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore 
sources 
108 OSPAR Recommendation 2011/8 amending OSPAR Recommendation 2001/1 for the Management of 
Produced Water from Offshore Installations as amended; OSPAR Recommendation 2006 on Management 
Regime for Offshore Cuttings Piles; OSPAR Decision 98/3 on the Disposal of Disused Offshore Installations 
and OSPAR Decision 2000/3 on the use of Organic Phase Drilling Fluids (OPF) and the discharge of OPF-
Contaminated Cuttings; OSPAR Recommendation 2012/5 for a risk-based approach to the Management of 
Produced Water Discharges from Offshore Installations; OSPAR Recommendation 2010/18 on the prevention of 
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Recommendation 2003/5 promotes the use and implementation of environmental management 
systems by the offshore industry. Its goal was to ensure that by the end of 2005 all operators 
within OSPAR maritime area have in place Environmental Management Systems (EMS) that 
are of international standards.  
The Barcelona Convention109 which was revised in 1995, is one of the early regional 
conventions that addressed marine pollution.110The Convention calls for the application of the 
precautionary and the polluter pays principles to prevent and minimize marine pollution.111 
While it addresses pollution from seabed exploration and exploitation activities112 there was no 
detailed provision on pollution from offshore installations. A 1994 Protocol for the Protection 
of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the 
Continental Shelf and the Seabed and Subsoil113 (Offshore Protocol) was adopted to provide 
detailed provisions to address offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities in the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
The Offshore Protocol’s aim is to “prevent, abate, combat and control pollution” resulting from 
offshore activities using the “best available techniques, environmentally effective and 
economically appropriate” measures.114 As precaution, operators are to report any incidence or 
near misses on any offshore installation.115  
                                                          
significant acute oil pollution from offshore drilling activities; OSPAR Recommendation 2010/3 on a 
Harmonised Offshore Chemical Notification Format (HOCNF) that108 replaces OSPAR Recommendation 
2000/5 as amended by OSPAR Recommendations 2005/3 and 2008/2; OSPAR Recommendation 2010/4 on a 
Harmonised Pre-screening Scheme for Offshore Chemicals that replaces OSPAR Recommendation 2000/4 as 
amended by OSPAR Recommendation 2008/1; OSPAR Recommendation 2005/2 on Environmental Goals for 
the Discharge by the Offshore Industry of Chemicals that Are, or Contain Added Substances, Listed in the 
OSPAR 2004 List of Chemicals for Priority Action 
109 1102 UNTS 27 (1976), The Barcelona Convention entered into force on February 12, 1978 
110 When this revised one came into force 9 July 2004 it became referred to as Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean  
111 Art. 4(3) of 1995 Barcelona Convention 
112 Art. 7 of 1995 Barcelona Convention 
113 Adopted on October 14, 1994 and entered into force on March 24, 2011 ( commonly referred to as the 
Offshore Protocol) 
114 1994 Offshore Protocol, Art. 3(1) 
115 Offshore Protocol, Art.17 
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Authorization for exploration and exploitation is to be premised on the technical competence 
and financial capacity to undertake offshore operation.116 Also, installations must be 
constructed in line with international standards and practice.117 Safety measures in all offshore 
installation must meet the criteria set in Annex VI of the Protocol before authorisation by the 
Competent Authority. Such safety measures should be in respect of the design, construction, 
placement, equipment, marking, operation and maintenance of installations.118 These measures 
if implemented and closely monitored throughout the life circle of the installation would 
guarantee safety of the operations and prevent major accidents. Abandoned and disused 
installations are to be removed in line with international guidelines put in place by institutions 
like the IMO. This is to ensure safety of navigation and take into consideration other legitimate 
uses of the sea.119 
Similarly, the 1992 Helsinki Convention obligates member parties to individually or 
collectively take measures to ‘prevent and eliminate pollution in order to promote the 
ecological restoration of the Baltic Sea Area and the preservation of its ecological balance.’120 
Annex VII addresses prevention of pollution from offshore activities. In line with the principle 
of prevention, the Convention incorporates the precautionary and polluter pays principles and 
encourages the use of best available technology and best environmental practice.121 These 
provisions are dynamic in the sense that they are to be applied in line with advances in 
technology, scientific knowledge and understanding, as well as change in economic and social 
                                                          
116 The European Union seems to have adopted these conditions as basis for the grant of licences, see Article 4 
of the 2013 EU Directive on Offshore Safety 
117 1994 Offshore Protocol, Art.4(1) 
118 Id., Art.15(1) 
119 Id., Art. 20. This provision is similar to the UNCLOS requirement as opposed to the 1958 Continental Shelf 
Convention that required total removal of disused offshore installations.  
120 Art. 3(1) 
121 Art. 3(2)-(4); Annex II provides criteria for the Use of Best Environmental Practice and best Available 
Technology. The “Best Environmental Practice” means ‘the application of the most appropriate combination of 
measures’ while “Best Available Technology” means ‘the latest stage of development (state of the art) of 
processes, of facilities or of methods of operation which indicate the practical suitability of a particular measure 
for timing discharges’, see Regulations 2 and 3 of Annex II. 
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factors.122 These provisions have the potential of encouraging industry self-regulation in the 
technical aspects of offshore petroleum operation in view of the ever changing conditions of 
marine environment and the technical challenges they present to operators.  
Annex VI contains specific undertaking to prevent and eliminate pollution from offshore 
activities through the application of the Annex II defined principles of Best Available 
Technology and Best Environmental Practice.123 Parties are to take all measures and adhere to 
the provisions of Article 12 and Annex VI of the Convention to prevent pollution from 
exploration and exploitation of the seabed and its subsoil.  Abandoned, disused offshore units 
and accidentally wrecked offshore units are to be completely removed and brought ashore. This 
obligation is a step further than the provisions of UNCLOS and Mediterranean Offshore 
Protocol which do not provide for mandatory total removal of abandoned offshore installations.  
Co-operation is expected in combating marine pollution124 “to conserve natural habitats and 
biological diversity and to protect ecological processes” to ensure the sustainable use of natural 
resources of the Baltic Sea.125 Parties are expected to consult when a given project require by 
law an environmental impact assessment.126 They shall notify other parties whose interests are 
affected or likely to be affected by an incident resulting in pollution of a transboundary scale.  
The EU Directive on Offshore Safety adopted by the Parliament on 21 May 2013127 and by 
Council on 10 June 2013128 aims to “reduce as far as possible the occurrence of major accidents 
                                                          
122 Annex II, Regulation 4.  
123 Id., Annex VI, Regulation 2 
124 See 1992 Helsinki Convention, Arts 13, 14, 15. It also provides for notification and consultations obligations 
in the event of an incident. 
125 Id., Art.15 
126 Id., Art. 7(1) and (2); see also Annex VI, Regulation 3 on environmental impact assessment and monitory for 
offshore activities  
127 Oil and Gas Journal, European Parliament Approves Offshore Oil, Gas Safety Directive, 21 May 2013 
available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/05/european-parliament-approves-offshore-oil--gas-safety-
directive.html accessed on 12 June 2013 
128 See Upstream, EU Ministers Sign off on Offshore Safety Law, 10 June 2013, available at 
http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article1329554.ece accessed on 12 June 2013 
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related to offshore oil and gas operations and to limit their consequences”.129 It is applicable to 
present and future installations and operations.130  To achieve this objective it establishes a set 
of basic requirements that will help to prevent major accidents and limit its consequences in 
offshore oil and gas operations.131 It acknowledges the importance and necessity to apply the 
preventive and polluter-pays principles.132 
MODUs in transit are considered to be ship and subject to relevant provisions of SOLAS, 
MARPOL and their applicable construction codes.133 Major accident prevention policy of 
operators should be applied also in operations outside Union waters subject to prevailing 
national legal framework.134 This does not guarantee the application of EU standards outside 
EU waters as the prevailing national legal framework may not be in concord with the EU 
Directive. However, in what seems like a self-regulatory obligation, operators are expected to 
act proactively to ensure the highest level of safety.135 
It urges global cooperation and affirms the Commission’s commitment to promoting high 
safety standards of offshore operations at international level in relevant global and regional 
fora including Arctic.136 Meanwhile, bearing in mind the lessons learnt from the US regulatory 
lapses leading to the Macondo blowout, the EU Directive calls for a mandatory separation of 
“regulatory functions relating to offshore safety and environment and regulatory functions 
relating to economic development, including licensing and revenues management.”137 Also, 
                                                          
129EU Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations 2013, Preamble, para. 2; see also European 
Parliament Approves  Offshore Oil, Gas Safety Directive, available at 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/2013/05/european-parliament-approves-offshore-oil--gas-safety-directive.html 
accessed on 25 May 2013  
130 Council of the European Union, Council adopts directive on safety of offshore oil and gas operations, 
Luxembourg 10 June 2013, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/trans/137424.pdf accessed 12 June 2013 
131 Id., Art.1 
132 Preamble, para.1 
133 Preamble, para.32 
134 Id.,para.36 
135 Id., para.37 
136 Art.33(3) 
137 See Council of the European Union, supra note 131 
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the EU appears not to be favourable toward prescriptive regulations of offshore oil and gas 
operation. It acknowledges that “best practices currently available for major accident 
prevention in offshore oil and gas operations are based on a goal-setting approach and on 
achieving desirable outcomes through thorough risk assessment and reliable management 
systems.”138 Member States are therefore to ensure that operators carry out offshore oil and gas 
operations on the basis of systematic risk management.139 
 
2.6.2 Emergency Response 
 
In the OSPAR regime, where transboundary pollution is envisaged in any circumstance, 
concerned parties are expected to consult and negotiate a cooperation agreement to contend 
with the transboundary nature of the pollution.140 One negotiated cooperation agreement is the 
Bonn Agreement141 which is applicable whenever there is grave and imminent danger of 
pollution of a transboundary nature.142 The Agreement provides the mechanism for North Sea 
countries and the European Community to help each other in contending with pollution from 
maritime disasters and prolonged pollution from ships and offshore installations, and engages 
in surveillance as a method of detecting and combating pollution at sea.143 However, it does 
not address liability in the event of transboundary marine pollution.  
In the Barcelona Convention regime parties have obligation not to allow activities within their 
waters to cause transboundary pollution. In the event of an incident that poses threat of 
                                                          
138 Id., Preamble, para. 25 
139 Id., Art.3(4) 
140 1992 OSPAR, Art. 21. 
141 Bonn Agreement, available at http://www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/welcome.html accessed on 25 May 
2012 
142 Bonn Agreement, Art. 1 
143 See generally Arts. 3 – 9 of the Agreement 
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pollution of a transboundary nature, the party in whose territory the installation is located is to 
promptly notify other parties likely to be affected to enable them take appropriate measures. 
In the event of an emergency, provisions of the Protocol for Cooperation in Combating 
Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of 
Emergency144 shall be applied mutatis mutandis. Operators are required to put in place 
Contingency Plans to combat accidental pollution. The coordination for the development and 
implementation of which shall be in accordance with the provisions of Annex VII of the 
Offshore Protocol.145 Parties are to give mutual assistance in cases of emergency.146 Article 
15(2) of the Offshore Protocol is explicit on the responsibility and duty to respond adequately 
to emergency. It mandates Contracting Parties to ensure operators at all times have on 
installations adequate equipment and devices in good working order, not just to prevent 
accidental pollution but also facilitate prompt response to an emergency in line with the best 
available environmentally effective and economically appropriate techniques. 
In the Baltic Sea region, Annex VII of the Helsinki Convention provides requirements for 
emergency response to pollution. Fundamentally, States are to maintain the ability to respond 
to incidents that could cause damage to marine environment within the region and beyond state 
jurisdiction. Parties must have national contingency planning and where appropriate, bilateral 
and multilateral plans for response to pollution incidents. There is also mandatory surveillance, 
response measures and assistance required of members when incidents within region waters 
call for such.147 Parties are to cooperate on regular basis on ways of dealing with spillages, 
                                                          
144 Barcelona Emergency Protocol (16 February 1976 and in force 12 February 1978) 15 ILM 300 (1976). This 
protocol was revised by the Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from Ship and in Cases of 
Emergency, Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea adopted at Valetta on January 2002 (Now 
Prevention and Emergency Protocol), in force 17 March 2004  
145 1994 Offshore Protocol, Art. 16 
146 Id., Art. 18 
147 Id., Annex VII, Regulations 1-8 
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information on research and development and on implementation and further development of 
the Convention.148 
The EU Directive on Offshore Safety provides the expected EU standard for emergency 
response within a State and where there is threat of transboundary harm. The operations are to 
be guided by both internal and external emergency response policies. 149   
 
2.6.3 Liability and Compensation 
 
There appears to be limited provisions in liability and compensation at regional levels. For 
example, the OSPAR Convention provides for the application of polluter pays principle but 
has no substantive provisions to address liability and compensation for accidental pollution 
from offshore petroleum operations.   
The Barcelona Offshore Protocol requires licences to be supported by insurance or other 
financial security to cover liability relating to compensation for damage caused by offshore 
activities.150 It provides for equal access to justice for victims of transboundary pollution in 
other states.151 Each State is to formulate “appropriate rules and procedures for the 
determination of liability and compensation for damage”.152 In the absence of such appropriate 
rules and procedures liability shall be in line with the provisions of the protocol. In which case 
                                                          
148 Id., Regulation 10; Parties are to also apply the principles and rules of the Manual on Co-operation in 
Combatting Marine Pollution, see Regulation 11. 
149 EU Directive on Offshore Safety, Arts. 28-33 
150 Id., Arts. 7 and 27(2)(b) 
151 Id., Art.26(4) 
152 Id., Art. 27(1); see also Art. 16 which requires parties to ensure that operators have a contingency  plan 
fashioned in line with the Contracting state parties contingency plan established in accordance with the Protocol 
for Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in 
Cases of Emergency which they are expected to implement mutatis mutandis.   
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liability would be channelled to the operator to make adequate and prompt payment of 
compensation.153 
Similarly, the EU Directive on Offshore Safety requires technical expertise and financial 
capability, including financial security to cover liability associated with offshore operations to 
be taken into consideration in the grant or transfer of licences.154 States must also put in place 
“effective and proportionate penalties” for breach of regulations.155 In the event of an accident, 
operators are to be held responsible even when the act or omission is that of a contractor.156 
However, for the avoidance of doubt, States are to decide on the responsible party (to be held 
liable) in the event of an accident before the commencement of offshore operations.157 
Offshore licensees are to be financially held liable by States for prevention and remediation of 
environmental damage caused by offshore operations by, or on behalf of, the licensee or the 
operator.158 Delegation of this responsibility is not to be allowed by member States.159 In effect, 
the operator remains the responsible party for cost of precautionary measures and remediation. 
However, details on liability is still governed by Directive 2004/35/EC, subject to minor 
amendment that extended its application to all European waters, that is, up to the exclusive 
economic zones of member States.160 The Directive creates avenue for revision and 
improvement of the liability regime for offshore operations as the Commission is to report to 
Council and Parliament on the availability of financial security instruments for offshore 
                                                          
153 Id., Art. 27(2)(a) 
154 Art.4 
155 Id., para.56 
156 Art.3(2) 
157 Preamble, para.8. These provisions are aimed at addressing the legal uncertainties that arose as to who was to 
be held responsible as between the operator and contractors for the Macondo Blowout. The legal battles rages 
on as to whether (and to what extent) the contractors, Transocean and Halliburton should be held jointly and 
severally liable along with BP, the operator.   
158 Art.7 
159 Id., see also preamble, para.13 
160 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.38; See also para.50 of the preamble and Art.3(1)(a) of Directive 2008/56/EC 
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operations and the handling of compensation claims. The report is to be accompanied by 
relevant proposals.161  
Penalties in relation to all issues covered by the Directive are to be decided by individual 
countries that must implement them and ensure that they are “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive”.162 These are all words and phrases with imprecise degrees for compliance. As such 
implementation by member States would be different. However, as a check on the efficacy of 
penalties, two years into the entry into force of the Directive, the Commission is expected to 
submit to the Council and Parliament, a report on its “assessment of the effectiveness of the 
liability regimes in the Union in respect of the damage caused by offshore oil and gas 
operations.”163 The commission will in the report evaluate the appropriateness of expanding 
liability provisions.164   
 
2.7 Enforcement  
 
States voluntarily enter into international agreement and they are expected to implement the 
terms of such agreement to achieve desired results. Some treaties have institutions or 
mechanism for their enforcement. In relation to protection of marine environment from 
offshore activities, Article 214 of UNCLOS provides that: 
“States shall enforce their laws and regulations adopted in accordance with article 208 
and shall adopt laws and regulations and take other measures necessary to implement 
applicable international rules and standards established through competent international 
organizations or diplomatic conference to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
                                                          
161 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.39(1) 
162 Art.34 
163 Art.39(2) 
164 Id. 
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marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed activities subject to their 
jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures under their 
jurisdiction, pursuant to articles 60 and 80.”165  
The above provision discourages arbitrary measures in municipal laws by requiring that 
measures taken by coastal States be in accord with “applicable international rules and 
standards”. But the determination of what these international standards are might be difficult. 
For instance, the “applicable international rules and standards” may include existing global and 
regional treaties on prevention and control of marine pollution. In addition, “applicable 
international rules and standards” would continually expand in scope with the addition of any 
new regulation that might be negotiated or adopted in line with States’ obligation to develop 
international rules and standards.166 According to some commentators, the scope of Article 214 
in relation to artificial islands, installations and structures under the jurisdiction of coastal 
States is, by its reference to Articles 60 and 80, wider than its title suggests.167 Article 80 deals 
with artifices on the continental shelf and thus is concerned with seabed activities under the 
jurisdiction of the coastal State. But Article 60 deals with artifices in the EEZ where coastal 
States have exclusive rights of construction, regulation, operation of artificial islands and 
installations for a wide range of economic purposes without restrictions.168  
At regional level, OSPAR Commission established by Article 10 of the Convention has the 
responsibility to assess the effectiveness of the measure contained in the convention. It shall 
                                                          
165 Article 60 deals with artificial islands, installations and structures in the exclusive economic zone while Art. 
80 is concerned with artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf. And contrary to the 
requirement for total removal of disused installation and structures under Article 5(5) of the 1958 Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, UNCLOS does not insist on total removal under Article 60(3) 
166 Klein, supra note 81, p.159. This uncertainty as to what constitutes “applicable international rules and 
standards” played out in the Mox Plant Case.  In the case, Ireland urged the ITLOS to consider provisions of 
‘non-UNCLOS’ instruments as an aid to interpretation of UNCLOS articles but the argument was opposed by 
England, see MOX Plant, Day 2 Transcript, p.40 cited in Klein, supra note 81, p.150 
167 See Nordquist, Myron H., supra note 90, p.115 
168 Vinogradov, S. V. and Wagner, J. P., ‘International Legal regime for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment against Operational Pollution from Offshore Petroleum Activities’ in Environmental Regulation of 
Oil and Gas, Zhiguo Gao (ed.), (Kluwer Law International) 93, 101 1998 
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assess compliance by parties to the convention, decisions and recommendations and promote 
the implementation of recommendations, including measures to assist a Contracting Party to 
carry out its obligations.169 It is vested with powers to adopt decisions and recommendations 
in accordance with Article 13. In case of transboundary pollution the Commission may assist 
parties by making recommendations with a view to reaching a satisfactory solution. However, 
implementation of safety standards seems to be the responsibility of each State that authorises 
such activities. Similarly, in the Baltic Sea the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) oversees the 
implementation of the Helsinki Convention. The EU Directive on Safety of Offshore 
Operations provides reporting obligations while the European Commissions is expected to 
monitor the implementation of the Directive. An example is the requirement for the 
Commission to submit to the Council and Parliament, a report on its assessment of the 
effectiveness of liability regimes in the Union 170 and evaluate the appropriateness of expanding 
liability provisions.171  
 
2.8 “Soft Law” Regulation of Accidental Pollution from Offshore 
Operations 
 
In addition to binding treaties there are “soft law” instruments that influence the conduct of 
offshore operators. They are persuasive and gradually sway the content of binding instruments. 
Some “soft law” instruments relevant to offshore oil and gas operations are the Stockholm 
Declaration, Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, UNEP Environmental Law Guidelines and 
Principles ‘Offshore Mining and Drilling’,172 2007 World Bank Environment, Health, and 
Safety Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Development of the World Bank (World Bank 
                                                          
169 1992 OSPAR, Arts. 21 and 23 
170 Art.39(2) 
171 Id. 
172 Decision 10/14/VI of the Governing Council of UNEP, 31 May 1982; see Vinogradov, S. V. and Wagner, J. 
P., supra note 168, p.113 
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HSE Guidelines). Also important are guidelines and standards by professional institutions like 
the API. 
 
2.8.1 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
 
The Stockholm Declaration calls on States to “take all possible steps to prevent pollution of 
the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources 
and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.”173 
More importantly, they must in the exploitation of their resources avoid any form of 
environmental damage to other States’ territories or areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.174 The issue is, who is the victim and has locus standing to sue when the high sea 
is polluted by activities within a State? The absence of international liability regime is noted as 
declaration is made urging States to cooperate to develop international law of liability and 
compensation for victims of transboundary pollution.175  
 
2.8.2 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development  
 
Rio Declaration acknowledged various principles of environmental law like inter-generational 
and intra-generational equity,176 common but differentiated responsibility,177 and sustainable 
                                                          
173 1972 Stockholm Declaration , Principle 7 
174 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21; the high sea is an area beyond limits of national jurisdiction. 
Therefore, as oil and gas exploration goes miles away from shore into deep waters, states must be mindful of 
incident that are likely to damage the waters of the high seas and take steps to prevent it.  
175 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 22; see also Principle 24 which underscores the importance of 
international cooperation at all levels. 
176 Id., Principle 3 
177 Id., Principle 7 
  
68 
 
development.178 Furthermore, the application of the precautionary principle and polluter- pays 
principles in the protection of the environmental was underscored.179 
The Rio Declaration renewed the call on States to develop national law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage. It calls for 
cooperation and more determined effort to develop further international law on liability and 
compensation for environmental damage caused by activities within State jurisdiction or 
control to areas beyond State jurisdiction.180 This is in addition to a confirmation of the 
sovereign right of nations to exploit resources within their territories in accordance with their 
own environmental and developmental policies save to avoid transboundary pollution.181 
A related conference, Rio+20 in 2012, failed to adopt a new major international agreement. 
Though it made a statement of recognition that “oceans, seas and coastal areas form an 
integrated and essential component of the Earth’s ecosystem and are critical to sustaining it, 
and that international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, provides the legal framework for the 
conservation and sustainable use of the oceans and their resources.”182  
 
2.8.3 Agenda 21183 
 
Agenda 21 was adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit as a blue print and action plan for sustainable 
development by addressing the current problems and preparing the world for the challenges of 
the 21st Century in various issues such as social, economic and environment.184 
                                                          
178 Id., Principles 4 & 5 
179 Id., Principles 15 &16 
180 Rio Declaration, Principle 13  
181 Id., Principle 2 
182 Rio + 20 , Clause 158 
183 UNCED Report, A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1) (1993) 
184 United Nations, Earth Summit available at http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/envirp2.html last visited 24 April 
2015 
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Agenda 21 urges States to avoid degradation of the marine environment through the application 
of preventive, precautionary and anticipatory approaches in addition to impact assessment of 
major activities with potential environmental impacts. The application of the polluter pays 
principle as a means of discouraging environmental degradation was also advocated.185  
In relation to offshore oil and gas operations, Agenda 21 advocated individual, sub-regional, 
regional and global assessment of “the need for additional measures to address degradation of 
the marine environment from offshore oil and gas platforms, by assessing existing regulatory 
measures to address discharges, emissions and safety and assessing the need for additional 
measures.”186 It further emphasised the need to train both regulatory staff and oil-and-chemical-
spill response personnel.187 There was no direct mention of accidental pollution from offshore 
petroleum operations. But an assessment of existing safety measures in the present 
circumstances implies focusing on prevention of major hazards in offshore operations and their 
management. 
 
2.8.4 UNEP Environmental Law Guidelines and Principles 
‘Offshore Mining and Drilling’ 
 
Following a 1977 study of the legal aspects of offshore mining and drilling and its impact on 
the environment, UNEP commissioned a Working Group of Experts on Environmental Law to 
prepare a report. The Group of Experts’ report was endorsed by UNEP Governing Council on 
31 May 1982 and known as the UNEP Environmental Law Guidelines and Principles ‘Offshore 
Mining and Drilling’.188 The Guidelines, according to the UN General Assembly, provides 
                                                          
185 Paras.17.21 and 17.22(a), (b)& (c) 
186 Para.17.30 
187 Para.17.38 
188 Decision 10/14/VI of the Governing Council of UNEP, 31 May 1982; see Vinogradov, S. V. and Wagner, J. 
P., supra note 168, p.113 
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general direction for States to adhere to in their formulation of national legislation or 
negotiation of international agreements.189 
The general obligation of the Guidelines as provided in Conclusion 1 is focused on prevention 
of pollution by urging States “to take preventive measures against, limit, and in so far as 
possible reduce pollution and other adverse effects on the environment resulting from offshore 
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons… and other related activities, within the limits 
of national jurisdiction”. It contains relatively detailed provisions on safety of offshore 
operations as States are to ensure that proper safety measures are taken in design, construction, 
placement, equipment and maintenance of offshore installations.  
The Guidelines require national laws on offshore operations not to be “less effective than 
international rules, standards and recommended practice and procedure”. It calls for 
harmonisation of municipal laws and regulations adopted by States, in particular at the regional 
level, “taking into account the best available standards and technology”.190 It also provides for 
exchange of information and technology transfer.  
Other provisions are authorisation of offshore operation, safety measures, contingency 
planning and implementation measures and liability and compensation. Offshore operation are 
to be subjected to prior authorisation that is based or dependent on an assessment of 
environmental effects.  
The guidelines are not binding but provide basis for subsequent instrument related to offshore 
operations.191  
 
                                                          
189 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 37/217 of 20 December 1982 
190 UNEP Environmental Law Guidelines and Principles No. 4‘Offshore Mining and Drilling’, Conclusion 2(1) 
and (2) 
191 See Vinogradov, S. V. and Wagner, J. P., supra note 168, p.115 
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2.8.5 World Bank Environment, Health, and Safety Guidelines for 
Offshore Oil and Gas Development 2007  
 
The World Bank provides finance and technical assistance to developing countries. Most 
finances are given to countries for specific projects which are monitored to ensure they are in 
line with the terms of the loan agreements. The entities that execute the projects must meet the 
standards set by the bank and follow its guidelines, especially health safety and environment 
guidelines. These guidelines usually contain good international practices. In view of the spread 
of World Bank projects across the world its guidelines influence business conducts and set 
standards. 
The 2007 World Bank Environment, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development of the World Bank (World Bank HSE Guidelines) forms part of ‘technical 
reference documents with ‘general and industry specific examples of Good International 
Industry Practice (GIIP).192 The HSE Guidelines contain performance levels and measures 
generally considered to be achievable in new facilities by existing technology at reasonable 
costs.193 The Guidelines include information relevant to seismic exploration, exploratory and 
production drilling, development and production activities, offshore pipeline operations, 
offshore transportation, tanker loading and unloading, ancillary and support operations, and 
decommissioning’.194  
The Guidelines identified air emissions, wastewater discharges, solid and liquid waste 
management, noise generation and spills as potential environmental issues associated with 
                                                          
192 Defined as the exercise of professional skill, diligence, prudence and foresight that would be reasonably 
expected from skilled and experienced professionals engaged in the same type of undertaking under the same or 
similar circumstances globally. The circumstances that skilled and experienced professionals may find when 
evaluating the range of pollution prevention and control techniques available to a project may include, but are 
not limited to, varying levels of environmental degradation and environmental assimilative capacity as well as 
varying levels of financial and technical feasibility 
193 2007 World Bank HSE Guidelines, p.1   
194 Id. 
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offshore oil and gas development.195 It provides for measures necessary to prevent spill and 
emphasises the need for Spill Response Plans.196 It addresses occupational health and safety 
issues like well blowout.197 But liability and compensation were not addressed in the 
guidelines. These guidelines are persuasive, especially to entities and countries engaged in 
World Bank sponsored projects. Moreover, they have the potential for indirect application to 
developing countries of requirement for EIA and other standards in Conventions to which they 
are not party to as condition of International Finance Corporation (IFC) or other international 
project financing. 
 
2.8.6 Guidelines and Standards by Professional Institutes 
 
In addition to binding and non-binding international legal instruments that regulate offshore 
petroleum operations, there are recommended practices, guidelines and standards provided by 
private institutions. These standards are seen as good oil field practice that operators in the 
industry are expected to use in their activities. They influence safety and technical operations 
in the industry.   
These are Guidelines for the Conduct of Offshore Drilling Hazard Site Surveys 2013198 adopted 
by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IAOGP). The American Petroleum 
Institute (API) also have recommended guidelines and practices relating to Planning, 
Designing, and Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms Working Stress Design,199 Seismic 
Design Procedures and Criteria for Offshore Structures,200 Structural Integrity Management of 
                                                          
195 See 2007 World Bank HSE Guidelines, Clause 1.1  
196 Id., Section 1.1, pp10-11 
197 Id., Section 1.2 
198 Report No. 373-18-1,Version 1.2, April 2013 
199 API Recommended Practice 2A-WSD, 22nd ed. November 2014 
200 ANSI/API Recommended Practice 2EQ/ISO 19901-2, 1st ed. November 2014 
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Fixed Offshore Structures,201 Deepwater Well Design Considerations,202 Well Construction 
Interface Document,203 Cementing, Isolation and Barriers,204 and Practices for Blowout 
Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells.205 These guidelines, practices and standards 
influence industry practice and are in some cases incorporated into national legislation.206 
 
2.9 Conclusion  
 
There are various binding international norms and regulations on offshore oil and gas E&P, 
especially at the regional level. The principal concern is the adequacy of these regulations. 
Beyond the framework provided by UNCLOS at the global level there are few detailed 
provisions on requirements for prevention, emergency response and liability and 
compensation. UNCLOS provides guide to regions on the adoption of regional agreements and 
States in their formulation of domestic regimes on offshore oil and gas operations.  
However, there is no designated international organisation to ensure the development of rules 
and regulations governing offshore petroleum E&P the way the IMO does for shipping. 
Therefore, regions and States exercise a lot of discretion in the regulation of their offshore 
petroleum industries. The result being that while some regions have adopted instruments 
covering offshore petroleum operations others have no such regulations. The different concerns 
and focus of various regions and nations also affect the content of regional instruments and 
national regulations. What is obviously absent at the global level is detailed instrument on 
                                                          
201 API Recommended Practice 2SIM, 1st ed. November 2014 
202 API Recommended Practice 96 
203 API Bulletin 97 
204 API Recommended Practice 95-2 
205 API Standards 53 
206 See Deepwater: the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling-Report to the President (National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling), p.225 (January 2011); Section 362 
Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) 2012 which interprets “good oilfield practice” to mean, inter alia, 
“knowledge of and compliance with the latest standards developed by relevant professional institutions” like 
API, the British Standard Institute (BSI) and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)  
  
74 
 
prevention of accidental pollution, liability and compensation for accidental pollution. Issues 
such as the responsible party and breach of safety regulations; liability and compensation for 
accidental pollution; locus standing to sue and equal access to justice especially in cases of 
transboundary pollution are not clearly defined in some regions and at the global level.     
The OPRC contains broad provisions on emergency response but may need more details for 
better implementation and response to the magnitude of damage a major hazard in offshore 
installation may cause. The detailed analysis and recommendation would be expounded later 
in chapter five. 
In addition to global frameworks the regional regimes address accidental pollution from 
offshore petroleum operations but deal with different aspects in varying degrees. The 2013 EU 
Directive on offshore safety provides more comprehensive provisions on safety and prevention 
of accidental pollution and emergency response. The extent to which the directive would 
influence regional conventions and municipal laws of EU member States is reviewed in 
subsequent chapters. While the Directive offers EU’s commitment to safety of offshore 
operations globally it remains binding only within the EU. The need for offshore safety to 
prevent major hazards globally remains unguaranteed by international law.  
The EU is also commitment to promoting high safety standards of offshore operations 
including the Arctic in relevant global and regional fora and call for global cooperation.207 The 
Arctic has very challenging environment characterised by ice most part of the year, low 
temperature, lack of existing communication, logistical and information infrastructure, low 
visibility and hours of daylight. There is lack of access to expert help and knowledge of its 
geology is limited.208 These environmental and infrastructural challenges are not only a concern 
                                                          
207 Art.33(3) 
208 National Academy of Sciences, ‘Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment’ (the 
National Academies Press) pp.1-12 (2014)  
  
75 
 
for exploration but also a problem for emergency response in the event of a spill.209 The EU 
commitment is a welcome development in view of the absence of binding international 
regulation of petroleum activities in the arctic offshore. The countries bordering the Arctic are 
not of one region or continent. Therefore, in addition to the Arctic Council,210 a broader than 
regional approach would be ideal in building consensus on issues of safety and accident 
prevention, emergency response, and liability and compensation. Considering the special 
nature of Arctic environment, actions in this regard would contribute to achieving sustainable 
protection of the global marine environment. 
The international legal framework is complemented by other non-binding rules and standards 
set by international organisations like UNEP, World Bank, IMO and UN Conferences on the 
environment. But these non-binding instruments, though persuasive, cannot be part of 
‘applicable international rules and standards’ obligatory on States to implement in addressing 
accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations. However, instruments such as the 
Stockholm and Rio declarations have influenced the content and interpretation of many 
environmental multilateral agreements. Private professional institutions also provide 
guidelines and standards as good oil field practices to improve safety and technical operations 
to prevent accidents.  
The various legal regimes and their adequacy in terms of accident prevention, emergency 
response and liability and compensation in a post Macondo era would be examined in chapters 
four, five and six. 
                                                          
209 Id., p.28 
210 The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction 
among the Arctic States on issues such as environmental protection and sustainable development. The Member 
States are Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian 
Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America; see 1996 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic 
Council (1996 Ottawa Declaration), Clauses 1 and 2 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF OFFSHORE 
PETROLEUM OPERATIONS 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
Offshore petroleum exploration and production has been acknowledged by both industry 
operators and regulators as a technologically challenging activity involving high risks. 
Operational and environmental challenges underpin the notion of a possibility of accidents and 
pollution. Hence, it requires good safety practice, the best of technological expertise and 
financial capacity to engage in and respond to the negative consequences of any eventuality.  
This chapter looks at the technical aspects of offshore petroleum E&P, challenging sea 
conditions and installations used in the operations. Also, it highlights the environmental impact 
of operational discharges and accidental pollution of petroleum activities.  
 
3.1 The Offshore Petroleum Environment 
Offshore oil and gas operations1 take place within the continental margins of coastal States. 
These are areas of the sea bed that are contiguous to and lying seaward of the baseline. 
According to the European Union ‘offshore’ is “situated in the territorial sea, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone or the continental shelf of a Member State within the meaning of the United 
                                                          
1 By EU legal regime a reference to ‘offshore oil and gas operations’ would mean “all activities associated with 
an installation or connected infrastructure, including design, planning, construction, operation and 
decommissioning thereof, relating to exploration and production of oil or gas, but excluding conveyance of oil 
and gas from one coast to another”, see Article 2(3) of  EU Directive 2013/30/EU on offshore safety; but this 
thesis is focused on accidental pollution at the operational stage. 
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.2 The continental margin comprises of three 
portions, that is, the continental shelf,3 the continental slope and the continental rise which 
inclines seaward from the base of the continental slope. See (Figure 1).4  
Figure 1: Continental Shelf and Slope  
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
 
Offshore operations are carried out at various depths. Initial exploration and exploitation of 
petroleum offshore was done in shallow waters.5 Following advancement in technology, 
offshore exploitation and production (E&P) moved to deep waters with depths of over 1,000 
feet and ultra-deep waters of 10,000 feet.6 Deep and ultra-deep waters have extreme climatic 
                                                          
2 See EU Directive 2013/30/EU on Offshore Safety, Art. 2(2)  
3 UNCLOS, Art.66 provides that “The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of 
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory 
to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which 
the breath of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.” This definition is different from the 
definition given by the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention where it was described in terms of water depth and 
exploitability. For full commentary on the extent of the continental shelf under the UNCLOS see  Centre For 
Ocean Law and Policy, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. II, 
Nordquist (ed.) (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 825-890 (1993) 
4 Energy Information Administration, ‘Overview of U.S. Legislation and Regulations Affecting Offshore 
Natural Gas and Oil Activity’, Office of Oil and Gas, p.2 (September 2005) 
5 Like the 1896 well drilled at Summerland Field in the Santa Barbara Channel in California, see Deepwater 
Horizon Commission Report to the President. The first commercial offshore oil well drilled by a mobile rig off 
the coast of South eastern Louisiana by Mobil in 1947 was in water depth of 14 feet, History of the Offshore 
Industry, available at http://www.offshore-mag.com/index/about-us/history-of-offshore.html last visited on 5 
April 2013. Though there are other sources that state 1937 as the year of Mobil well and records that Kerr-
McGee's (Anadarko Petroleum) well of 1947 drilled at their Vermilion platform the first oil discovery drilled 
out of sight of land, see Offshore Drilling  at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offshore_drilling 
6 The depth of water where one of the deepest offshore oil well was drilled in 2009 by the ill-fated Deepwater 
Horizon in the Tiber Oil Field at Keathley Canyon block 102, 250 miles Southeast of Houston was 1,259m 
(4,132 feet). The well has a vertical depth of 35,050 feet (10,683m) and measured depth of 35,055 feet 
(10,685m). See BP Makes Giant Deep Water Discovery at Tiber available at 
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conditions that may complicate the control of subsea installations, response to emergency and 
major accident.7 The velocity of the wind is usually high while the waves or tidal swings could 
be as high as 30 feet and beyond.8 These conditions are believed to be critical as explained by 
the US National Academies:  
“Offshore drilling, especially in deep water, is an inherently hazardous activity. 
Construction of deepwater wells like Macondo is a complex process. Sophisticated 
equipment is used, such as the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, which must operate in 
a highly coordinated manner in areas of uncertain geology, often under challenging 
environmental conditions, and subject to failures from a variety of sources including 
those induced by human and organizational errors.”9      
The Arctic offshore present its own complex environmental challenges. It has limited day light, 
ice, low temperature, permafrost, limited knowledge of its geology, absence of supporting 
facility and infrastructure, sparse or limited bathymetric information, remoteness and lack of 
access to expert help, remoteness, isolation and human factors.10  
                                                          
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=79913 last visited on 11 March 2013; the ill-fated Macondo well 
was being drilled in water depths of about 5,000 feet. 
7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Facing the Challenge of 
the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities {SEC(2010) 1193 final} COM(2010) 560 final, p.3  
8 Oregon State University, Maximum Height of Extreme Waves up Dramatically in Pacific Northwest, Online at 
http://oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/2010/jan/maximum-height-extreme-waves-dramatically-pacific-northwest 
accessed on 8 April 2013; The waves in the location of the Piper Alpha were over 40 feet, see Read, Colin, BP 
and the Macondo Spill: The Complete Story, (Palgrave Macmillan) p. 76 (2011); Hurricane in the Gulf of 
Mexico could produce winds of 150 mph and waves as high as 75 feet and above, see Shell: Oil and Gas 
Offshore Production, p.3,  available at http://www-
static.shell.com/content/dam/shell/static/usa/downloads/alaska/os101-ch3.pdf  accessed 21 February 2013  
9 Committee on Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater, Horizon Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill to Identify 
Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents in the Future; National Academy of Engineering and National Research 
Council Report, Macondo Well-Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety, 
(National Academies Press) p.3 2012, hereafter (NAENRC Deepwater Horizon Report 2012), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13273 last visited on 25 March 2013 
10 Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness And Response (EPPR) Working Group Doc. ACSAO-
SE03, Doc. 4.1, November 2012: Final Draft of Recommended Practices for Arctic Oil Spill Prevention (The 
RP3 Project), para 3.4 (Hereafter Arctic Council RP3 Project) 
  
79 
 
Exploration offshore begins with seismic data collection to detect the type of “subsurface 
configuration” where oil and gas are found.11 This stage of exploration is accompanied by 
significant physical presence that causes ground vibration which brings with it environmental 
impacts such as visibility and clearance, acoustic emission, accidental spills and pollution of 
water and land.12  
Positive seismic and geological surveys are followed by exploration and appraisal phases 
which in most cases encompass the drilling of appraisal wells to determine the commercial 
viability of the reservoir. Considerable physical presence stems from drilling mud dumps, drill 
cuttings discharge, atmospheric emissions from machinery, accidental spills (small and major), 
blowouts, waste disposal and noise. These problems interfere with fishing and shipping and 
cause marine pollution with impacts on fish stocks, sea plants, birds, sea mammals and 
nuisance for coastal businesses and its inhabitants.13  
Also, the possibility of an accident, if operations are not properly managed and executed, is 
very high at this stage.  
 
3.2 Offshore Platforms and Rigs Used for Exploration and 
Exploitation of Petroleum 
 
Offshore platforms provide facilities and equipment required for E&P of oil and gas in the 
marine environment.14 With increased search for petroleum in deep and ultra-deep waters the 
                                                          
11 See Furor over Offshore Drilling, 2 EPA J. 2, at 3 (1976) 
12 Zhiguo Gao (ed.), Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas, (Kluwer Law International 1998) 
13 Id at p.5 
14 see Morten Holmager, (ed.), Offshore Book: An Introduction to the offshore Industry (Offshore Centre 
Denmark) p.39 2010, on line at http://www.offshorecenter.dk/log/bibliotek/OffshoreBook2010.pdf  accessed on 
19 February, 2013 (hereafter Offshore Book) 
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technology for design and construction of deep and ultra-deep ocean compliant structures keeps 
evolving.15   
In order to address the dynamics and challenge of structural fatigue, the design of offshore 
structures take into account maximum load occurrence frequencies over a period of time, water 
depth and wave and weather scenarios to achieve a maximum level of safety. Some of these 
installations are gravity islands, steel jacket, jack-up platforms, gravity base structures, star 
platforms, complaint towers, tension leg platforms, semi-submersibles, spars, floating 
production storage and offloading units (FPSOs), mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs), 
subsea production systems and ice resistant rigs.   
Sea conditions and water depth influence the type of installation used. For instance, gravity 
islands may be used in water depths of up to 50 feet year-round and are commonly used in the 
Arctic regions16 while steel jacket platforms which are usually intended for long-term are 
ordinarily used in shallow to medium water depth areas of the sea. Also, jack-up rigs are used 
mainly in relatively low water depths.17  
Tension Leg Platforms can be used in up to 6,000 feet of water and could serve as utility, 
satellite or early production platforms in large deep water sites.18 MODUs are used for 
exploration wells and subsea production wells like the ill-fated Deepwater Horizon in BP’s 
Macondo field. Similarly, FPSOs can operate in water depths up to 10,000 feet. With the 
                                                          
15 Id; According to the Offshore Book, following the rise in oil prices in the 70s and again from 2005, the 
development of oil from offshore has been systematically encouraged to enable nations attain self-sufficiency. 
In addition, population growth and increased worldwide demand for energy has encouraged the offshore 
venture.  
16 Shell: Oil and Gas Offshore Production, supra note 8, p.3 
17 Offshore Book, note supra 14, pp.29 and 43 
18 Offshore Book, supra note 14, p.42 
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gradual increase in investment towards drilling in the Arctic, ice resistant drilling rigs are used 
to advance drilling operations in the Arctic region.19   
 
3.3 Environmental Aspects of Offshore Operations  
 
Environmental impact resulting from production of oil and gas offshore has been of special 
concern20 as the extraction of oil and gas from subsurface deposits modifies the physical 
environment.21 The two circumstances in which the marine environment is impacted by 
offshore petroleum operation are operational pollution and accidental pollution. However, not 
all oil components in the sea come from operational or accidental pollution of offshore 
petroleum operations. Some have seeped naturally for thousand and more years but assimilated 
into the marine environment without problems.22 
 
3.3.1 Operational Pollution  
 
Operational pollution is a result of discharges associated with the normal day to day operations 
of offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation. These operational discharges vary both in 
types and quantity with various levels of harm to the environment.23 The polluting substances 
                                                          
19 An impressive drillship for possible use in the Arctic is the Stena Drillmax Ice constructed at the cost of 
$1.3billion. See Upstream Technology, Quarter 1, 2013, p. 23 available at     
http://www.upstreamonline.com/upstreamtechnology/   last visited 17 February 2013. GustoMSC, one of the 
most active designers of drilling rigs for arctic regions is working on turrent-moored drillship and a jack-up for 
operation in ice, p.23 
20 Wilder, Robert J., ‘Cooperative Governance, Environmental Policy, and Management of Offshore Oil and 
Gas in the United States’ in Ocean Development and International Law, Vol 24, p.41 at p.42 
21 Committee on The Cumulative Environmental effects of Oil and Gas Activities on Alaska’s Slope North 
Slope, National Research Council, Cumulative Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on the Alaska’s 
North Slope (The National Academies press)(2003) p.64 
22 See Brubaker, Douglas, Marine Pollution and International Law: Principles and Practice (Belhaven Press: 
London and Paris) p.12 1993 
23 Vinogradov, S. V. and Wagner, J. P., Combating Operational Pollution from Offshore Petroleum Activities, 
CEPMLP Paper CP 1/97 p.5; see also, Vinogradov, S. V. and Wagner, J. P., ‘International Legal regime for the 
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include both chemicals and by-products of well drilling and discharges during production. At 
least 25 chemicals are used in offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation.24 Though these 
chemicals are widely used, control measures should be put in place to regulate their use and 
disposal to minimize their impact on marine environment. A good example of such regulation 
can be found in the region covered by OSPAR.25  
Discharges during exploration are composed of drilling fluids (or drilling muds) which are 
essential elements of drilling technology and in most cases are accompanied by hydrocarbons 
and surface active chemicals that make the fluid very toxic.26 There are two basic forms of 
drilling muds; the oil based mud and the water based mud. Though water based mud (WBM) 
is commonly used in offshore drilling as it is considered much friendly to the marine 
environment,27 sometimes oil-based mud (OBM) or synthetic-based mud (SBM) is used when 
drilling conditions become more difficult and the use of water based mud become 
inappropriate. The type of mud used is usually determined by economics as well as by the 
                                                          
Protection of the Marine Environment against Operational Pollution from Offshore Petroleum Activities’ in 
Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas, Zhiguo Gao (ed.), (Kluwer Law International) 93 1998 
24 OffshoreBook, supra note 14, p.34. These are Acidity control, Drag reducing agent, Antifoam, Dye, 
Asphaltene dissolver, Flocculant, Asphaltene inhibitor, Gas hydrate inhibitor, Biocide, Hydraulic fluid, Carrier 
solvent, Hydrogen sulphide scavenger, Coagulant Oxygen scavenger, Coolant, Scale dissolver, Corrosion 
inhibitor, Scale inhibitor, Demulsifier, Water clarifier, Deoiler, Wax dissolver, Detergent/cleaning fluid, Wax 
inhibitor and Dispersant.  
25 OSPAR regulatory measures are contained in OSPAR Decision 2000/2 on a Harmonised Mandatory Control 
System for the Use and Reduction of the Discharge of Offshore Chemicals (as amended), OSPAR 
Recommendation 2000/4 on a Harmonised Pre-Screening Scheme for Offshore Chemicals (as amended) and 
OSPAR Recommendation 2000/5 on a Harmonised Offshore Chemical Notification Format (HOCNF) (as 
amended) 
26 Wilder, Robert J., supra note 19, p.42; In the North East seas covered by OSPAR Commission discharge of 
drilling mud has been banned. Studies done by Norway indicate that in some cases the impacts from the 
discharge of drilling mud were severe while in some other areas levels of potential contaminants and areas of 
impact have decreased substantially since the cessation of discharges in 1996, see  OSPAR Commission: 
Assessment of Impacts of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities in the North-East Atlantic (2009) p.22,  available on 
line at http://qsr2010.ospar.org/media/assessments/p00453_OA3-BA5_ASSESSMENT.pdf  accessed on 19 
February, 2013 (hereafter OSPAR Commission Report 2009).  
27 In confirmation of that difference the OSPAR Commission Report 2009, supra note 20, p.24 states that “the 
Ekofisk region (monitoring region A) is a mature area with a decreasing trend in area contaminated by barium 
and area of disturbed fauna. This is due to the change from oil-based to water-based drilling fluids following 
OSPAR Decision 2000/3 on the Use of Organic-Phase Drilling Fluids (OPF) and the Discharge of OPF-
contaminated Cuttings and reduced oil and gas activities in the area. The monitoring region B in the Norwegian 
Sea from 64 – 66 degrees north is a more recently developed area with increasing area contaminated with 
barium from water based drilling fluids and THC from oil production.” 
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effect it will have on the environment. Though OBM costs much more per unit than WBM,28 
the long term economic cost of OBM far outweighs that of WBM. But all discharges of OBM 
can be hazardous due to their persistence in the marine environment and low bio-degradation 
level.   
Closely linked to drilling mud is drill cuttings29 which are usually contaminated by chemicals 
associated with drilling muds. Though the impact of these cuttings is localised and temporary, 
it may in combination with water based drilling mud cause a bit of smothering in areas in the 
vicinity of the well.30 Another element of operational pollution is produced water which 
contains some level of crude oil constituents, organic chemicals, natural and added salts, solids 
and heavy metals.31 Produced water at varying degrees of salinity is discharged into the ocean 
in the course of offshore operations.32 Produced water is of major concern to the OSPAR 
Commission as most oil entering the marine environment during E&P is through produced 
water.33  
There are other forms of discharges like well-completion and work-over fluids, cement 
residues, produced sand, deck drainage, blow-out preventer (BOP) fluid, gas and oil processing 
wastes, slop oil sanitary and domestic wastes. Most of the sewage and garbage originating from 
offshore installations contain high concentration of suspended solids which may not be too 
                                                          
28 Evans, Shelley M., ‘Control of Marine Pollution Generated by Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Exploitation: The Scotian Shelf’, 10 Marine Policy, No.4, (1986) p. 261. OBM, according to Shelley, is a much 
more efficient lubricant which results in substantially reduced drilling time. The author also stated that in an 
experimental exploration well on the Scotian Shelf, $200,000 was saved by recycling the AOBM and the reduced 
number of drilling days saved $3 million.  
29 Drill cuttings are made of crushed rock and clay. 
30 Davies, J.M. and Kingston, P.F., ‘Sources of Environmental disturbance Associated with Offshore Oil and Gas 
Developments’ in William J. Cairns (ed.), North Sea Oil and the Environment: Developing Oil and Gas 
Resources, Environmental Impacts and Responses, (Essex: Elsevier Science Publishers Ltd.)p.428 1992 
31 Evans, Shelley M., supra note 28, p.263; see also OSPAR Commission Report 2009, note 26, p.14 which 
explains that “Produced water is the water found in reservoirs along with the oil or gas. When the oil or gas is 
extracted, produced water is associated with it. Entrained within the water there are hydrocarbons that are, as far 
as possible, removed from the water prior to any discharge.” 
32 OSPAR Commission Report 2009, supra note 26, p.27; It also states that within the OSPAR Region 
“Environmental monitoring of the physical impacts arising by the placing a structure on the seabed is 
undertaken on a case by case basis depending on the particular sensitivities associated in the area.”- See p.19 
33 OSPAR Commission Report 2009, supra note 26, p.13 
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damaging to the environment if discharged in reasonable quantities as they are usually 
degradable.34  
There is also the menace of atmospheric emissions from venting and flaring of gas.35 Most of 
these pollutants are non-degradable, with domestic wastes being the only exception.36 The 
consistent presence of the non-degradable toxic chemicals in the marine environment could in 
some cases last for many generations of marine plant and animal life.37  
While land-based activities and shipping may contribute more to marine pollution than offshore 
petroleum operations, the latter’s ability to pollute the marine environment is also high. With 
increase in offshore E&P of petroleum, these activities would in years to come be significant 
source of marine pollution, especially, when current offshore fields become spent and much 
more water is injected to sustain pressure in the reservoir. The process will possibly result in 
increased produced water.38 This is of great concern as most of these offshore installations are 
located in biologically productive parts of the ocean with fragile and sensitive ecosystems that 
harbour significant fisheries.39 
In addition to pollution of the marine environment, offshore installations constitute 
navigational hindrances when linked with pipelines that can get ruptured in the course of 
                                                          
34 Gavouneli, M., Pollution From Offshore Installations, International Environmental Law & Policy Series 
(Graham & Trotman/martinus Nijhoff) p.35 (1995)   
35 OSPAR Commission Report 2009, p13; GESAMP (IMO/FAO/UNESCO/WMO/IAEA/UN/UNEP Joint 
Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, Impact of Oil and Related Chemicals and waste 
on the Marine Environment, GESAMP Reports and Studies No. 50, at 102-103 (1993); see also Gavouneli, 
Maria, supra note  34, at  p.35   
36 Gavouneli, Maria,  supra note 34, p.35 
37 Id; Neff and Anderson, ‘Response of Marine Animals to Petroleum and Specific Petroleum Hydrocarbons’ in 
Clark and Cole (eds.), The Long-term Effects of Oil Pollution on Marine Populations, Communities and 
Ecosystems, (London) 1981 
38 Vinogradov and Wagner, supra note 23 at p.6; The E & P Forum, North Sea Produced Water: Fate and 
Effects in the Marine Environment, Report No. 2.62/204, London p.13 (1994) 
39 Vinogradov and Wagner, supra note 23  at p.3 
  
85 
 
navigation in coastal waters and impact negatively on marine life and economic activities in 
varying ways.40 
Apart from oil and chemicals, noise generated in the process is also a major environmental 
concern in offshore operations.41 The effects of noise in offshore environment vary depending 
on the sensitivity of the organisms concerned and their proximity to the activity.  
 
3.3.2 Accidental Pollution 
 
In the context of this work, accidental pollution is the result of unintended discharge of 
petroleum in the course of exploration and exploitation of petroleum. Different factors are 
responsible for accidental discharges of oil and chemicals from offshore operations - equipment 
failure, human errors, organisational system failure and the difficulties of the operating 
environment. These factors could create problems that might result in serious blowout, fire and 
complete destruction of rigs and other offshore installations. Also, aging infrastructure could 
increase the risk of accidents.42  
Admittedly, exploration and exploitation of petroleum is inherently dangerous, more so in 
challenging offshore environment where the cost of operation is also higher than onshore 
environment.43 Different factors are responsible for accidents offshore. Generally, evidence 
from accidents indicates that they are as a result of human error and or equipment failure. 
                                                          
40 Id, Gavouneli , supra note 34 at p.41 
41 OSPAR Commission Report 2009, supra note 26, p.17, In the North East Sea covered by OSPAR noise is 
addressed within the OSPAR JAMP assessment and background document on noise (OSPAR, 2009b and c) 
42 OSPAR Commission report 2009, note 26, p.17. According to the OSPAR Commission Report, there are 
concerns that the ageing infrastructure in Region II might increase the risk of accidents resulting in spills of oil 
and chemicals. Hence, as a control measure, since 2000 industry’s awareness and need to report all spills 
irrespective of the spill size has increased due to better regulatory controls and increased environmental 
awareness. 
43 Read, Colin, supra note 8, p. 75; Gourlay, K. A, Poisoners of the Sea (Zed Books Ltd, London and New 
Jersey) p.50 (1988) 
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Human error was responsible for the January 1969 Santa Barbara Channel incident off the coast 
of Summerland in the waters of California. The well was 3,479 feet and was yet to be properly 
cased when the drill bit was removed from the well. The increased pressure caused by this 
action could not be contained which resulted in a blowout. The Ekofisk Bravo blowout of 22 
April 1977 was also as a result of human error.  In the course of maintenance, the blowout 
preventer was mistakenly installed or placed upside down on the well head. Another major 
disaster resulting from human error in maintenance process was the 1988 Piper Alpha fire in 
the United Kingdom’s continental shelf in the North Sea in which 167 lives were lost. 
The Funiwa 5 platform blowout on 17 January 1980, 8 kilometres off the coast of Nigeria in 
the Gulf of Guinea was caused by technical fault involving the collapse of the borehole wall, 
which then plunged into the well. Similarly, on 2 October 1980, the Saudi Arabian Hashah 6 
platform with the Ron Tappmayer, a jack-up rig, experienced a blowout as a result of release 
of hydrogen sulphide fumes along with the petroleum.44 There are other situations that may 
cause accidental pollution in offshore petroleum operations.45 These could be due to metal 
fatigue of the rig structure,46 weakness as a result of weather conditions such as impact of 
                                                          
44 Gourlay, K. A., supra note 43, p.101 
45 Chevron operated KS Endeavour, a drilling platform leased from FODE Drilling Company burst into flame of 
the coast of Nigeria on 16 January 2012 due to suspected failure of surface equipment resulting in a ‘gas kick’. 
Two persons were killed. 
46 BP’s Sea Gem, a self-elevating barge and one of the earliest drilling rigs in UK Continental Shelf of the North 
Sea collapsed as a result of metal fatigue. The rig legs collapsed on 28 December 1965, killing 13 persons on 
board. 
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waves on the structure of the rig or installation,47 towline failure48 and collisions.49 Moreover, 
there are a few cases of design defect resulting in accidents involving petroleum installations.50 
In recent years the Macondo well51 blowout of 20 April 2010 in which a multitude of factors 
were responsible demonstrates the dangerous nature of offshore E&P, the serious 
environmental consequences and legal implications of their outcome. The Deepwater 
Horizon,52 a mobile offshore drilling rig was responsible for drilling an exploratory well which 
was later converted to a production well. The well, therefore, was to be put on temporary 
abandonment. However, close to completion of the abandonment process things went wrong.  
There was formation fracturing resulting in hydrocarbon flows and lost circulation events. This 
was compounded by poor cementing work that gave room for ‘pore pressure and fracture 
gradient’. The drilling team erroneously determined that the cementing work had been 
successfully completed and they proceeded to carryout negative pressure test aimed at 
establishing the integrity of the cemented production casing. Despite confusing signs and 
results, the drilling team concluded that the negative pressure test was a success. This turned 
out to be a wrong and costly decision.  
                                                          
47 On 2 January 1974, Transocean III, a self-elevating semi-submersible rig, operated by Mobil North Sea 
Limited sank in the North Sea as a result of structural defect inflicted on it by severe storm conditions in UK 
Continental Shelf. Same reasons were responsible for the sinking of Ocean Master II off the coasts of West 
Africa in June 1977. Also, on 15 February 1982, Mobil operated Ocean Ranger semi-submersible rig in the 
Hibernia Field sank off the coast of Newfoundland, Canada in the North Atlantic with 84 fatalities while  
Typhoon Gay in the Gulf of Thailand capsized the Seacrest Drillship on 3 November 1989, killing over 90 
persons 
48 During severe storm in the Gulf of Mexico, the towline of the Ocean Express, a jack-up rig, failed and sank 
on 15 April 1976 with 13 casualties. A similar fate befell Bohai 2 rig which was on tow in the Gulf of Bohai, off 
the coast of China when it capsized on 25 November 1979 as a result of storm. 
49 On 21 October 2007 in the Gulf of Mexico, Usumacinta, a PEMEX operated mobile rig, collided with the 
platform (Kab-101) causing fuel leaks and death of 21 workers. 
50 There was a design error in the gravity base of Sleipner, a platform operated by Statoil in the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf that ended in its structural failure on 23 August 1991. Similarly, a jack-up rig by name Mr 
Bice sank in Grand Isle, LaGulf of Mexico in June 1998 due to structural failure and flooding. 
51 The Macondo well operated by BP was located in the Mississippi Canyon region of the Gulf of Mexico, some 
50 miles off the coast of the state of Louisiana  
52 Operated by Transocean 
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The cementing gave way and there was escape of gas to the surface. Unfortunately, the blow 
out preventer (BOP) malfunctioned and technical well control measures and mechanism that 
were activated all failed. When well control could not be re-established flammable gas escaped 
from the well to the Deepwater Horizon. The gas which came in contact with oxygen caused 
double explosions and ignited fire on the Deepwater Horizon. After about 36 hours in flames 
the Deepwater Horizon sank and oil gushed uncontrollably from the Macondo well. At the time 
the well was finally ‘killed’ in July 2010, an estimated 5 million barrels of crude oil had seeped 
into the marine environment.53 The accident killed 11 workers and inflicted injuries on 16 
others. This spill was a pointer to the potential for offshore operations to cause serious 
environmental and human damage if not properly managed. The incident raised issues of 
effective response to offshore accidents, identification of the responsible party and the liability 
of the various actors (licensees, operator of the field and contractors) in an offshore E&P 
venture. 
Another incident of global legal significance was the Montara well H1 blowout of 27 August 
2009 which was also caused by a combination of equipment failure and human error. Drilling 
work on well H1 by West Atlas rig was temporarily ‘suspended’ on 21 April 2009 after 
supposedly putting in place measures to prevent escape of hydrocarbon. Unfortunately, on 7 
March, 2009 there was a defective installation of a cemented casing which resulted in a wet 
shoe that was not detected. Also, the integrity of the cementing was not tested and confirmed.  
On 19 August 2009 the West Atlas rig resumed work on well H1. In the morning of 21 August 
2009 the well kicked twice and resulted in a blowout. Human error and wrong judgement of 
both personnel on board the platform and onshore were blamed for the incident.54 The amount 
of oil introduced into the sea was relatively small compared to the Macondo blowout but the 
                                                          
53 NAENRC Deepwater Horizon Report 2012, supra note 9, pp.4-9 
54 Montara Commission Report, pp. 49-52, 343-350 
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significance of the Montara spill was its transboundary impact that raised issues of liability and 
compensation. It raised questions about the responsible party for the damage done to 
Indonesian waters in the Timor River. Can Australia be held responsible or is it PTTEP the 
operator that should be held liable for the damage to Indonesian waters? Who has locus 
standing to claim against a responsible party and is there access to justice for the victims in 
Indonesia? 
Another incident which raised questions of civil liability and compensations for transboundary 
harm arising from offshore petroleum E&P was the Ixtoc I incident of 3 June 1979 in the Gulf 
of Mexico. It was caused by “a major loss of circulation” of drilling mud to the well55 which 
triggered a blowout, explosion and fire that resulted in the destruction and sinking of the rig. At 
the time the well was successfully capped in March 1980 an estimated 129 million gallons 
(about 3 million barrels) of oil had leaked into the marine environment and the spread of the 
oil polluted the US waters. Ixtoc I was operated by PEMEX, a Mexican state owned oil 
Company and raised issues of responsibility and liability of Mexico and the operator.   
Irrespective of safety measures that might be put in place there is always the probability of 
catastrophic accident like blowout56 that may cause damage to marine ecosystem and humans.  
 
3.4 Effect of Pollution from Offshore Operations 
 
Petroleum operations by definition are adverse for the ecosystem, biodiversity and even social 
cultural dimensions.57 The effects of oil on the marine environment range from the total 
                                                          
55 The Impact of the Blowout of the Mexican Oil Well Ixtoc I and the Resultant Oil Pollution on Texas and the 
Gulf of Mexico: Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the 
Subcommittee on Water Resources of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, 96th 
Congress, 1st Session 21 (1979) (Statement of Stephen Mahood); Macdonald, William J., ‘Ixtoc I: International 
and Domestic Remedies for Transboundary Pollution Injury’ 49 Fordham L. Rev 404 (1980-1981) 
56 See Brubaker, Douglas, supra note 22, p.37  
57 Zhiguo Gao, supra note 12, p.8 
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disruption of the ecosystem, destruction of sensitive immature life-forms or the elimination of 
food sources, to sub-lethal effects like poisoning, physiological changes and 
bioaccumulation.58 When a spill occurs the species that will immediately be impacted are the 
organisms on the water surface, namely seabirds, marine mammals, minute organisms 
associated with the surface film and plankton (organisms in surface waters).59 Humans are not 
safe either.60  
Once oil is discharged into the sea approximately 1/3 to 2/3 of it will evaporate into the 
atmosphere and most of the oil become oxidized in a photochemical process in the atmosphere. 
Petrochemical oxidation and microbial degradation affect the oil chemically several hours or 
even days later. While petrochemical oxidation is a significant process, acting on oil on the 
ocean surface, dissolution into the water column is of considerably less importance because of 
the low solubility in water of most compounds of oil.61  
The rate at which oil spreads on water is determined by wind, waves and the water current. It 
is discovered that open beaches with high wave action most times have only 10% or less of oil 
remaining after a year but in the case of low energy beaches with less wave action oil pollution 
may last for more than a year and up to several decades.62 However, how oil will actually 
                                                          
58 Evans, Shelley M., supra note 28, p. 264 
59 Dicks, B.M. and White, I.C., ‘Oil Spills –Effects and Response’, in William J. Cairns (ed.), North Sea Oil and 
the Environment: Developing Oil and Gas Resources, Environmental Impacts and Responses, (Essex: Elsevier 
Science Publishers Ltd.)p.445 1992. On the impact of accidental pollution on the marine environment see 
generally Patin, Stanislav, Environmental Impact of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry, (East Northport: 
EcoMonitor Publishing) 1999; Boesch, Donald F. and Rabalais, Nancy N. (eds.), Long Term Environmental 
Effects of Offshore Oil and Gas Development ( London: Elsevier Applied Science Publishers Ltd.) 1987; 
William J. Cairns (ed.), North Sea Oil and the Environment: Developing Oil and Gas Resources, Environmental 
Impacts and Responses, (Essex: Elsevier Science Publishers Ltd.) 1992; the reports of the Group of Experts on 
Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution (GESAMP) entitled “The Impact of Oil on the Marine Environment,” 
Report No 6 1977 and GESAMP, supra note 35; the US National Academy of Science  2003 report called Oil in 
the Sea III: Inputs, Fates and Effects (2003) 
60 According to Gourlay, “wrapped up, and frequently lost sight of, in the jargon are the simple fact that oil in 
the sea leads not only to such obvious, and pitiful, disasters as the death of thousands of seabirds, but has 
longer-term, more potentially far-reaching, effects on mammals, fish, plankton, plant life, and, through the food 
chain, may even affect human beings”, Gourlay, K. A., supra note 43, p.84 
61 Dicks, B.M. and White, I.C., supra note 59; Gourlay, K. A., supra note 43, p.105  
62 See Brubaker, Douglas, supra note 22, p.14 
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behave in the arctic is not certain as there has been no petroleum E&P incident in the Arctic 
offshore. What is clear is that it will impact on the environment and the difficulties of access 
to site, limited daylight and harsh weather conditions would make response difficult.63  
 
3.4.1 Effect on Humans 
 
The negative impact of oil spill is emphasised more in relation to the environment, ecosystem 
and biodiversity than humans. In reality humans are greatly impacted by offshore petroleum 
exploration activities as they suffer economic losses following suspension of fishing activities 
and other marine related businesses. They may also suffer health complications from direct 
contact with oil and consumption of polluted fish. Some chemicals used in offshore operations 
may cause allergy, skin irritation or more serious effects such as cancer.64  
 
3.4.2 Effect on Fish 
 
Pollution by oil and chemicals used in offshore operations is a serious threat to the fish 
population, though the impact is much greater in cases of accidental pollution. An oil polluted 
environment has the effect of terminating life of fish and also push adults fish that are of great 
commercial value to deeper waters for safety. This makes them to be out of the reach of the 
fishing industry that usually carry out their trade within the waters of coastal States.65  
                                                          
63 National Geographic, ‘What Happens When Oil Spills in the Arctic?’ Available at   
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/04/140423-national-research-council-on-oil-spills-in-
arctic/ last visited 10 August 2015; National Academy of Sciences, Responding to Oil Spill in the US Arctic 
Marine Environment (National Academy Press) P.28 (2014); See also Arctic Council RP3 Project  
64 OSPAR Commission Report 2009, supra note 26, p.14 
65 Gavouneli, supra note 34, pp.38-39 
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Fish are affected through intake of spilled oil or contaminated prey and dissolved oil 
compounds through the gills. There are effects of oil on fish eggs and larva survival and by the 
ecological change caused by the oil. Fish appear more sensitive to short, acute exposures to oil 
and absorb lethal quantities in relatively shorter periods than invertebrates.66 Fish eggs and 
larvae are easily affected by fluctuations in temperature and salinity and by pollutants in 
general due to their lack of sufficient structures and organs capable of detoxifying oil.67  
 
3.4.3 Effect on Marine Mammals 
 
Oil related activities like underwater explosions, drilling noise, discharge of poisonous 
chemicals and noise from drill ships may have damaging effect on marine mammals.68 When 
oil is released into water in the course of normal operations or accidentally, mammals (and 
turtles) that may consume food tainted with oil are exposed to potential toxic effects. There is 
indication to suggest that some tissue hydrocarbons may reduce breeding success in both birds 
and mammals.69 Oil in large quantities may also coat fur of some marine mammals which 
reduces their ability to provide buoyancy and insulation, leading to increased mortality.70  
                                                          
66 See Brubaker, Douglas,  supra note 22, p. 18 
67 Exposure to BP oil-contaminated sediment causes defects in Killifish, study says, available at 
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/05/exposure_to_sediment_contamina.html#incart_river 
accessed on 8 May 2013 
68 Brubaker, D., supra note 22, p.23 
69 OSPAR Commission Report 2009, supra note 26, p.13 
70 Id. According to the OSPAR Commission Report 2009 supra note 26, at p.30 “Evidence indicates that for 
marine mammals there may be some behavioural changes in areas where seismic surveys are being undertaken 
with reduced vocalisation and some evidence of avoidance behaviour. Temporary threshold shifts in hearing can 
occur if they are within close proximity of sound source. Impacts on fish from seismic surveys have been shown 
to occur with an increase in fish mortality less than 5 metres from the sound source. Temporary threshold shifts 
and behavioural responses have also been reported. Evidence from North Sea indicates potentially large scale 
avoidance of areas where seismic surveys are being undertaken with fish either moving into deeper water or 
avoiding the area altogether. Experiments undertaken in the North Sea on sandeels indicated relatively minor 
responses from seismic surveys with no increases in mortality.” 
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3.4.4 Effect on Marine Birds 
 
Marine birds are among marine species most impacted by oil and gas operations, especially 
when there is an accidental spill of great amount of oil. These birds are affected as they live 
most of their lives on the surface of the sea where spilled oil is also concentrated.71 The oil 
clogs the feathers that are essential to birds in maintaining water repellency and heat insulation. 
The loss of repellency allows the bird’s feathers to absorb water and result in the bird sinking 
and drowning.72 Loss of insulation greatly increases metabolism to maintain body heat, in 
which case the bird exhausts its fat and muscular energy reserves and dies as a result.73 Also, 
when cleaning oiled feathers, birds may in the process swallow oil with attendant toxic effects.   
 
3.4.5 Effect upon Marine Bacteria, Phytoplankton and 
Invertebrates 
 
There are bacterial cells and bacterial–consuming micro-organisms in the ocean that transfer 
energy, sunlight or organic material to the food chain. When oil spill occurs, these dead organic 
materials increase and feed on dissolved oil and on oil droplets resulting from the soluble 
components of oil.74  Oil affects invertebrates like snails, crabs and shell clams even after a 
considerable length of time of the occurrence of a spill.75Another micro-organism which oil 
may affect is phytoplankton that is at “the bottom of the marine food chain and creates the basis 
                                                          
71 Gourlay, K. A., supra note 43, pp.110-111 
72 Clark, R. B., Marine Pollution, 5th edition (Oxford University Press) p.84 (reprint 2002 ) 
73 Id at p.24 
74 OSPAR Commission Report 2009, supra note 26, p.29  
75 Id  
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of life in the sea by its photosynthesis.”76 However, some argue that the effect of oil on this 
class of organisms is not as gloomy as some laboratory studies suggest.77    
 
3.4.6 Effect on Coastal Vegetation 
 
Heavy spill of oil affects the vegetation on the coast when it reaches the shore. While those 
lightly touched by oil may recover, the vegetation that is coated with thick layer of oil could 
be overwhelmed and the devastation can be catastrophic. Marshes that loss vegetation may be 
easily washed away by tidal erosion once there is loss of vegetation caused by oil spills. Death 
of trees and seedlings, defoliation and deformation may also occur. In tropical environments 
such as the Niger Delta of Nigeria and the Caribbean, mangrove swamps can be affected greatly 
by crude oil, though the damage may not be apparent immediately following the spill, as 
mangrove trees die slowly from the effect of oil.78 However, based on some situations where 
mangroves have survived oil spill their vulnerability to oil pollution may need further studies.79  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Offshore operations is increasingly technical and very challenging as activities move further 
into deep and ultra-deep waters. The challenges of the deep seas and the technology employed 
in the operations require great presence of mind and expertise. Anything less is an invitation to 
accident and major environmental disaster. 
                                                          
76 Id, this could be up to 8 years after the incident.  
77 Clark, R. B., supra note 72, pp.84-85 
78 Gourlay, K. A., supra note 43, p.107. This was evident in the case of the Funiwa 5 blowout in the Niger delta 
of Nigeria where it was discovered fourteen months after the spill that mangroves in an area of about 836 acres 
had died from the oil impact, see Incident News 17 January 1980, available online at  
http://incidentnews.noaa.gov/incident/6256/507727 last visited 19 August 2015  
79 Clark, R. B., supra note 72, p.85 
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Considering the serious environmental impact that offshore operations have on the marine 
environment, especially when accidents occur, it is imperative that both technical and human 
elements of these operations are sufficiently regulated at international and municipal levels to 
prevent accidental pollution.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTAL POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE 
PETROLEUM OPERATIONS 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
Offshore petroleum operations are undertaken in dynamic and challenging marine environment 
in which technical, human and organizational malfunctions may cause major accidents, 
including blowout which are a significant problem in the petroleum industry. A large scale fatal 
accident has occurred in every two to three years in the past thirty years.1 More than ever before 
the fundamental issue in offshore petroleum industry is how to prevent the occurrence of a 
major accident. This need to prevent accidents and environmental pollution is not peculiar to 
the petroleum industry but cuts across many industries and activities.2 Hence, great emphasis 
is being placed on the duty of prevention in international environmental law.3 Like the saying 
that ‘prevention is better than cure,’ the prevention of pollution is believed to be the smartest, 
cheapest and cleanest solution for the environment and public health.4  
Bearing in mind the requirements of the principle of prevention, this chapter would examine 
relevant international instruments, global and regional, containing obligation to prevent 
accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations. Also, the mechanisms to be employed 
in fulfilment of that obligation.    
 
                                                          
1 Health & Safety Middle East, The Three Cs of Oil and Gas Safety, op cit.; RPS Energy, Preventing Major 
Accidents in the Oil and Gas Industry, P.1 (2010) op. cit.  
2 The chemical industry has had its fair share of accidents, with the Bhopal disaster of December 1984 
considered as one of the world’s worst industrial accidents; in the nuclear industry, Chernobyl disaster of 1986 
and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of 2011 are sad reminders of the consequences of failure to prevent 
accidents  
3 Iron Rhine case (2005), paras. 55; Pulp Mill case (2010) pages 55-56, para. 101 
4 Pollution Prevention, EPA J. Vol.21 Issue 1, p.38 (1995) 
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4.1 Obligation to Prevent Accidental Pollution from Offshore 
Petroleum Operations 
 
The right of coastal States to exploit resources in their maritime territories must be in 
accordance with the obligation to “protect and preserve the marine environment” as provided 
in Article 192 of UNCLOS. In line with customary international law and UNCLOS provisions 
States must ensure proper regulation of activities under their jurisdiction or control not to cause 
damage by pollution to other States and environment beyond national jurisdiction.5 It is also 
mandatory on States to individually or jointly take all measures necessary and in consonance 
with the convention to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from 
any source.6 This includes accidental pollution from offshore petroleum E&P.7 In order to fulfil 
this obligation, States are to use “the best practical means at their disposal and in accordance 
with their capabilities”.8  
However, this obligation is arguably not absolute and States can hardly be held liable for such 
transboundary impacts as a State is only expected to exert due diligence9 to prevent such harm. 
Based on the existing international binding instruments, States do not necessarily guarantee 
that there will be no harm in all circumstances. Employing the best practical means aimed at 
preventing accidents would suffice.10 These steps should include prescription and enforcement 
of strict construction and operating standards for offshore installations to prevent accident due 
to structural and equipment failure, organisational and personnel weakness.  Hence, good 
                                                          
5 UNCLOS, Art. 194(2); the locus classic case is the Trail Smelter Arbitration which was amplified 
subsequently in Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of Rio Declaration . 
6 UNCLOS, Art. 194 (1) 
7 UNCLOS, Art. 194 (3)(c) 
8 Id. 
9 Due diligence is defined as ‘a diligence proportioned to the magnitude of the subject and to the dignity and 
strength of the power which is exercising it’, see Alabama Claims Arbitration (1872), 1 Moore’s International 
Arbitration Awards 485 
10 Article 194(1). In the Chenobyl accident States not being sure of the culpability of Russia did not push claims 
against the Russian government.   
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design, proper construction and equipment of installations manned with qualified personnel are 
key preventive measures.11  
As offshore petroleum operations move further into deep and ultra-deep waters the provisions 
of Article 196 of UNCLOS making it mandatory for States to “take all measures necessary to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment resulting from the use of 
technologies under their jurisdiction or control” becomes apt in providing the needed obligation 
to apply caution in the use of technology in marine activities.12 Though it is doubtful if the 
draftsman of Article 196 had in mind deep and ultra-deep water petroleum exploration and 
exploitation at the time it was drafted. Malta which first proposed and presented the draft article 
considered the possible use of technology in ways that “may cause significant and extensive 
change in the natural state of the marine environment” and therefore wanted such use to be 
controlled to prevent marine pollution.13 Given its framework nature, Article 196 provides the 
basis for further development of a legal regime to regulate the use of technology for offshore 
operations at global and regional levels.   
Article 193 of UNCLOS reconfirming Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and 
Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration affirms the right of States to exploit natural resources 
within their territorial jurisdiction and a duty to avoid transboundary effects of pollution. It 
came short of establishing an obligation to protect and preserve the environment in the exercise 
of the exploitation rights. However, other principles of the Stockholm Declaration made the 
protection of the environment a general duty of all States.  A stronger expression is found in 
                                                          
11 The Deepwater Horizon disaster has some design challenges in terms of the BOP and the integrity of the 
cementing work coupled with the judgment of the personnel on board the MODU 
12 Brown, E. D., Sea-bed Energy and Mineral Resources and the Law of the Sea, Vol. 2, The Area Beyond the 
Limits of National Jurisdiction (Graham & Trotman) II.9 12 (1986)  
13 Nordquist, Myron H., Vol. IV(1991), op. cit., p. 74, para 196.2  
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Article 193 of UNCLOS wherein the States’ right to exploit resources must be exercised only 
“in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment”.14     
 
4.1.1 Obligation to Cooperate 
 
As an umbrella treaty, UNCLOS calls for regional cooperation in the measures that States take 
in respect of potentially harmful activities and prevention of pollution by encouraging the 
establishment of regional and global regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution from 
offshore activities.15 Article 197 of UNCLOS imposes an obligation on States to “cooperate on 
a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent 
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.” 
While global cooperation in formulating rules in relation to shipping is well established and 
sufficiently effective16 same cannot be said of marine pollution arising from offshore petroleum 
E&P.  
In a clear application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, Article 203 
of UNCLOS provides for developing States to be given preference by international 
organizations in allocation of appropriate funds and technical assistance. Same differential 
treatment is required in the utilization of specialized services they provide for the purposes of 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment or minimization of 
its effects. This is in addition to scientific and technical assistance States are required to give 
                                                          
14 Birnie, P., Boyle, A. and Redgwell, C., op. cit., p.387 
15 UNCLOS, Art. 208(4) & (5) 
16 Under the auspices of IMO several conventions with global application have been adopted to improve safety 
of shipping and protection of marine environment. Examples are MARPOL 73/78, SOLAS,  SWTC, Civil 
Liability Conventions and the 1989 Salvage Convention 
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to developing countries directly or through competent international organisations for 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution and assistance to minimize the effects of 
major incidents that may result in serious pollution of the marine environment.17  
Cooperation is also emphasised at the regional level. For instance, under the OSPAR 
Convention where preventive measures fail and an accident is likely to result in transboundary 
impacts, Parties must cooperate and negotiate a cooperation agreement with a view to reaching 
satisfactory solution in the circumstance.18 Parties to the 1992 Helsinki Convention recognised 
that protection and enhancement of the sea requires “close regional co-operation and other 
appropriate international measures”.19 
 
4.1.2 Obligation at Regional Levels 
 
In addition to the global obligation, different regional sea agreements also impose obligation 
to prevent marine pollution. For instance, parties to the Barcelona Convention are to “take all 
appropriate measures to prevent, abate, combat and to the fullest extent eliminate pollution of 
the Mediterranean Sea area resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf 
and the seabed and its subsoil”.20 Similarly, the 1994 Offshore Protocol obligates contracting 
States to use, among other measures, the “best available techniques, environmentally effective 
and economically appropriate” measures and techniques to prevent pollution from offshore 
activities.21 But the question of what “appropriate measure” is would be subjective and reflect 
                                                          
17 UNCLOS, Art. 202 
18 OSPAR Convention, Art.21 
19 1992 Helsinki Convention, Para. 5 of the Preamble 
20 Barcelona Convention, Art. 7  
21 1994 Offshore Protocol, Arts. 3(1) and 8 
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the political will or capacity of each State. Furthermore, they must ensure that all necessary 
measures are taken for offshore activities not to cause pollution.22 
In the North-East Atlantic region, parties to OSPAR are to ‘take all possible steps to prevent 
and eliminate’ marine pollution and in appropriate situation restore damaged marine 
environment.23  Most of the provisions of Annex III address pollution that arises from the 
normal operations of offshore installations such as dumping of waste and disused offshore 
installations and pipelines24and discharges or emissions from ‘offshore sources’.25 What 
appears to be applicable to accidental pollution from offshore operations is contained in Article 
7 that obligates parties to take appropriate measures individually and within relevant 
international organisations “to prevent and eliminate pollution resulting from the abandonment 
of offshore installations in the maritime area caused by accidents.” The OSPAR Convention 
seems to lack provisions regulating offshore petroleum operations with a view to preventing 
major accidents. However, where there are no international guidelines in this regard measures 
shall be based on such guidelines as the OSPAR Commission may adopt as part of the OSPAR 
treaty regime.26 
The fundamental obligation under the 1992 Helsinki Convention is for parties to prevent and 
eliminate pollution through the application of the precautionary principle that requires parties 
to take preventive measures where there is the likelihood that an activity may “create hazards 
                                                          
22 Id., Art.3(2) 
23 1992 OSPAR, Arts 2(1) and 5. The obligation to ‘eliminate’ marine pollution in this convention is an 
improvement on UNCLOS which used the word ‘control’. Moreover, the requirement to take “all possible 
steps” is to ensure commitment by parties to stop at nothing in preventing marine pollution. 
24 Id, Arts.3, 5 and 8 of Annex III 
25 Id, Art.4 of Annex III; offshore sources under the convention means “offshore installations and offshore 
pipelines from which substances or energy reach the maritime area”, see Art. 1(k) of 1992 OSPAR Convention.  
26 OSPAR Recommendation 2010/18 on the prevention of significant acute oil pollution from offshore drilling 
activities; OSPAR Recommendation 2011/8 amending OSPAR Recommendation 2001/1 for the Management 
of Produced Water from Offshore Installations as amended; OSPAR Recommendation 2006 on Management 
Regime for Offshore Cuttings Piles; OSPAR Decision 98/3 on the Disposal of Disused Offshore Installations 
and OSPAR Decision 2000/3 on the use of Organic Phase Drilling Fluids (OPF) and the discharge of OPF-
Contaminated Cuttings; OSPAR Recommendation 2012/5 for a risk-based approach to the Management of 
Produced Water Discharges from Offshore Installations 
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to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystem” even in the absence of 
conclusive proof.27 There is no doubt that offshore petroleum operations could create those 
negative effects if an accident does occur and as such requires precautionary measures to be 
taken. 
In respect of offshore operations the Helsinki Convention imposes obligation on Member 
States to take all appropriate measures to prevent pollution of the Baltic Sea from exploration 
and exploitation of the seabed and subsoil or from any ‘associated activities thereon’.28 Annex 
VI on prevention of pollution from offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities, 
provides for the procedures and measures to be undertaken to prevent and eliminate pollution 
from such activities.29 
 
4.2 Mechanism for Prevention of Pollution 
 
Prevention of accidents and pollution of the marine environment is the ‘litmus test’ of any 
operator. This is also the fundamental concern of the regulator. There are various elements and 
factors that come to play in ensuring safe offshore petroleum operations. Some of which are 
the legal regime, authorisation of offshore operations, the design, construction and equipment 
of installations, application of environmental principles and measures for prevention, and 
manning of offshore installations.   
 
 
                                                          
27 1992 Helsinki Convention, Art.3(1)&(2) 
28 Id., Art.12 
29 Id., Art. 12(2); whether those procedures and measure are adequate is a different issue to be determined 
separately. 
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4.2.1 Legal regime 
 
Article 208 of UNCLOS addresses the need to prevent pollution from seabed activities subject 
to national jurisdiction. Though with no clear requirements and set standards, it makes it 
obligatory on coastal States to have legislations to prevent, reduce and control pollution that 
may arise from seabed activities in the continental shelf, artificial islands, installations and 
structures within national jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 60 and 80. But States are at liberty 
to decide on measures necessary for the prevention, reduction and control of such pollution. 
The laws must stipulate measures not less effective than international rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures.30 Such international rules, standards and 
recommendation must be binding for States to be legally bound to use them as benchmark for 
their national laws and regulations. Where there are no binding international rules and 
standards States may incorporate such international rules into their municipal laws and 
regulations to give them force of law.31 On the other hand, in the absence of binding 
international rules, standards and recommended practices, States would determine the criteria 
and standards for authorisation of offshore petroleum operation to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution. But this may not guarantee uniformity of standards of operations globally. 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 UNCLOS, Art. 208(2) & (3) 
31 For instance, the Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) of 2012 expects oil and gas operations to be done in 
line with good oilfield practice. Section 362 of the PIB defines “good oilfield practice” to mean, among other 
things, “knowledge of and compliance with the latest standards developed by relevant professional institutions 
including but not limited to: the American Gas Association (AGA); the American Petroleum Institute (API); the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME); the American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM); the 
British Standard Institute (BSI); the International Organisation for Standards (ISO); and any other organisation 
deemed acceptable by the Inspectorate” 
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4.2.2 Authorisation of Offshore Operations 
 
In exercise of their sovereign rights, a coastal State has the exclusive power to “authorise and 
regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes.”32  
Authorisation of offshore operations is the exclusive preserve of the coastal State. Perhaps, this 
explains the seeming lack or complete absence of global provisions with definitive criteria for 
authorization to undertake offshore petroleum operations. Various regions and States have their 
own conditions for granting of operational licences. To guarantee safety and prevent accidental 
pollution the conditions for authorisation of offshore operations must ensure that only 
competent and credible entities are granted such permits.   
In the Mediterranean Sea region, in respect of issuance of licences for offshore exploration and 
exploitation, the Offshore Protocol places premium on evidence of financial capacity to settle 
liability in the event of an accident.33 Also, the granting authority must be satisfied that the 
installation has been constructed to “international standards and practice” and the operator has 
the technical competence and finance to undertake offshore operations.34 In line with the 
supportive role of polluter pays principle, it requires licence to be supported by insurance or 
other financial security to cover liability relating to compensation for any damage that may be 
caused by such offshore activity.35 
The Operator’s competence notwithstanding, conditions relating to measures, techniques or 
methods designed to reduce to the minimum risks of major hazard may be imposed by the 
                                                          
32 UNCLOS, Art.81; see also Art.85 and similar provisions contained in Article 7 of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. On the international regime of the continental shelf see Brown, E. D., Sea-
Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol.1 The Continental Shelf (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers)361-415 (1992); Brown, E. D., The International Law of the Sea, Vol.1 Introductory Manual         
(Dartmouth) 350-360 (1996)  
33 1994 Offshore Protocol, Art. 4(1) 
34 Id. 
35 Id., Arts. 5(1)(i) and 27(2)(b) 
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authorization.36 In the case of an abandoned or disused installation, the operator will still be 
required to take all necessary measures to prevent spillage or leakage from the operational site 
prior to the removal of the installation.37 Monitoring requirements may also be imposed on the 
operator.38 
However, the OSPAR and Helsinki Conventions did not provide conditions for authorisation 
of offshore petroleum operations. 
 
4.2.3 Design, Construction and Equipment of Offshore 
Installations 
 
The design, construction and equipment of offshore installations is relevant to the safety of 
operations. Presently, there are no global and regional binding instrument on standards and 
guidelines relating to the construction and operation of offshore installations used for 
petroleum exploration. An attempt at having a global instrument was made by the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 1979 when it adopted a Code for the Construction and 
Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU).39 A subsequent Code was adopted in 
October 1989 and made applicable to units constructed after 1 May 1991.40 Its purpose was to 
recommend design criteria, construction standards and other safety measures for MODUs in 
order to minimise the risk to such units, to personnel on board and to the environment. A mobile 
offshore drilling unit is defined as a vessel capable of engaging in drilling operations for the 
                                                          
36 1994 Offshore Protocol, Art.6(3) 
37 Id., Art.20 
38 Id., Art.19 
39 IMCO Resolution A.414(XI) of November 1979 
40 Resolution A.649 (16). See Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units 
(MODU Code) (1990 edition), IMO Publication 811 90.05.E 
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explorations for, or exploitation of resources beneath the seabed such as liquid or gaseous 
hydrocarbons, sulphur or salt.41  
UNCLOS did not provide any global criteria for design, construction and equipment of 
offshore installations. It only requires States to ensure safety of such operations by regulating 
the design, construction, equipment, operation and manning of the installations and devices.42 
Among regional instruments the provisions of Article 15 and Annex VI of the Mediterranean 
Offshore Protocol are of relevance. They address safety of offshore operations as an important 
aspect of preventing, combating and controlling pollution. They provide that safety measures 
must be taken in terms of the design, construction (taking into consideration the offshore 
weather conditions), placement, equipment, marking, operation and maintenance of 
installations.  
Also a Contracting Party is to ensure that the operator has on the installations, at all times, 
adequate equipment and devices in good working order to prevent and combat accidental 
pollution and protect human life. An operator should be able to facilitate prompt response to 
an emergency using the best available environmentally effective and economically appropriate 
techniques.43 The requirement for the use of ‘best available environmentally effective and 
economically appropriate techniques’ may create conflict between environmental and 
economic considerations in the choice of technique or technology to be employed to guarantee 
safety in the operation. On the whole, every installation must be safe and fit for purpose and 
designed to withstand difficult offshore weather conditions, earthquakes, sea conditions and 
water depth.44 A monitoring system is also necessary to ensure that activities are conducted in 
                                                          
41 See para 1.1 of MODU Code Consolidated Edition 2001 
42 UNCLOS, Art.194(3)(c)  
43 Offshore Protocol, Art.15(1) & (2) (emphasis mine) 
44 Id., Annex VI Clause (a) 
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the safest possible way at all times.45While these provisions are plausible, the challenge is the 
implementation and enforcement to achieve the desired goal, which is, prevention of accidents 
and pollution. 
The OSPAR Convention obligates parties to “adopt programmes and measures which contain, 
where appropriate, time-limits for their completion and which take full account of the use of 
the latest technological developments and practices designed to prevent and eliminate pollution 
fully.”46 This provision creates room for adaptation and employment of new technology that 
may guarantee safety under any prevalent offshore operational circumstances. 
 
4.2.4 Application of Environmental Principles and Measures for 
Prevention  
 
Environmental treaties usually contain requisite principles for environmental protection. The 
Mediterranean Offshore Protocol urges States to use, among other measures, “best available 
techniques, environmentally effective and economically appropriate” measures and 
techniques.47 Furthermore, they must ensure that all necessary measures are taken for offshore 
activities not to cause pollution.48 
In the OSPAR Convention polluter pays and precautionary principles are to be applied in 
addressing marine pollution,49 both from fixed and floating offshore platforms in the maritime 
area and engaged in exploration, appraisal or exploitation of oil and gas.50 Operation 
                                                          
45 Id., Annex VI Clause (b) 
46 OSPAR Convention, Art.2(3)(a) 
47 1994 Offshore Protocol, Arts. 3(1) and 8. It is doubtful if application of economic considerations will result in 
good environment and safety option for the offshore oil and gas industry. 
48 Id., Art.3(2) 
49 1992 OSPAR Annex I, Art. 2(2). These obligations are much more mandatory and binding than the provisions 
of UNCLOS in view of the use of the word ‘shall’. 
50 Id., Art. 5. See generally Annex III that addresses prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore 
sources; also Art.1(j)&(l) where “offshore activity” is defined as “activities carried out in the maritime area for 
the purposes of the exploration, appraisal or exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons” and “offshore 
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programmes and measures shall take into account ‘best available techniques’, ‘best 
environmental practice’, and ‘clean technology’ where appropriate.51 Bearing in mind that  
‘best available techniques’ are subject to the factors enumerated in paragraph 2 of Appendix 1 
and “best environmental practice” is subject to the consideration of factors in paragraph 6 of 
Appendix 1 would change with time in line with advances in technology, economic and social 
factors and with changes in scientific knowledge and understanding.52 
Annex III of OSPAR Convention focuses on “Prevention and Elimination of Pollution from 
Offshore Sources”. It obligates Contracting parties in the adoption of preventive programmes 
and measures to require the use of ‘best available techniques’ and ‘best environmental 
practice’, and where appropriate, ‘clean technology’ while priorities are to be set in accordance 
with the criteria given in Appendix 2.53 Oil and hydrocarbons of petroleum origin are obviously 
among substances that are subject to the requirement for adoption of programmes and 
measure.54 The criteria in setting priorities include persistency, transboundary significance and 
risk of negative changes to marine ecosystem and irreversibility or resilience of effects. Others 
are interference with sea-foods harvest or other legitimate uses of the sea55 that are possible 
effects of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations. 
Similarly, parties to the Helsinki Convention are required to apply the polluter-pays principle 
and promote the use of “Best Environmental Practice” (BEP)56 and “Best Available 
                                                          
installation” is defined as any man-made structure, plant or vessel or parts thereof, whether floating or fixed to 
the seabed, placed within the maritime area for the purpose of offshore activities”. These were clearly excluded 
in the definition of “vessel or aircraft” in Art. 1(n). 
51 Id., Art.2(3)(b)(i)(ii); Appendix 1 of the Convention defines the term "best available techniques" to mean “the 
latest stage of development (state of the art) of processes, of facilities or of methods of operation which indicate 
the practical suitability of a particular measure for limiting discharges, emissions and waste.” And "best 
environmental practice" to mean “the application of the most appropriate combination of environmental control 
measures and strategies.” 
52 Paragraphs 3 and 8 of Appendix 1 of 1992 OSPAR Convention. 
53 Id, Art.2 of Annex III 
54 Id., Paragraph 3 of Appendix 2 
55 Id., Paragraph 1 of Appendix 2 
56 In the convention “Best Environmental Practice” means the application of the most appropriate combination 
of measures. These measures would include among other things the precautionary principle, “potential benefit 
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Technology” (BAT).57 What is BEP and BAT may alter with the changes in technological 
advances, scientific knowledge and understanding and economic and social factors because of 
the factors that determinate them.58  Article 3 which requires additional measures to be taken 
when the application of BEP and BAT do not lead to environmentally acceptable results is 
significant. It means operators are expected to do all within their reach and power to prevent 
accidents and pollution.59 This is similar to the provision of OSPAR Convention which requires 
parties to take “all possible steps” to prevent and eliminate pollution. In consonance with 
international norms all measures and preventive actions must ensure that transboundary 
pollution is avoided.60 
Annex IV of the Helsinki Convention, which addresses prevention of pollution from ships is 
applicable to offshore fixed or floating platforms and submersibles by virtue of the 
Convention’s definition of ‘ship’ in its Article 2(3). However, it is focused on operational 
discharges and not accidental pollution. More detailed provisions on prevention of pollution 
from offshore activities is provided for in Annex VI. Parties again are obligated to prevent and 
eliminate pollution from offshore activities through the application of the “Best Environmental 
Practice” (BEP) and “Best Available Technology” (BAT) principles.61 Most of the regulations 
dwell more on pollution that may arise from normal operations of an offshore petroleum 
installation.62 The requirements for an environmental impact assessment and notification of the 
                                                          
or penalty of substitute materials or activities”, possible changes and advances in scientific knowledge and 
understanding and social and economic implications of the measures; see Regulation 2, Annex II of 1992 
Helsinki Convention.   
57 “Best Available Technology” means ‘the latest stage of development (state of the art) of processes, of 
facilities or of methods of operation which indicate the practical suitability of a particular measure for limiting 
discharges’, see Regulation 3, Annex II of 1992 Helsinki Convention. For a determination of the BAT 
comparison must be made with recent successfully tried technology; consider the advances in technology, 
scientific knowledge and understanding; economic feasibility of the technology and the precautionary principle.  
58 Regulation 4, Annex II of 1992 Helsinki Convention 
59 This is more or less like a performance based regulatory situation where the goal is prevention of accidents 
through environmentally acceptable means. See similar provisions in Arts. 2(1) and 5 of OSPAR Convention 
60 1992 Helsinki Convention, Art.13 
61 Regulation 2, Annex VI of 1992 Helsinki Convention 
62 Regulations 4 and 5, Annex VI of 1992 Helsinki Convention 
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Helsinki Commission of the outcome before the commencement of operations are 
commendable.63  
 
4.2.5 Manning of Offshore Installations  
 
Human error has been identified as one of the factors responsible for major hazards in offshore 
petroleum operations. Therefore, the type of personnel in-charge and working on board an 
offshore installation is critical to its safety. The Mediterranean Offshore Protocol while 
advocating for the use of the most advanced safety systems requires periodic tests to minimize 
possible accidents. This is to be done with the availability of trained specialised crew to operate 
and maintain these systems and undertake periodic exercises.64 Moreover, persons in control 
of an installation and or the activities thereon, especially persons responsible for the blow-out 
preventer must have the requisite qualifications and be permanently available.65  
Other regional conventions do not provide for manning of offshore installations, but most 
countries in those regions may benefit from the regime introduced by the EU Directive on 
offshore safety which is applicable to all three regions.  
 
4.3 Prevention of Accidental Pollution under EU Directive 
2013/30/EU on Offshore Safety 
 
Safety of offshore oil and gas operations in European Union waters is chiefly governed by 
Directive 2013/30/EU. The Directive provides the minimum standard applicable to prevention 
of accidents in offshore oil and gas operations within the EU. Though the European 
                                                          
63 Regulation 3, Annex VI of 1992 Helsinki Convention 
64 Offshore Protocol, Annex VI Clause (c) 
65 Id., Annex VI Clause (f) 
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Commission could explore other appropriate means of improving prevention of accidental 
pollution.66  
 
4.3.1 Obligation of Parties 
 
The essence of the Directive was succinctly stated in paragraph 2 of the preamble as follows: 
“The objective of this Directive is to reduce as far as possible the occurrence of major 
accidents relating to offshore oil and gas operations and to limit their consequences, 
thus increasing the protection of the marine environment and coastal economies against 
pollution, establishing minimum conditions for safe offshore exploration and 
exploitation of oil and gas and limiting possible disruptions to Union indigenous energy 
production, and to improve the response mechanisms in case of an accident.” 
In other words, the central idea of the Directive was to establish “minimum requirements” for 
preventing the occurrence of major accidents in offshore oil and gas operations within EU 
waters. If and when prevention fails, it is to ensure that responses to major accidents are prompt 
and adequate to minimise the consequences.67 In what seems like a self-regulatory obligation, 
operators are to act proactively and maintain the highest level of safety.68 
The EU believes the best regulatory practices necessary for highest safety standards are 
achievable through integration of “related functions into a competent authority that may draw 
resources from one or more national bodies.”69The competent authority is to be given various 
powers by Member States for the purpose of achieving the objective of the Directive. These 
include powers to prohibit operations where the report on major hazards for prevention or 
                                                          
66 EU Offshore Safety Directive, para.62 of the preamble. 
67 EU Offshore Safety Directive, Art. 1(1) and Para 65 of the Preamble 
68 Id., para.40 of the Preamble 
69 Id., para. 18 of the Preamble 
  
112 
 
limitation of consequences of major accidents is insufficient; power to take adequate measures 
to ensure the continued safety of operations; and power to require improvement on the 
operations or prohibit continued operations if the requirements of the Directive are not met or 
the oil and gas operations raise safety concerns.70  
Perhaps, in recognition of the fact that safety of offshore oil and gas operation is a global issue, 
the Commission makes a commitment to “promote high safety standards for offshore oil and 
gas operations at international level in relevant global and regional fora, including those related 
to Arctic waters.”71 
 
4.3.2 Coverage  
 
In terms of geographical scope, the Directive will have influence in four marine regions. This 
is because the EU Member States sovereignty or sovereign rights and jurisdiction partly extend 
to marine waters of the Baltic Sea, North-east Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Black Sea.72 By the definition of offshore in Article 2(2), the Directive is applicable beyond 
the territorial sea to the exclusive economic zones or continental shelves of its Member States. 
Although MODUs in transit are considered to be ship and subject to relevant provisions and 
applicable construction codes of SOLAS, MARPOL, once stationary for the business of 
offshore oil and gas operation they become subject to the provisions of the Directive.73 
The Directive has a level of global implication as EU operators are required to apply their major 
accident prevention policy in their operations outside Union waters “as far as possible within 
the applicable national legal framework.”74 This requirement is not mandatory and is made 
                                                          
70 Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.18 
71 Id., Art.33(3) 
72 Id., para.50 of the Preamble 
73 Directive 2013/30/EU , Preamble, para.32 
74 Id.,para.37 
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subject to national laws of the non-EU Countries. It therefore provides a lee way for operators 
to hide under the guise of compliance with national laws to operate below the expected 
standards under the Directive. This is a whittled down version of what was contained in the 
2011 proposed regulation of the European Council. In the 2011 proposed regulation for the 
purpose of pollution prevention, licensees, operators and major contractors based in the Union 
were to conduct their offshore oil and gas operations outside the union in accordance with the 
principles set out in the Regulation.75 
 
4.3.3 Authorisation 
 
The process of authorisation and grant of offshore operational licences are given serious 
consideration in the Directive. It sets up minimum criteria or conditions that must be considered 
by EU Member States in the process of granting licenses and authorising offshore oil and gas 
operations. These conditions include, inter alia, the financial capacity of the operator to settle 
liabilities and other responsibilities that come with a major accident,76 the safety record and 
technical competence of the operator.77 
The Directive also stipulates some conditions precedent that must be fulfilled and documents 
submitted to the competent authority before carrying out offshore oil and gas operations within 
EU waters. The documents include design notification which must indicate that “the concept 
contributes to reducing major hazard risk to an acceptable level”;78 a report on major hazard 
that must demonstrate that all major hazards have been identified with their likelihood and 
consequences assessed together with the control measures to reduce the risk of major accident 
                                                          
75 2011 European Commission’s Proposed Regulation on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, Art. 18(6) 
76 Id., Art.4 
77 Id., Art.4(2)(d) 
78 Id., Art.11(1)(c) and Annex I, Part 1; To ensure safety designs must follow the best practice defined in 
authoritative standards and guidelines; see Paras. 29 and 30 of the Preamble  
  
114 
 
to an acceptable level.79 Also, a notification of well operation that inter alia, incorporates the 
particular risk associated with well operation with “environmental, meteorological and seabed 
limitations on safe operation”, possibilities for simultaneous major hazard potentials, surface 
hazards, suitable control measures and in the event of any change or modification to the well, 
additional sufficient details to update the notification.80 Other required documents are internal 
emergency response plan containing a description of foreseeable conditions and events likely 
to cause major accidents as contained in the report on major hazards which must be site 
specific; 81 the safety and environmental management system report;82 and the corporate major 
accident prevention policy.83 
Importantly, operators are not to be relieved of their duty of prevention of major accident even 
where the actions or omissions leading or contributing to the major accident were carried out 
by a contractor.84  
 
4.3.4 Mechanisms for Prevention 
 
To achieve the goal of prevention of accidental pollution, the EU Member States must require 
operators and owners of offshore installations to have a corporate major hazard prevention 
policy that take into cognisance their primary responsibility for control of risk of major 
accidents. The policy must be implemented throughout the life circle of the operations.85 
Operators and owners would also be required to prepare their safety and environmental 
management system as part of documents required for carrying out offshore oil and gas 
                                                          
79 Id., Art.11(1)(e) and Annex I, Part 2 
80 Id., Art.11(1)(h) and Annex I, Part 4 
81 Id., Arts. 11(1)(g) and 14 and Annex I, Part 10; see also Para. 35 of the Preamble 
82 Id., Arts. 11(1)(b) and 19(3)&(5) and Annex I, Part 9 
83 Id., Arts. 11(1)(a) and 19(1) and Annex I, Part 8 
84 Id., Art.3(2) 
85 Id., Art.19 (1) & (2); see also Paras. 26 and 27 of the Preamble 
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operations. The policy document must have clear organisational arrangements for control of 
major hazards; submission of major hazard reports and related documents; and schemes for 
independent verification established in line with the requirements of Article 17 of the 
Directive.86 Description of the independent verification scheme is to be submitted within the 
safety and environmental management system that is required in the application for 
authorisation to carryout offshore oil and gas operations.87 
There are two main purposes for the establishment of schemes for independent verification by 
operators and owners as provided in Article 17. First, it is to provide guarantee for installations 
that “the safety and environmental critical elements identified in the risk assessment for the 
installation, as described in the report on major hazards, are suitable and that the schedule of 
examination and testing of the safety and environmental critical elements is suitable, up-to-
date and operating as intended.” Second it is in respect of notifications of well operations to 
guarantee that “well design and well control measures are suitable for the anticipated well 
conditions at all times.” 
Pursuant to their major accident prevention policy and safety and environmental management 
system, operators and owners shall be expected to build and maintain strong safety culture and 
secure the cooperation of workers. This should be done by, inter alia, encouraging and 
rewarding the report of accidents and near-misses, protection of whistle-blowers and a 
commitment to tripartite consultation between the competent authority, operators and owners, 
and workers.88 Bearing in mind that prevention of harm is a collective task, Clause 2 of Annex 
IV mandates Member States to ensure cordial industry and competent authority relationships 
that can create and implement priority plan for “development of standards, guidance and rules 
                                                          
86 Id., Arts. 19 (3), 11(1)(b), 17 and Annex IV 
87 See Directive 2013/30/EU, Arts.11 (1)(b), 17 and Annex 1, Part 5. The views expressed by the independent 
verifier and the response to it by the operator must be made available to the competent authority and retained up 
to six months after completion of the offshore oil and gas operations to which they relate (Art 17(6)) 
88 Id., Clause 1 of Annex IV 
  
116 
 
which will give effect to best practice in major accident prevention” and minimise 
consequences of major accidents should they still occur. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The established right of a State to exploit resources within its territory comes with an equal 
responsibility to prevent pollution resulting in harm to areas outside its jurisdiction. In maritime 
context this includes harm caused to the high seas. All States have a right to the resources of 
the high seas and are prohibited from any activity that negatively impacts the environment or 
hinders any State’s lawful use of the high seas.  
It is inevitable that when disasters occur steps will be taken to prevent similar reoccurrence. 
The offshore petroleum industry is not different as major incidents propel both operators and 
regulators to take steps, including regulatory and technological steps, to prevent major 
accidents and system failures. This was the case of the regulatory impact of Macondo 
blowout.89 The situation is no different within the sea regions of the European Union.90 
However, the extant global legal regime is made of framework provisions that are yet to be 
supported by concrete treaty on safety and prevention accidental pollution in offshore 
operations. Except for the EU Directive on offshore safety the regions under consideration are 
                                                          
89 DNV, Key Aspects of an Effective U.S. Offshore Safety Regime, op. cit., p. 2. It is also argued that generally 
international law is developed as response to disasters, see Comite Maritime International, “The Origins of the 
CMLA Draft Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration 
for and Exploitation of Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources” CMI News Letter, No.1 January/April 2004 
p.3 
90 Facts from the development of legislations in aftermath of oil spills involving the Braer, Brent Spar, Erika and 
the Prestige show that within the EC, just like in many other regions and globally countries seem to learn 
through accidents, See Kramer, Ludwig, “The Contribution of the European Union to Marine Pollution 
Prevention” in Pollution of the Sea – Prevention and Compensation, Basedow, Jurgen and Magnus Ulrich (eds), 
Hamburg Studies on Maritime Affairs, Vol.10 (Springer Link) 64 at p.76 (2007) 
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yet to have updated international treaties on prevention of accidental pollution. But States in 
those regions that are members of the EU may get the benefits of the Directive. 
Though the new instruments are welcomed developments, there is the danger of legislation 
made in response to a disaster. Such instruments may not adequately address possible future 
causes of disasters as regulators and draftsmen are most times blinded by the cause of the 
immediate disaster.91 Therefore, rather than being reactionary the international community 
should be proactive through a regulatory regime with risk assessment and management 
approach with equal focus on the elements of risk, control and condition in the offshore 
petroleum industry.   
Furthermore, for there to be sufficient guarantee of safety of operations and prevention of 
accidental pollution, operations must be conducted safely throughout the life circle of the 
installation. This is possible when the design and technical components of the operations are 
fit for purpose and work as intended and the facility is manned by competent staff that are 
trained in safety culture. Also, there should be a planned organisational structure that ensures 
that decisions made and, most importantly, safety procedures are followed as planned.92 
Ultimately, these conditions must be in place throughout the life of the offshore installation 
from exploration to decommissioning with a close, consistent and sustained monitoring and 
enforcement of regulations. 
                                                          
91 DNV, Key Aspects of an Effective U.S. Offshore Safety Regime, p.3 
92 Id. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO ACCIDENTAL 
POLLUTION IN OFFSHORE PETROLEUM OPERATION 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
Irrespective of the measures that might be put in place to prevent hazards in onshore or offshore 
petroleum E&P, there is still a likelihood of an accident. This possibility underlines the need 
to prepare and have effective and adequate response mechanism to take care of any eventuality 
with the aim of minimizing damage that may result from any accident. Hence, emergency 
preparedness and response is considered a key aspect of measures at preventing loss of life, 
injury, damage to properties, equipment and environment, should an incident occur. The 
operations must be safety conscious as any equipment failure, human error or any other cause 
could have dire consequences.1 
The two main areas of consideration are emergency preparedness including contingency 
planning and response to major accidents. Emergency response, in the sense used in this work, 
involves the actual deployment of resources, material and personnel to contain the accident and 
minimise its consequences.2 It has been observed that most of the safety means used in offshore 
industry are very much the same irrespective of the legal regime and the follow-up by operators 
are similar in the different regimes.3 An effective emergency preparedness and response 
                                                          
1 Woodcock, Ben and Au, Zachary, Human Factors Issues in the Management of Emergency Response at High 
Hazard Installations, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 25 (2013) 547-557, at p.548 
2 Immediate response action has to do with evacuation, escape and rescue, containment of the hazard to 
minimize the consequences (like pollution control and fire-fighting) and then remediation. See Kaasen, Knut, 
Handling of Emergencies: Comparison of the Systems for Emergency Preparedness and Control within the UK 
and Norwegian Sector of the North Sea, Scandinavian Institute of Marine L.Y.B. I (1980) p.3.4-3.4; and 
Alexopoulos, Aristotelis, International Co-operation and Response Arrangements for Oil Spills and Other 
Harmful Substances in European Waters: Improving Contingency Plans by Assessing the Risk, 59 RHDI 763 
(2006) at 767 
3 Skogdalen, Jon Espen; Khorsandi, Jahon; and Vinnem, Jan Erik, Evacuation, Escape, and Rescue Experiences 
from Offshore Accidents including the Deepwater Horizon, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 
25 (2012) 148,153 
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regulation should provide the necessary parameters for adequate preparedness and effective 
response to major hazards in offshore petroleum E&P.  
This chapter analyses the extant global and regional legal frameworks on emergency 
preparedness and response with emphasis on their basic components such as contingency 
planning; equipment and personnel; reporting, notification and information sharing; 
cooperation and assistance and operations. 
 
5.1 Global Legal Framework on Emergency Preparedness and 
Response to Accidental Pollution from Offshore Petroleum 
Operations 
 
The obligation imposed on States by UNCLOS to take steps to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment from all sources, including installations used in offshore 
oil and gas E&P, imputes a duty to prepare and respond to maritime accidents that pose a threat 
of pollution. To fulfil that responsibility, States are to introduce measures designed to minimize 
to the fullest possible extent pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or 
exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, especially measures for 
preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies.4 
Coastal States are required to respond to emergencies resulting from seabed activities within 
their jurisdictions. One way of doing it, in addition to other measures that may be necessary, is 
the enactment of laws and regulations aimed at preventing such accidents. The laws, 
regulations and measures should at least be up to international standards and reviewed from 
time to time as circumstances may demand. States are expected to cooperate to adopt global 
                                                          
4 UNCLOS, Art.194(3)(c) 
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and regional rules, standards, practice and procedure, using the instrumentality of competent 
international organisations like the IMO.5  
Given its framework nature UNCLOS was not designed to provide such international standards 
and criteria for emergency response. The 1989 International Convention on Salvage6 is 
applicable to vessels in danger in navigable waters7 but expressly excludes MODUs and other 
offshore oil and gas installations.8 The binding global instrument on emergency preparedness 
and response for offshore petroleum operations is the 1990 International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC).  
The OPRC recognised the serious threat posed to the marine environment by oil pollution 
incidents involving not only ships but also offshore units. To this end, the importance of 
precautionary measures and prevention in avoiding oil pollution in the first instance was noted 
in addition to the need for strict application of existing international instruments dealing with 
maritime safety and marine pollution prevention.9  Though most international instruments on 
marine pollution like the MARPOL 73/78 relate more to safety of shipping and prevention of 
pollution from vessels, emphasis is placed on international cooperation with the application of 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibility in favour of developing countries.  
Fundamentally, mutual assistance, exchange of information about response capabilities of 
States, report of incidents of significance that is capable of causing marine pollution and 
preparation of pollution contingency plan are important elements of emergency response 
recognized by the OPRC.10 The next sections examine the extent to which binding global 
                                                          
5 UNCLOS, Art.208 
6 IMO/LEG/Conf.7/27, 2 May 1989 in force 6 September 1991 
7 International Convention on Salvage, Arts.1(a-d) 
8 Id., Arts.1(a-d)&3 
9 Id, preamble   
10 Id., para. 6 of the preamble 
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instruments provide for these basic elements of emergency preparedness and response to 
accidental pollution from offshore petroleum E&P activities. 
 
5.1.1 Contingency/Emergency Planning 
 
Contingency planning is regarded to be the most important part of preparing for emergency 
situations.11 It involves taking precautionary measures needed to deal with eventualities. Some 
argue that emergency preparedness should be based on the incorporation of "best practice" 
guidelines and technical information to develop innovative techniques, and a national 
contingency plan should be based on risk assessment of potential incidents.12 
The OPRC requires each State to ensure that offshore units13 engaged in oil and gas E&P under 
its jurisdiction have oil pollution emergency plans which should be coordinated with a national 
emergency system.14 A similar provision is in UNCLOS which imposes obligation on States 
to “jointly develop and promote contingency plans for responding to pollution incidents in the 
marine environment.”15 Also, States are to cooperate globally and regionally and with the IMO, 
within their capabilities and to the extent possible to eliminate the effects of pollution and 
prevent or minimise the damage.16  
The OPRC makes it mandatory for States to establish national systems that incorporate national 
contingency plan to respond to accidental pollution promptly and efficiently. Also, the 
establishment of competent authorities vested with the responsibility for preparedness and 
response to oil pollution. Such national systems are to provide for an operational contact point 
                                                          
11 Kaasen, Knut, supra note 2 at p.3.7 
12 Alexopoulos, A., supra note 2, p. 768 
13 Art.2(4) defines ‘offshore unit’ to mean “any fixed or floating offshore installation or structure engaged in gas 
or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities, or loading or unloading of oil” 
14 Id., Art.3(2) 
15 UNCLOS, Art.199 
16 Id., Arts. 198 and 199 
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responsible for receiving and dealing with pollution reports, have the authority to request for 
assistance from other States and take decisions to render help when requested by another 
State.17 As a monitoring measure, States are to give the IMO up-to-date information on the 
level of preparedness and activities of the national system at all times.18  
 
5.1.2 Response Equipment and Personnel  
 
Having a contingency plan for emergency preparedness and emergency response is not a 
guarantee that there would be effective response to accidents by all States and in all regions. A 
successful response system to accidental pollution relies on the availability of oil spill 
combating equipment and trained personnel.19 In addition to equipment such as vessels, 
aircrafts and other pollution combat equipment that are external to the platforms and 
installations engaged in the operations, the design of the platform and installations is also 
important. The design must be in a manner that eases evacuation, rescue, escape and 
abandonment. Personnel must be trained to act safe in all circumstances, following safety 
directive while there must be a clear command structure to be adhered to in an emergency with 
the incident commander taking charge of response operations.20 To this end, drilling exercises 
should be organised to keep personnel alert and practically conversant with response procedure 
and use of equipment.  
However, not every region and country may have adequate equipment and personnel to 
contribute and respond to emergencies. The OPRC in recognition of this fact mandates States 
                                                          
17 OPRC, Art.6(1) 
18 Id., Art.6(3) 
19 OPRC, paras 4 and 5 of the preamble,  
20 On detailed analysis of human factor in emergency preparedness and response see Woodcock, Ben and Au, 
Zachary, supra note 1. According to the commentators much of emergency response process is human activity. 
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to cooperate and extend differential treatment to developing countries in various aspects of 
preparedness including financial and technical assistance, equipment and training.21 
Noteworthy, UNCLOS provides that States should directly or through competent international 
organisations extend assistance to developing States through training of scientific and technical 
personnel, supply of relevant response equipment and facilities and also enhance the capacity 
of developing States to manufacture such necessary equipment.22 In similar vein, international 
organisations are required to grant preferential treatment to developing States in the allocation 
of funds and technical assistance and the use of specialized services they provide for the 
purpose of prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution or minimization of its 
effects.23  
The IMO is designated under the OPRC to facilitate the implementation of some of its 
provisions, especially information services and management, education and training, technical 
services and training with particular attention given to the needs of developing countries.24 The 
response to two major accidents that occurred at offshore Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea in 
December 2011 (Bonga Oil Field)25 and January 2012 (Chevron’s Endeavour fire)26 questions 
the level of implementation of these provisions. Facts about the consequences of the spill and 
the emergency response efforts in both cases are less known when compared to the April 2010 
                                                          
21 This is reflected in Art.12 of the convention, Clause (3) of the Annex, Conference Resolution 5 on 
Establishment of Oil Pollution Combating Equipment Stockpiles and Conference Resolution 6 on Promotion of 
Technical Assistance 
22 UNCLOS, Art.202(a)(i),(iii)&(iv) 
23 Id., Art.203 
24 OPRC Arts.12 and 2(6) 
25 The Telegraph, Shell oil spill off Nigeria likely worst in a Decade, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/8974141/Shell-oil-spill-off-Nigeria-likely-
worst-in-a-decade.html accessed on 15 November 2013; Platform, Shell’s Bonga oil spill hits Nigerian 
communities, available at http://platformlondon.org/2012/01/04/shells-bonga-oil-spill-hits-nigerian-
communities/ accessed on 15 November 2013 
26 Ring of Fire, ‘Chevron Hit with $5 Billion Suit for Deadly Nigerian Gas Rig Explosion’ 15 January 2014 
http://ringoffireradio.com/2014/01/chevron-hit-5-billion-suit-deadly-nigerian-gas-rig-explosion/ last visited 22 
August 2015; see also OilPrice, The Shocking Truth Behind Chevron’s Gas Rig Fire off the Coast of Nigeria, 
available at http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/The-Shocking-Truth-Behind-Chevrons-Gas-Rig-Fire-off-
the-Coast-of-Nigeria.html accessed on 15 November 2013  
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Macondo blowout. There seems to be no record of implementation of these provisions on 
differential treatment on emergency preparedness and response with recorded success in 
developing countries and regions. 
 
5.1.3 Reporting, Notification and Information Sharing 
 
Notification of pollution accidents that create an imminent danger or actual damage is an 
important facet of cooperation for emergency response. Where States which are likely to be 
affected are not informed, it is difficult to expect a prompt and effective response. There is 
therefore a duty imposed on States to notify any other State that might be affected by pollution 
incidents from their territories. In addition, notification about such incidents must also be given 
to competent international organisations.27  
Some more specific commitments on reporting and notification are included in the OPRC. For 
instance, the operators of offshore units are obligated to report every incident of discharge or 
probable discharge of oil to the State in which they operate.28 Such State must consequently 
assess the nature, extent and possible impacts of the pollution. Where, by the assessment, the 
pollution incident could have a transboundary nature the State in question must promptly notify 
other States whose interests or territory may be affected. Such notification should be 
accompanied by details of the assessment, action already taken and any intended action and 
such other information that may be necessary.  
However, a decision to inform or not to inform the competent international organisation is 
dependent on the severity of the incident.29 Where it is severe, the IMO shall be informed by 
                                                          
27 UNCLOS, Art.198 
28 OPRC, Art. 4(1)(a)(ii). In the case of a ship, report shall be made to the nearest coastal State. 
29 Id., Art.5(1) 
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the State directly or through relevant regional organisation with details of the assessment and 
actions already taken or intended action by the State.30 While reporting to the IMO of incidents 
involving ships at sea might be appropriate, one may doubt the rational and or relevance for 
such notification of the IMO when it is a major hazard incident such as a blowout in offshore 
petroleum installation. 
The notification paves way for a possible cooperation for collective response to the incident 
and provision of assistance where needed. The failure of the OPRC to provide specific duration 
for the required notifications might affect the success of any response operation as time is of 
the essence in an emergency. 
 
5.1.4 Cooperation and Assistance   
 
At the international level, a foundation on which emergency preparedness and response to 
accidental pollution in the marine environment rest is cooperation. Section 2 of Part XII of 
UNCLOS emphasises the need for international cooperation.31 Similarly, the OPRC imposes 
an obligation to cooperate through the provision of advisory services, technical support and 
equipment in response to an oil pollution incident. This is expected when the severity of the 
incident so demands and upon request from a party affected or likely to be affected by the 
pollution.32 Responsibility is on the party that requests for assistance to facilitate the arrival, 
utilization and departure of all equipment and personnel engaged in the response activities and 
also ensure their expeditious movement into, through and out of its territory.33 
                                                          
30 Id., Art.5(2)&(3) 
31 The section urges global and regional cooperation in notification, contingency plan development, studies, 
research, exchange of information and data, and scientific criteria for regulations 
32 OPRC, Art.7(1) 
33 Id., Art.7(3) 
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Though a State may request the IMO for help in identifying sources of interim financing of 
response cost, the financial cost of assistance given in response to a request shall be borne by 
the party that requested for assistance, subject to prior agreement of the Parties.34 Where the 
assistance was unsolicited, the assisting party shall bear the cost of its action.35 Irrespective of 
the motive of this provision, the unqualified nature of it is likely to discourage friendly States 
from rendering prompt and adequate assistance to prevent and control pollution from offshore 
accidents when they are not guaranteed reimbursement of their expenses.  
To encourage genuine voluntary assistance when circumstances call for it, at least, 
reimbursement of expenses in cases where the voluntarily assisting State actually recorded 
some level of success in minimizing damage to the marine environment would be fair. This is 
purely in the interest of the protection of the marine environment which is of great importance 
to the international community. An example of such consideration is found in Article 14 of the 
1989 International Convention on Salvage which was adopted to modify the ‘no cure, no pay’ 
rule36 of salvage law to enable salvors get special compensation that is, at least, equivalent to 
their expenses in situations where damage to the environment was prevented or minimized but 
the ship and cargo in peril were not saved.  
Cooperation is also demanded in research and development relating to “enhancement of state-
of-the-art oil pollution preparedness and response, including technologies and techniques for 
surveillance, containment, recovery, dispersion, clean-up and otherwise minimizing or 
mitigating the effects of oil pollution, and for restoration.”37 Similar cooperation on studies, 
                                                          
34 Id., Art.7(1)&(2), Clause 1(a)(i)&(b) of the Annex  
35 Id., Clause 1(a)(ii) of the Annex 
36 Under the ‘no cure no pay’ rule irrespective of the effort and expense put into a salvage operation, where they 
fail to save ship and cargo of value, the salvor would receive no pay. 
37 OPRC, Art.8  
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research and the exchange of information and data acquired in the process is provided under 
UNCLOS.38  
Though the Parties to OPRC agreed to give technical assistance in terms of personnel training 
and make available relevant technology, equipment and facilities to States that may be in need, 
the transfer of technology is not guaranteed by the OPRC as it is subject to the national law of 
the State.39 This is a major setback to the Convention in terms of increased global capacity 
building. These provisions were adopted in 1990, at a time concerns were centred on 
responding to pollution incident involving oil tankers following the Exxon Valdez incident off 
the coast of Alaska in 1989. These provisions of the OPRC are not specifically tailored to 
offshore petroleum E&P emergency response situations and as such may not adequately 
address the peculiar circumstances of offshore E&P.   
A number of offshore incidents resulted in fire that puts the installation at risk of total loss. 
Offshore E&P installations have high number of persons on board that would need to be 
rescued to safety. Ability to respond timely is therefore crucial. For instance, based on the 
lessons of Macondo incident HELCOM adopted in 2010 Recommendation 31/1 on 
“Development of National Ability to Respond to Spillages of Oil and Other Harmful 
Substances”40 to improve on response time. Also, killing the well to stop continued escape of 
oil is very important. The availability of technology, equipment and personnel to do it should 
not be hindered by national laws. Conditions for assistance and technology transfer would need 
to be liberalised by amendments to the OPRC and through regional agreements.   
 
                                                          
38 UNCLOS, Art.200 
39 OPRC, Art.9 
40 Adopted on 4 March 2010 in line with Article 20(1)(b) supersedes HELCOM Recommendations 1/7, 4/3 and 
11/13 and is an improvement on the time line set in Recommendation 19/17 of 1998 
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5.1.5 Emergency Response Operations 
 
Although issues regarding reporting, notification and information sharing; cooperation and 
assistance; and equipment and personnel discussed above are essential to emergency response, 
the actual response operations at the moment of a major accident will to a great extent 
determine the success of any contingency planning. The steps taken by the operator, regulator 
and third parties to combat major accident and prevent or minimize its impact on personnel, 
installations, the environment and other related interests is the main determinant of the 
effectiveness of emergency response.   
Once there is a major hazard on an offshore installation there will be evacuation, escape and 
rescue operation which would be focused largely on the safety of personnel on board the 
installation. Evacuation is the planned method of leaving the offshore installation without 
directly entering the sea. This involves the transfer of personnel to a safe location onshore or 
offshore or to a vessel through the use of helicopters, lifeboats and or bridge-links. In the event 
that the evacuation method or system fails, personnel may be able to leave the installation by 
way of an escape. This may involve entering the sea directly through the use of items such as 
life rafts, chute systems, ladders and throw-over life rafts as a ‘last resort’ means of taking 
personnel off the affected installation to safety. These items form part of emergency equipment 
and should be in good condition and readily available.  
Rescue is the recovery of persons who were successfully evacuated or escaped from the 
offshore installation and other persons near the installation to a place of safety. It also refers to 
the process by which man overboard (MOB) survivors are taken to a safe place where medical 
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help is available.41 The emergency response operation must always consider the risk 
influencing factors (RIF)42 in the circumstance of the accident and or hazard.  
Some times in the course of evacuation, escape and rescue, the personnel on board the offshore 
petroleum installation may be confronted with physical constraints relating to the design of the 
installation, its malfunction or failure. Also, there could be command inadequacies in terms of 
procedure, communication and possible breakdown of safety management systems;43 and 
control and behavioural hazards intrinsic to the personnel as humans.44 UNCLOS and the 
OPRC did not take into cognisance such factors and eventualities. The OPRC may be amended 
to create obligation for national regulations to take into consideration these circumstances to 
achieve minimal casualties in any major accident offshore.  
A successful evacuation, escape and rescue operation ultimately leads to an abandonment of 
the offshore installation by personnel. Once the personnel have been taken to safety, emergency 
response would then be concerned with efforts to contain the hazard and save the installation 
from serious or total loss as well as minimise damage to the marine environment and related 
interests.  
Some response might require the drilling of relief wells, closing of valves or cementing the 
well depending on the type of incident. Oil released would have to be cleaned up and prevented 
from getting ashore, using various methods and processes in line with best practice. The 
international regulatory framework should provide for the necessary parameters of best practice 
                                                          
41 Skogdalen, J. E., et al, supra note 3 at p.149 
42 RIF is “an aspect (event/condition) of a system or an activity that affects the risk level of this system or 
activity” see Oien, K., ‘Risk Indicators as a Tool for Risk Control’, Reliability Engineering and Systems Safety, 
74, 129-145 (2001), quoted in Skogdalen, Jon Espen, et al, supra note 3, p.149 
43 In the Vermillion Block incident of 2 September 2010, a fire stated on board the Vermillion 380 platform in 
the Gulf of Mexico 102 miles of the coast of Louisiana. Though all 13 worker on board the platform survived by 
jumping into the water in an escape action, investigation revealed that the crew failed to act in accordance with 
regularly practiced and drilled procedures. See Woodcock, Ben and Au, Zachary, supra note 1, at pp.548-549.  
44 Skogdalen, J. E., et al, supra note 3, at pp.149-153; see also Woodcock, Ben and Au, Zachary, supra note 1, 
pp 547-557 
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for adequate preparedness and effective response to emergency incidents.45 A global or 
regional instrument should provide such necessary guidelines that stipulate minimum standards 
to be applied globally by all operators. Notwithstanding, the seeming differences in regulatory 
regimes, be it prescriptive or performance based, it has been observed that most of the response 
approach, including safety equipment used in offshore installation are very much the same. 
Also follow-up by operators are similar in the different countries and regions with different 
regulatory regimes.46 
There are circumstances when the requirements for oil installations may conflict with maritime 
regulations required of vessels and are applicable to MODUs that have dual status as vessels 
and offshore oil and gas drilling installations. This is already playing out in Norway where new 
regulations require new production installations to use free-fall life boats in Norwegian waters 
but MODUs do not follow the legislation but maritime regulations.47    In such circumstances 
MODUs should be compelled to follow the offshore industry regulation where they are 
stationed and involved in E&P activities. A regulation beyond the State level should be able to 
compel compliance to create uniform application in the industry.   
 
5.2 Regional Legal Regimes on Emergency Preparedness and 
Response in Offshore Petroleum E&P 
 
A focus of the international regime on emergency response to accidental pollution from 
offshore petroleum E&P should be the establishment of regional regulations, emergency 
preparedness in terms of personnel and equipment and assistance in taking response action.  
                                                          
45 Alexopoulos, A., supra note 2, p. 768 
46 Skogdalen, J. E., et al, supra note 3, p.153 
47 Id., p.156 
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In the North-East Atlantic, the OSPAR Convention does not contain detailed provisions on 
emergency response. Annex III on prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore 
sources does not address the issue of emergency response, especially from offshore oil and gas 
E&P. Instead, where an incident occurs and transboundary pollution is envisaged, affected 
parties are expected to consult and negotiate a cooperation agreement to contend with the 
pollution.48   One negotiated cooperation agreement is the 1983 Agreement for cooperation in 
dealing with pollution of the North Sea by oil and other harmful substances (Bonn 
Agreement)49 which is applicable whenever there is grave and imminent danger of pollution of 
a transboundary nature.50   
The Bonn Agreement provides the mechanism for the North Sea countries and the European 
Community to help each other in contending with pollution in the North Sea Area from 
maritime disasters and prolonged pollution from ships and offshore installations. Parties to the 
agreement engage in surveillance as a method of detecting and combating pollution at sea.51 
However, it appears not to make a case for urgent response to accident in offshore petroleum 
E&P activities.  
In the Mediterranean Sea, the 2002 Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution 
from Ship and, in Cases of Emergency, Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea 
(Prevention and Emergency Protocol)52 is largely focused on pollution from ships and 
emergency resulting therefrom.53 Though it did not define ‘ship’ to enable unambiguous 
determination of whether offshore oil and gas installations are regarded as ship under the 
                                                          
48 1992 OSPAR, Art. 21. 
49 Bonn Agreement, available at http://www.bonnagreement.org/eng/html/welcome.html accessed on 25 May 
2012 
50 Bonn Agreement, Art. 1 
51 Id., see generally Arts. 3 – 9 of the Agreement on issues of surveillance,  notification, assistance and finance 
of response operations  
52 Entered into force on 17 March 2004 
53 2002 Prevention and Emergency Protocol, Art.3(1)(a) and the title of the protocol suggests so 
  
132 
 
Protocol, the definition of ‘pollution incident’ in Article 1(b)54 and the obligation created by 
Article 3(1)(b)55 suggest that the Protocol could be applicable to offshore oil and gas 
operations. In fact, it is mandatory for persons having charge of offshore installations to report 
by ‘rapid and adequate channels’ all incidents that resulted or may result in discharge of oil or 
hazardous and noxious substances in accordance with reporting procedures established by the 
Offshore Protocol.56 Also, Article 11 of the Prevention and Emergency Protocol provides for 
emergency measures to be taken on offshore installations, on-board ships and in ports.   
In practical terms the Prevention and Emergency Protocol must apply to all incidents of marine 
emergencies. For instance, the Regional Maritime Pollution Emergency Response Centre 
(REMPEC) for the Mediterranean Sea states that the 2002 Prevention and Emergency Protocol 
is the basic legal framework for the region’s cooperation in “dealing with threats to the marine 
environment, the coasts and related interests of the Contracting Parties posed by accidental 
releases or by accumulations of small, operational discharges, of oil or other harmful 
substances”.57  
In the Baltic Sea region States must take all measures to not only prevent pollution but also 
ensure prompt response actions against pollution incidents.58 They are to do their best to 
maintain adequate ability and actually respond to pollution incidents to eliminate or minimize 
                                                          
54 According to Art.1(b) ‘pollution incident’, means an occurrence or series of occurrences having the same 
origin, which results or may result in a discharge of oil and/or hazardous and noxious substances and which 
poses or may pose a threat to the marine environment, or to the coastline or related interests of one or more 
States, and which requires emergency action or other immediate response 
55 Art 3(1) provides that “The Parties shall cooperate: (a) to implement international regulations to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from ships; and (b) to take all necessary measures in 
cases of pollution incidents.” 
56 Id., Art.9(4) 
57 See REMPEC, Regional Legal Framework available at 
http://www.rempec.org/rempec.asp?pgeVisit=New&theID=6 accessed on 8 October 2013 
58 Helsinki Convention, Art.12(1) 
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the consequences of such incidents. This could be done individually or in conjunction with 
other States in the region.59  
Under the EU Directive on offshore safety, operators and owners are, in accordance with Union 
best practice, “encouraged to establish effective corporate safety and environmental policies 
and to give effect to them in a comprehensive safety and environmental management system 
and emergency response plan.”60 
The following sections would consider the various aspects of emergency preparedness and 
response as provided for under various regional instruments.  
 
5.2.1 Contingency/Emergency Plan 
 
In the Mediterranean Sea region States, individually or in partnership with other parties, must 
have in place contingency plan and other means of emergency response.61 The emergency 
measures should require all ships to have on board a pollution emergency plan with obligation 
to follow the procedures stipulated in the said emergency plan and where need be request for 
assistance from REMPEC. In relation to offshore installations, operators shall be required by 
parties in which jurisdiction they operate to have contingency plans to combat any pollution 
incident, coordinated within a national emergency plan and other procedures that shall be 
established by the competent national authority.62  
                                                          
59 Id., Art.14 
60 Id., para.26 of Preamble 
61 2002 Prevention and Emergency Protocol, Art.4. The requirement for the use of ‘other means’ gives a wide 
latitude on what states may do to respond to emergency, including but not limited to “equipment, ships, aircraft 
and personnel prepared for operations in cases of emergency, the enactment, as appropriate, of relevant 
legislation, the development or strengthening of the capability to respond to a pollution incident and the 
designation of a national authority or authorities” responsible for the implementation of the Protocol. This wide 
latitude is interterm with the general provision set out in Article 3(1)(b) that requires parties to cooperate “to 
take all necessary measures in cases of pollution incidents”. (Emphasis mine)    
62 Id., Art.11(5) 
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The 1994 Offshore Protocol requires operators in charge of installation to have contingency 
plan to combat accidental pollution in coordination with the national contingency plan of the 
country established pursuant to and in accordance with the Emergency Protocol which is 
applicable mutatis mutandis to issues covered by the Offshore Protocol.63  
Furthermore, coordination for development and implementation of contingency plan is to be 
established by the Parties in line with guidelines established by the competent international 
organisation.64 Curiously, the Protocol did not describe such competent international 
organisation. Article1 only defined “Organisation” to mean the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) as indicated in Articles 2 and 17 of the Barcelona Convention. The 
detailed provisions on requirement of the operator’s contingency plan and national 
coordination and direction in an emergency are provided for in Annex VII of the Offshore 
Protocol.  
A fundamental requirement of a contingency plan under the Offshore Protocol is that it must 
involve the use of what is “most appropriate” in terms of alarm, methods, techniques and 
equipment.65 Where the incident may cause significant adverse effect, the competent authority 
shall ensure coordination of both the national contingency plan and that of the operator. Such 
coordination must be done through control of the response process, including intervention by 
technical experts and trained personnel with the necessary equipment and materials.66  
                                                          
63 Offshore Protocol, Art.16(1)&(2); Art.3 of the Emergency Protocol creates the obligation for contingency 
plan which was improved upon by Arts.4&11 of the Prevention and Emergency Protocol  
64 Id., Art.16(3) 
65 The requirement for a standby boat or vessel is of great value. This was acknowledged by the United States 
Coast Guard following the role played by the supply ship, the Damon B. Bankston in rescuing from water some 
crew members of Deepwater Horizon who had abandoned it in the aftermath of the blowout and fire. 
Unfortunately, having a standby vessel or having a fast rescue craft was not a requirement for MODUs under 
US regulations; see Report of Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Explosion, Fire, Sinking 
and Loss of Eleven Crew Members Aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of 
Mexico April 20-22, 2010,United States Coast Guard, Redacted Volume I p.63 (2011) (hereafter called 
Deepwater Horizon USCG Report 2011); Skogdalen, J. E., et al, supra note 3 at p.155-156 noted this point made 
by the U S Coast Guard 
66 See Regulation B, Annex VII of Offshore Protocol 
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Similarly, in the Baltic Sea region, States are required to have national contingency plans and 
where appropriate, develop bilateral or multilateral plans for a combined response to pollution 
incidents.67 It is obligatory for all offshore units to have an approved pollution emergency plan 
in accordance with the procedure established by the appropriate national authority.68 The plan 
must contain a list of prepositioned equipment, information on alarm and communication 
systems, a description of the measures to be taken in different types of pollution incidents and 
the organization of response measures. Before the installation is put into use, the pollution 
emergency plan should be appropriate and relevant to the installation’s operation and user 
friendly. This is very important as the provision of equipment might become irrelevant in the 
time of response operation if it is not user friendly and appropriate to the installations 
concerned. For instance, in the Deepwater Horizon, the report of the investigation of the US 
Coast Guard found that the lifeboat design was not appropriate in the circumstance. For 
example, among other issues, it “was not conducive to receiving an injured crew member on a 
stretcher”.69  
Furthermore, the Offshore Protocol requires the development of the said emergency plan to 
take into account the risk assessment relating to the operation of the offshore installation and 
harmonised with the national contingency plan.70 In addition to contingency plan, States have 
obligation to put in place surveillance activities to monitor offshore operations and ensure 
timely reporting of incidents.71 
                                                          
67 Helsinki Convention, Regulation 2 of Annex VII 
68 Id, Regulation 7 of Annex VI 
69 Deepwater Horizon USCG Report 2011, p.57 
70 See Clause 1(a) and (b) of HELCOM Recommendation 19/17 on “Measures in order to Combat Pollution 
from Offshore Units”, adopted on 24 March 1998 pursuant to Article 13(b), and Regulation 2 of Annex VI of 
the Convention. The recommendation recalls Article 12 of the Convention, Regulation 7 of Annex VI and 
Regulation 2 of Annex VII of the 1992 Helsinki Convention dealing with adequate preparedness and prompt 
response action 
71 Helsinki Convention, Regulation 3&5 of Annex VII 
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A similar trend can be detected in the EU Directive on offshore safety, although it is much 
more detailed and contains stricter requirements. Under the Directive, to ensure effective 
response to emergencies, operators should prepare internal emergency response plans72 in 
accordance with Article 28 of the Directive. The Response Plan must be site specific and take 
into consideration major accident risks assessment and hazard scenarios identified in the report 
on major hazards. Also, it should include an analysis of the oil spill response effectiveness.73 
The response plan must be submitted to the competent authority in line with Article 11(1)(g) 
and the operator must maintain necessary resources for prompt execution of those plans. Where 
the particular nature and location of a well necessitates an amendment to the internal 
emergency response plan, the amended one or an adequate description of it must be submitted 
to the competent authority to complement the relevant notification of well operations.74  
Hence, it is important that the owner’s internal emergency response plans for installations in 
the case of mobile offshore drilling units are amended as and when necessary to be applicable 
to a given new location and well based on identified risk and scenarios in the major hazards 
report. Perhaps based on the lessons of Macondo blowout and circumstances that left 11 crew 
members of the Deepwater Horizon dead, the Directive requires the internal emergency 
response plan of the operator to be “integrated with other measures relating to protection and 
rescue of personnel from the stricken installation so as to secure a good prospect of personal 
safety and survival”.75 
Beyond the operators and owners of offshore oil and gas installations, States are to put in place 
external emergency response plans in accordance with Annex VII of the Directive on offshore 
                                                          
72 By Art.2(28) ‘internal emergency response plan’ “means a plan prepared by the operator or owner pursuant to 
the requirements of this Directive concerning the measures to prevent escalation or limit the consequences of a 
major accident relating to offshore oil and gas operations” 
73 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.14(1) and 28(1) 
74 Id., Art.14(2) 
75 Id., Art.28(4) 
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safety76 covering all offshore oil and gas installations and connected infrastructure within their 
jurisdiction. The external emergency response plans must take into consideration the latest 
internal emergency response plan of existing or planned installations and connected 
infrastructure and be done in cooperation with the operators, owners and or licensees and the 
competent authority.77 At the request of a member State, the European Maritime Safety Agency 
(EMSA) may assist the Commission in assessing the external emergency response plans of that 
State to ascertain their conformity with the Directive. The Agency may also help the State 
review exercises aimed at testing transboundary and Union emergency mechanisms.78  
 
5.2.2 Equipment and Personnel 
 
The Offshore Protocol of the Mediterranean Sea region makes control of pollution one of the 
principal commitments of the Parties.79 As part of safety measures they are to ensure that at all 
times the operator has on the installations adequate equipment and devices, maintained in good 
working order, to protect human life, prevent and combat accidental pollution and facilitate 
prompt response to an emergency, in line with the best available environmentally effective and 
economically appropriate techniques and the provisions of the operator's contingency plan.80 
To ensure effective response by personnel it is necessary to undertake periodic emergency 
exercises.81 Without understanding the workings and procedure of safety equipment, their 
availability might be rendered useless in time of need. For instance, in the case of the 
                                                          
76 Id., Art.2(36)  defines ‘external emergency response plan’ to mean “a local, national or regional strategy to 
prevent escalation or limit the consequences of a major accident relating to offshore oil and gas operations using 
all resources available to the operator as described in the relevant internal emergency response plan, and any 
supplementary resources made available by the Member States” 
77 Id., Art.29(1)-(3) 
78 Id., Art.10(3) 
79 Offshore Protocol, Art.3 
80 Article 15(2) 
81 Id., Regulation A(1) of Annex VII 
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Deepwater Horizon, the crew failed to efficiently operate the MODU’s liferaft launching 
appliance and components. But for the timely intervention of the vessel Damon B. Bankston 
occupants of the liferaft may have been consumed by the fire.82 
In the Baltic Sea, States are to maintain the ability to respond to incidents by having in place 
adequate equipment, ships and manpower prepared for pollution combat. But there is no 
guarantee that response from member States would be of the same standard in all waters of the 
region as parties can only cooperate in responding to pollution incidents within their 
capabilities, relevant resources available and when the severity of the incident so justify.83  
However, to build capacity, it is recommended that States maintain national inventories on 
emergency capacity that are continuously updated and “establish national training and exercise 
programme to ensure effectiveness of emergency capacity”.84 This emergency combat 
equipment must meet certain requirements. For instance, oil recovery system must be designed 
to operate under wave heights/velocity prevailing in the waters involved and prevailing 
temperature conditions in a blowout situation and those for ice conditions must be tested for 
that purpose.85 The location of the emergency combat equipment must be clear, stored and 
maintained to ensure that combat measures can be taken promptly”.86  
In the North-east Atlantic, the Bonn Agreement in recognition of the importance of well trained 
and alert personnel provides guidelines for member States to undertake three types of joint 
exercises. These are the alarm exercise, equipment exercise and operational exercise with focus 
on alarm procedure, response capability and response time.87  
                                                          
82 Deepwater Horizon USCG Report 2011, p64 
83 Helsinki Convention, Regulation 1(1)&(3) of Annex VII 
84 HELCOM Recommendation 24/9 on “Ensuring Adequate Emergency Capacity”, adopted on 25 June2003 in 
response to Article 20 paragraph 1(b) of the Helsinki Convention.  
85 HELCOM Recommendation 19/17, Clause 1(g) 
86 Id., Clause 1(c)&(i) 
87 Bonn Agreement, Counter Pollution Manual, Chapter 7: Exercises, Clause 7.5 
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Under the EU regime, Member States are required to make it mandatory for operators and 
owners of offshore oil and gas installations to maintain equipment and expertise relevant to the 
internal emergency response plan. Such maintained equipment and expertise should be 
available at all times and made available as and when necessary to the authorities responsible 
for the execution of the external emergency response plan of the Member State.88 In terms of 
personnel, Member States must regularly carry out drills to test their preparedness to respond 
effectively to major accidents in collaboration with Member and Non-Member States 
potentially affected by the offshore oil and gas operations and Union agencies. The 
Commission may make contributions where exercises are directed at testing mechanism for 
transboundary emergency response.89   
As part of the EU emergency preparedness and response plans the EMSA has built a Network 
of Stand-by Oil Spill Response Vessels, maintained through annual procurement procedures 
since 2005, but the vessels are used in line with the principle of ‘subsidiarity’. Thus, Member 
States are primarily responsible for response to pollution incidents in their waters and have the 
EMSA response resources under their operational control upon request for assistance. The 
Network of pollution response vessels is given to requesting States through the Monitoring and 
Information Centre (MIC) of the European Commission in Brussels.90 
 
 
                                                          
88 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.28(2) 
89 Id., Art.31(5) 
90 The service is said to be cost efficient, and is based on ensuring the availability of commercial vessels like 
bunker and product tankers to carry out at-sea oil recovery services following a request for assistance from a 
coastal State. The Network utilises ‘state of the art’ large scale at-sea oil recovery technology. Vessels are ‘pre-
fitted’ and certified for oil recovery operations by an appropriate Classification Society. Following a spill, and a 
request for assistance from an affected State, a vessel ceases its normal commercial activities and is transformed 
rapidly into a fully operational spill response vessel; see EMSA, Annual Report 2012, page 4, available at 
http://emsa.europa.eu/emsa-documents/latest/77-documents/143-annual-reports.html accessed on 18 November 
2013 
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5.2.3 Cooperation and Assistance 
 
The need for cooperation and assistance in response to major hazard incident in offshore E&P 
cannot be over emphasised and is reflected in some regional agreements. Under the Bonn 
Agreement, the North Sea is divided into zones and each party is responsible for a zone with a 
duty to observe every oil incident, give situation report to other members and the necessary 
measure to address it.91 The Parties have right to call for assistance when confronted with 
pollution emergencies and when requested are equally under obligation to respond and render 
help to a party in need.92 
In the Mediterranean region, the Parties by the provisions of the Barcelona Convention are 
obligated to “cooperate in taking necessary measures for dealing with pollution emergencies” 
in order to reduce or eliminate damages resulting from marine accidents.93 Its Emergency 
Protocol calls for cooperation in taking action in respect of ‘grave and imminent danger’ to 
marine environment “due to the presence of massive quantities of oil or other harmful 
substances resulting from accidental causes”.94 The Emergency Protocol applies to pollution 
from “oil or other harmful substances resulting from accidental causes” involving offshore oil 
and gas installations. It confers the right on States to call for assistance when in need and a 
corresponding obligation to render such assistance when requested.95  
Similar provisions on assistance to deal with pollution are contained in the 2002 Prevention 
and Emergency Protocol.96 Under this Protocol, while any State party may call for assistance 
from another party, it must first ask States that are likely to be affected by the pollution. States 
                                                          
91 OSPAR, Bonn Agreement, Art.6 
92 Id., Art.7  
93 Barcelona Convention, Art. 9 
94 1976 Emergency Protocol, Art.1 
95 Id., Art.10 
96 2002 Prevention and Emergency Protocol, Art.12. This replaced the 1976 Emergency Protocol upon entering 
into force in 2004 by virtue of its Article 25. 
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could request for expert advice, required specialised personnel, products, equipment and 
nautical facilities directly or through REMPEC. Those that have been asked for assistance must 
use their best endeavour to render assistance.97 Cooperation in recovery operations seems not 
to apply to accidental pollution in offshore petroleum E&P. It is specific to salvaging hazardous 
and noxious substances in packaged form, including containers, tanks and like items from the 
sea.98  
The question is what happens if a State refuses to render the assistance requested? Can a State 
that has the required assistance be compelled to render the assistance to any Member State that 
requests? The Protocol makes no provision for enforcement of these provisions. Perhaps, in 
view of the fact that all member States in the region may be affected by any major hazard, they 
would be willing to combat emergency to not only assist the asking State but also protect their 
own interests. 
The Offshore Protocol provides that in an emergency a State may ask another State for 
assistance directly or through REMPEC. Countries who are parties to the 1976 Emergency 
Protocol are to apply the pertinent provision of that protocol.99 However, considering the highly 
risky nature of offshore oil and gas operations, Contracting Parties are mandated to cooperate 
in developing newer and better ways of responding to emergency through scientific and 
technological research.100  
To build capacity among all countries of the Mediterranean Sea region, developed countries in 
the region are to put in place programmes to assist developing countries in science, law, 
education and technology relating to prevention, combat and control of pollution.101 A broader 
                                                          
97 Id. 
98 Id., Art.6  
99 Offshore Protocol, Art.18 
100 Id., Art.22 
101 Id., Art.24 
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and unrestricted cooperation is expected on the part of the operator who is at liberty to get 
necessary assistance from any capable organisation or entity when an emergency creates a risk 
beyond its capability.102  
In the Baltic Sea region these issues are governed by provisions on requirements, procedure 
and conditions for assistance similar to those contained in the OPRC.103 The Helsinki 
Convention provides for cooperation in taking appropriate measures for emergency 
preparedness and response to pollution incidents with the details provided in Annex VII on 
response to pollution incident.104  
In the European Union waters, Directive 2013/30/EU105 requires a methodical and planned 
cooperation among Member States and also between Member States and offshore oil and gas 
operators. They are to share compatible emergency response expertise and assets as a way of 
making emergency response and contingency planning for major accidents more effective. 
Where suitable, the planning and responses should also make use of the existing resources and 
assistance available from within the Union, in particular through EMSA. Member States could 
also request additional assistance from the Agency through the Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism.106 While operators should be made to cooperate with relevant authorities of the 
State on regular drill and test of their preparedness for effective response to major accident it 
is the duty of a State to ensure that the competent authority develop cooperation scenarios for 
emergency.107 
                                                          
102 The cooperation could be with other operators or ‘entities capable of rendering necessary assistance’. Perhaps 
this could include companies undertaking salvage operations. See Offshore Protocol, Regulation A (2) of Annex 
VII. 
103 Helsinki Convention, Regulation 8&9 of Annex VII 
104 Id., Art.14 
105 The Directive covers various portions of about four marine regions identified in Article 4(1) of Directive 
2008/56/EC, namely the Baltic Sea, North-east Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea; see 
EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Para. 50 of the Preamble 
106 Id., Para.48 of the Preamble 
107 Id., Art.29(6) and (7) 
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5.2.4 Reporting and Notification  
 
Reporting and notification are two related obligations which reflect customary obligation/duty 
of notification in international environmental law. Reporting requirements are usually imposed 
on the operator of an offshore installation to keep the regulator and other relevant institutions 
informed of occurrences both in terms of compliance with regulations and incidents in the 
course of operations. Notification is used mainly in respect of an operator or State’s obligation 
to inform or intimate other States, regional bodies and organisations of the occurrence of a 
major hazard or accident in the operations and any development that may affect them adversely.  
For instance, in the Mediterranean Sea, a State in whose territory a major hazard occurred must 
notify States likely to be affected by the pollution, REMPEC and IMO as the relevant 
international organisation.108 Similarly, the 1976 Emergency Protocol imposes obligations 
such as monitoring,109 rapid, and adequate reporting.110 The 2002 Prevention and Emergency 
Protocol also require States to develop and apply monitoring activities,111 information 
sharing112 and reporting.113 
In the Baltic Sea region whenever incidents in a State territory are likely to cause pollution to 
areas of the Baltic Sea outside its sovereign control, the State has a duty to ‘notify without 
delay’ other Parties whose interest are affected or likely to be affected.114 The notification 
obligation is subjective as the time frame for such notification and what will amount to a delay 
is not provided in the Helsinki Convention. Although further reporting procedure is provided 
in Regulation 5 of Annex VII, persons in charge of ships (which include offshore installations) 
are also required to report about incidents ‘without delay’. Cooperative information sharing is 
                                                          
108 Offshore Protocol, Arts.17 and 26(3) 
109 Emergency Protocol, Art.4 
110 Id., Art.8 
111 Prevention and Emergency Protocol, Art.5 
112 Id., Arts.7&8 
113 Id., Art.9 
114 Helsinki Convention, Art.13(1) 
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also encouraged among the Parties on matters of preparedness and response to pollution, 
especially with regard to individual country institutions and procedure for emergency 
preparedness and response.115 
In the European Union, Article 30(1) of EU Directive 2013/30/EU obligates Member States to 
ensure that operators or owners of installations notify ‘without delay’ the relevant authority of 
any major accident or situations of risk of major accident. The notification must include 
information on the circumstances, source, potential environmental impact and major 
consequences of the incident. Also where it is considered that a major hazard from a proposed 
offshore oil and gas operation is likely to cause transboundary pollution, the other Member 
State that is likely to be affected shall be given all relevant information prior to the 
commencement of any operations and both parties shall endeavour to jointly adopt measures 
to prevent the damage.116  
Member States that consider that they could be potentially affected by a major hazard incident 
may request the Member State in whose jurisdiction the operations are to take place or 
installation is located to forward all relevant information to them. Without prejudice to the 
functions of the competent authority, both parties may then jointly assess the effectiveness of 
the measures put in place to contain and prevent damage.117  
Where third parties are likely to be affected by a risk of foreseeable transboundary effect of a 
major hazard, information shall be shared with such third party on a reciprocal basis.118 But if 
a major hazard does occur or there is an imminent danger of such which is capable of causing 
                                                          
115 Id., Regulation 10 of Annex VII 
116 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, First Paragraph of Art.31(1)  
117 Id., second paragraph of Art. 31(1). Moreover, to aid joint effective response, any major hazard identified in 
the process shall be taken into account in internal and external emergency response plans; see Art.31(2) 
118 Id., Art.31(3) 
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transboundary effect, the Union, Member States and Non-Union countries likely to be affected 
shall be notified ‘without delay’.   
During response to accidents, information relevant for emergency response shall continuously 
be provided by the Member State in whose jurisdiction the situation ensues.119 Meanwhile, 
within Union waters the European Commission facilitates the exchange of information by 
Member States that have on-going offshore oil and gas operations and adjacent countries to 
promote preventive measures and regional emergency response plans.120 This form of 
facilitation will perhaps help to prevent any delays that might result from non-adherence to the 
requirement of notification “without delay”.  
 
5.2.5 Response Operation  
 
The importance of emergency preparedness and response is underlined by the EU Directive 
2013/30/EU requiring the Member States to make it mandatory and ensure that a licensing 
authority does not grant licence for offshore oil and gas E&P unless it is satisfied that the 
applicant has adequate financial provisions to cover potential liability from such operations 
and also “has sufficient financial resources for the immediate launch and uninterrupted 
continuation of all measures necessary for effective emergency response and subsequent 
remediation.”121 
Every aspect mentioned above will be tested at the moment of an accident that requires 
immediate response action. The moment of response is the assessment of the adequacy or 
otherwise of the contingency plan, the equipment and drill exercises by the personnel. It will 
                                                          
119 Id., Art.31(6) 
120 Id., Art.33(2) 
121 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.4(3) 
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also ascertain whether information shared has been that useful and the level of assistance a 
State in need actually gets.  
Response to oil pollution incidents in the Baltic Sea requires close cooperation through 
information sharing/exchange on preparedness and response, research and development, 
surveillance, joint operational combating exercise and so on.122 Actual response involves 
assessment of the situation; use of mechanical means and exceptional use of chemicals after 
due authorization by the competent national authority.123 By and large, response operations 
must be in accordance with best environmental practices124 which are defined as “the 
application of the most appropriate combination of measures” as explained in Regulation 2 of 
Annex II to the Helsinki Convention. 
The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) adopts recommendations in relation to response 
operations. In a bid to providing standards and time line for response operations, 
Recommendation 19/17125 on “Measures in order to Combat Pollution from Offshore Units” 
requires, inter alia, that response measures must be taken immediately by the operator of a 
platform while supporting measures of the contingency plan must be taken within eight hours 
of the spillage and dispersants usage must be limited and subject to authorization by the 
competent national authority. Also, the “capacity of equipment should march the spill 
expectancy rate in relation to discharge of oil from production drilling or production platform 
and expectancy rate of spill from exploration drilling with due regard to geological location of 
the drilling site and to evaporation and emulsification of the oil.”126 Marching time with action 
is acceptable but the period of eight hours for initiating supporting measures of a contingency 
plan might be seen as a delay. If there is preparedness with response equipment adequately 
                                                          
122 Helsinki Convention, Regulation 10 of Annex VII 
123 Id., Regulation 7 of Annex VII 
124 Id, Regulation 2 of Annex VII 
125 See supra note 72 
126 HELCOM Recommendation 19/17, Clause 1(d)-(f) 
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stocked and trained personnel on duty, it should take far less than eight hours to initiate a 
supportive response.  
For improved response time and effectiveness HELCOM adopted in 2010 Recommendation 
31/1 on “Development of National Ability to Respond to Spillages of Oil and Other Harmful 
Substances”.127 It recommends that a National Contingency Plan should aim at ensuring the 
ability to deploy combat services timely. That is, services must leave base two hours upon 
being informed of an incident; reach the incident site within six hours when it is within the 
country or region; and adequate and substantial response action on the site of spill within twelve 
hours maximum. In the case of a major spillage parties are to respond within a maximum of 
two days of combating the pollution with mechanical pick up devices at sea and use dispersant 
in line with Recommendation 22/2.128 There must also be suitable capacity for disposal of 
recovered or lightered oil within 24 hours. It calls for continued development and improvement 
of combating services in line with the HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan. 
In relation to chemical use in response operations, HELCOM Recommendation 22/2129 on 
“Restricted Use of Chemical Agents and Other Non-Mechanical Means in oil Combating 
Operations in the Baltic Sea Area” recommends use of chemicals agents only with optimised 
efficiency and acceptable effects to the marine environment. While chemical use may be 
authorised, sinking agents are prohibited and absorbents could be used only when timely 
removal of the absorbed oil from the sea surface is guaranteed.  
                                                          
127 Adopted on 4 March 2010 in line with Article 20(1)(b) supersedes HELCOM Recommendations 1/7, 4/3 and 
11/13 and is an improvement on the time line set in Recommendation 19/17 of 1998 
128 Paragraph 2.1 of The Guidelines for Applying HELCOM Recommendation 31/1 on Development of 
National Ability to Respond to Spillages of oil and other Harmful Substances noted that “Oil spill spreading is a 
very fast process calling for immediate reactions with a maximum of recovery vessels in order to use effectively 
the first spreading phase with appropriate layer thicknesses. Experiences have shown that the key of effective 
recovery lies in the first 24 hours after a spontaneous outflow. The layer thickness in relation to the elapsed time 
and the potential surface sweeping performance must be used for the definition of the needed capacity, taking 
into account weathering of the oil, type and viscosity, sea state and wind influences.”  
129 Adopted on 21 March 2001 
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Under the OSPAR Convention, joint combat operation is encouraged with two main 
coordination and command levels. That is the operational control ashore and the tactical 
command at the scene of operation with the country that asked for assistance taking charge of 
operations as the lead country. The duty of the lead country, beyond taking charge of the 
operations, is to give administrative, operational and logistic support to assisting foreign 
units.130  
The country in charge of operations may change depending on where the pollution spreads and 
shifts to.  If the pollution spreads to a neighbouring country and operations move there, the new 
country where the operations are taking place becomes the lead country in charge of the 
operations. The requirement for the country that asked for assistance to be the lead country 
may only change where circumstances demand and it is practical and agreed by the parties.131 
The most recent international instrument on offshore safety, EU Directive 2013/30/EU requires 
States to have adequate availability of emergency response resources which should be assessed 
against the capacity to effectively deploy them to the site of an accident. The readiness and 
effectiveness of emergency response resources and their deployment should be assured and 
regularly tested through drilling exercises by the operators. Under justified circumstances, 
response arrangements could be allowed to be reliant on speedily transporting the response 
equipment such as capping devices, and other resources from distant locations.132 
Furthermore, States must ensure that operators or owners of installations promptly put their 
internal emergency plan into action to respond to any major accident or any likely risk of major 
accident in a manner consistent with the external emergency plan of the State.133 They must 
                                                          
130 Bonn Agreement, Counter Pollution Manual, Recommendation Concerning the Command Structure and 
Operational Co-operation for Joint Combating Operation, Clauses 2.1(a)&(b) and 2.4  
131 Id., Clauses 2.5 and 2.1(c) 
132 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, para.35 of Preamble; see also Arts. 11(1)(g), 14 and 28 thereof 
133 Id., Art.28(1); see also para.54 of the Preamble 
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require operators or owners to take all suitable measures to prevent its escalation and minimise 
its consequences.134 In this regard the competent authority may assist with supply of additional 
resources and a Union member could request additional assistance from the EMSA through the 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism.135 During the emergency response, information necessary 
for fulfilling the investigation obligation under Article 26(1) of the Directive shall be collected 
by the State.136   
Where suitable, the planning and responses should also make use of the existing resources and 
assistance available from within the Union, in particular through the EMSA and the Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism.137 EMSA has the mandate to assist Member States in the 
preparation and execution of their external emergency response plan especially where the 
impacts are transboundary.138   
 
5.3 Non-Binding Regulations on Emergency Preparedness and 
Response  
 
In addition to binding obligations and requirements contained in global and regional 
agreements, some not legally binding instruments or guidelines also shape the conduct of 
operators and other actors in the offshore oil and gas industry. One such instrument is the World 
Bank Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Development 
(World Bank Offshore Guidelines). Under the World Bank Offshore Guidelines the operators 
must conduct a spill risk assessment for their facilities and put in place measures to respond to 
emergencies like Emergency Shutdown System. The latter initiates automatic shutdown 
                                                          
134 Id., Art.30(2) 
135 Id., Para.48 of the Preamble 
136 Id., Art.30(3) 
137 Id., Para.48 of the Preamble 
138 Id., Art.10(2)(b) 
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actions to bring the offshore facility to a safe condition. Also, installations must be equipped 
with valves such as subsea shutdown valves that prompt early shutdown or isolation in the 
event of an emergency. Personnel must be adequately trained in oil spill prevention, 
containment and response. Spill response and containment equipment must be deployed or 
made available as and when necessary for response. 
The World Bank Guidelines further require installations to have both a Spill Response Plan 
that addresses potential oil, chemical, and fuel spills and the capability to implement such plan. 
The Guidelines provide a basic content of a response plan to include, inter alia, description of 
the operations, site conditions, current and wind data, sea conditions and water depth, and 
logistic support; identification of persons responsible for managing emergency, their 
responsibility, authority, roles and contact details; and possible cooperative measures with 
government agencies; arrangements and procedures to mobilize external resources for 
responding to larger spills and strategies for deployment; full list, description, location, and use 
of on-site and off-site response equipment, and the response times for deployment.  
Meanwhile, all spills should be documented, reported and while responding to a spill, a root 
cause investigation should be carried out and corrective action taken.139 This is to avoid a repeat 
disaster and improve operational standards beyond the level they were when the accident 
occurred.  
In addition to government efforts, industry actors are required to cooperate in ensuring safe 
operation and effective response to emergencies. For example, in the North Sea and adjacent 
waters of the North West European Continental Shelf, oil and gas companies in the area formed 
                                                          
139 World Bank Offshore Guidelines, pages 10-11   
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the Operators Co-operative Emergency Services (OCES) as an organisation to collaborate and 
share resources in the event of an emergency situation.140  
Interestingly, forum formation for the purpose of building capacity and peer review is not 
limited to operators of the industry. Regulators from various countries also form organisations 
and fora for such purposes. Examples are the North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum 
(NSOAF)141 and the International Regulators Forum (IRF).142 Also in 2012 the European 
Commission formed the European Union Offshore Oil and Gas Authority Group (EUOAG).143 
The Group is aimed at encouraging exchange of experience, identification of best practices 
among regulators and industry operators. With this Union-wide structure they hope to 
maximize the effectiveness of transfer of experiences.144 The activity of the group is expected 
to cover issues of prevention of accident and emergency response within Union waters and 
beyond, where appropriate.145    
 
5.4 Conclusion      
 
Following the 20 April 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico, capacity to 
respond to major hazards in offshore petroleum operations have become one of key 
considerations among operators and regulators of the industry. Beyond States like the US, UK 
and Norway, some sea regions have also acted in response to the lessons of the Deepwater 
Horizon. 
                                                          
140 There are some at national level like the Emergency Preparedness Offshore Liaison (EPOL) Group in the UK 
that seeks to improve offshore emergency response related issues in the central and northern UK Continental 
Shelf and west of Shetland 
141 See further details at http://www.psa.no/nsoaf/category999.html and  
http://www.sodm.nl/sites/default/files/redactie/nsoaf-supervision-report.pdf last visited 20 April 2015 
142 Details about IRF available at  http://www.irfoffshoresafety.com/about/ last visited 20 April 2015  
143 Further details available at  http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/  last visited 20 April 2014 
144 Commission Decision 2012/C18/07, see para. 6 & 7 of the Preamble 
145 Id., Art.2 
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The Barcelona legal framework seems to create room for discretion on the part of States who 
are expected to use contingency planning and adopt all necessary measures to achieve the main 
objective of preventing or minimizing the consequences of a major hazard.146 However, when 
it comes to emergency response it is vital that a country is prepared with some level of certainty, 
hence legislation on emergency response indicating basic level of preparedness is essential.  
 
Same is applicable to other regions, which while having requirements for emergency 
preparedness and response need to review those provisions to address accidents of the 
magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon blowout. The OSPAR Commission in the aftermath 
Deepwater Horizon called on the Parties to, as a matter of urgency, start reviewing their 
existing commitments. Parties are to take extra care to apply all relevant learning from the 
Deepwater Horizon accident,147 including the permitting of drilling activities in extreme 
conditions and continue to evaluate this on a case by case basis prior to authorisation. Similarly, 
HELCOM adopted new recommendations aimed at improving emergency preparedness and 
response time. 
 
However, there has been no suggestion on changes in the global legal framework on emergency 
preparedness and response beyond what is contained in the UNCLOS and OPRC. Though there 
are some expressions of desire for improved international regulations, the lessons of Deepwater 
Horizon is yet to propel regulatory changes at the global level.  A new agreement may not 
necessarily be what is needed. Amendment to the OPRC through the IMO or Conference of 
the parties as provided in Article 14 of the Convention would do at the global level. Such an 
amendment should be based on research on the state-of-the-art of oil pollution preparedness 
                                                          
146 2002 Prevention and Emergency Protocol, Arts 3(1)(b) 
147 OSPAR Recommendation 2010/18 on the Prevention of Significant Acute Oil Pollution from Offshore 
Drilling Activities  
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and response as demanded by Article 8 of OPRC. An amendment should address the observed 
lapses of the OPRC such as response time; technical assistance and cooperation; cost of 
assistance and reimbursement; internal emergency response plan of the operator; design, 
construction and equipment of offshore installations to improve response to major hazards. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENTAL POLLUTION FROM OFFSHORE 
PETROLEUM OPERATIONS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
Irrespective of emergency response, accidents may still result in pollution and subsequent 
damage to property, humans and the environment. Marine pollution may affect economic 
activities and businesses that are dependent on the sea and its natural resources. Sometimes 
such pollution could be transboundary. Once there is damage there must be a remedy (ubi jus 
ubi remedium) and the polluter must bear liability and pay compensation. 
Transboundary harm is presumably the first aspect of pollution regulated by international law.1 
Transboundary pollution arises where a pollutant moves beyond the territory of one State to 
cause harmful effect in another State through natural media such as water or air.2 The principle 
governing transboundary pollution was formulated in the Trail Smelter Arbitration and 
received international recognition in the form of Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration which provides that States have sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies and a corresponding responsibility to ensure that 
such activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause environmental harm to other 
States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.  
Also, Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration expressed the need for States to develop domestic 
regulations on liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental 
                                                          
1 Bodansky, Daniel, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law, (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England) p.11 (2010)  
2 Caron, David D., Liability for Transnational Pollution Arising from Offshore Oil Development: A 
Methodological Approach, 10 Ecology L.Q. 641 (1982-1983); Mccaffrey, Pollution of Shared Natural 
Resources : Legal and Trade Implications, 71 Am Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 56 (1977) 
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damage. It urges States to cooperate and expeditiously develop further international law on 
liability and compensation for environmental harm caused by activities within their jurisdiction 
or control to areas beyond national jurisdiction. The imposition of liability for environmental 
damage is in line with the polluter pays principle. 
While there are global liability regimes in respect of dangerous activities that may cause 
environmental harm, such as nuclear energy, space activities and oil transportation by ships, 
there is no global instrument that specifically addresses the issue of liability for pollution 
arising from offshore petroleum E&P. This absence is evident even in cases of transboundary 
harm.3 Liability may be viewed from two angles- State responsibility for breach of international 
obligation to prevent pollution and private law civil liability for environmental damage.  
Liability for pollution damage may be a means to enforce environmental standards or 
supplement existing enforcement mechanisms. Some commentators are of the view that 
liability provisions are not to influence the conduct of operators and owners of various 
potentially hazardous ventures but are basically to secure redress for victims of those ventures.4 
Hence, most liability regimes do not provide for payment of compensation for purely 
environmental damage, that is, where damage has not resulted in economic losses or damage 
to property.5 It is not the environment that gets compensated but its users that experience loss 
as a result of the environmental damage. All the environment may get is clean-up, remediation 
or restoration to a possible extent. But this notion of non-payment of compensation for damage 
only, to the environment is changing.6 
                                                          
3 Wetterstein, Peter, ‘Environmental Liability in the Offshore Sector with Special Focus on Conflict of Laws 
(Part 1)’, Vol.23 Issue 5, The Journal of Water Law,  167, 169 
4 Boyle, A. E., op. cit., p. 9 (2005) 
5 See Wolfrum, Rudiger, op. cit., p.129 
6 For instance, environmental damage was taken as a separate head of claim in the Nuclear Tests cases between 
Australia and New Zealand; UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) affirmed Iraq’s liability under 
international law for “any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage” as a result of its invasion of 
Kuwait. Under municipal law, the US, for example, under its Clean Water Act imposes liability based on the 
amount of oil spilled into US waters which is mere environmental damage.  
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While damage caused by an accident might be easily seen or identified, the identification of 
the responsible party for damage resulting from offshore accidental pollution might be difficult 
for some victims. This is due to the complexity of the operations of petroleum E&P which 
involves a host of players undertaking various jobs in the oil field. For instance, when the 
installation is jointly owned by multiple entities and the ownership structure is not always 
known to the public, the operator becomes the only target of victims. There are also 
circumstances where it is contractors on the installations that are known and sued by claimants 
for environmental damage. Such contractors rely on their contractual agreements and decline 
liability and victims are forced to withdraw cases for instituting an action against the wrong 
party. Thus, the channelling of liability is relevant to both those engaged in offshore activities 
and potential victims of the operations. 
Offshore petroleum activities are on the rise with new discoveries in different regions of the 
world, including Arctic offshore. In the event of accidental pollution what are the path ways to 
compensation for victims, especially when it is transboundary? This chapter examines the 
position of international law on liability for accidental pollution from offshore petroleum E&P 
activities. Issues such as State responsibility, private law civil liability for accidental pollution, 
nature of liability, access to justice in transboundary pollution, compensation and limitation of 
liability will be discussed.  
 
6.1 State Responsibility and Liability for Environmental Damage 
 
Responsibility relates to discharge of customary or conventional international law obligations 
imposed on States. Liability relates to reparation, damages or other forms of compensation due 
as a result of damage for breach of applicable international laws and regulations or from failure 
  
157 
 
to observe them.7 A State may also bear responsibility for harm resulting from acts not 
prohibited by international law. 
In international law, state responsibility may arise where there is a damage that results from a 
violation of international obligations.8 According to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
by the International Law Commission (ILC), internationally wrongful act of a State entails its 
international responsibility.9 There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when an act or 
omission attributable to the State under international law constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of that State.10 
International obligations of a State may arise from conventions to which the State is a party or 
from customary international law.11 Customary international law includes State practices that 
provide further evidence of the existence of such an obligation.12 Accordingly, the principle of 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas obliges States to ensure that activities within a State do not 
cause harm to the territory, rights or interests of another State as a matter of customary 
international law. 
The doctrine of State responsibility was influenced by Roman law which is based on the 
establishment of fault. There is a trend toward an objective responsibility of State whereby the 
proof of fault is no longer required, making a State liable by the mere violation of international 
                                                          
7 Nordquist, Myron H., op cit., p. 412 (1991) 
8 Smith, Brian D., State Responsibility and the Marine Environment (Clarendon Press) 22 (1988)  
9 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
November 2001, extract from the Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third 
session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), 
chp.IV.E.1, Art I; See also, in Crawford J, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 77 (2005). The 
Draft Articles were adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) on 9 August 2001 and are the result of 
a study extending over 40 years initiated by the UN itself and thus, can be considered ‘teachings of the most 
respected publicists’ for the purpose of art 38 (1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The 
Draft Articles are also considered to reflect customary international law. 
10 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), Chapter IV.E. 1, Art 2, in Crawford, supra note 9, 81. 
11 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of International Law (Oxford University Press 7th ed) 436-37 (2008) 
12 Smith, Brian D., supra note 8, pp.74-75  
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law.13 Though States may not be held liable in practice, it is the violation of established rules 
of international law that entails a responsibility on the State.14 States may be held responsible 
for making laws contrary to international law or failure to do so in compliance with its 
international obligation.15 Such violation could be by way of a direct act or an omission that 
adversely affects the corresponding rights of another sovereign State.16   
The responsibility of a State for the acts or omissions of the government and or its agencies is 
referred to as direct responsibility. The responsibility for harmful activities of individuals and 
corporate entities within the territory of the State that results in pollution or damage outside its 
jurisdiction is indirect responsibility.17 In circumstances where the injurious act is that of a 
private individual or entity, the indirect state responsibility is to the extent of ensuring that 
redress is available to victims, and where need be, punish such private individual/entity.18 
However, the State may as well be held directly responsible where contrary to its international 
obligations it refuses, fails and or neglects to prevent the individual or private entity from 
committing the injurious act.19 Such individual acts may be imputable on the State especially 
in cases where it adversely impacts the territory of another State. But in instances where 
individuals are acting under the authority of the State, liability will generally be imputed on the 
State even where the actions were ultra vires.20  
The notion of direct and indirect state responsibility becomes complicated in its application 
when it relates to activities which by virtue of their magnitude and high likelihood of harm, 
                                                          
13 Id, Jimenez de Arechaga, E., ‘International Responsibility’, in Manual of Public International Law, (M. 
Sorenson ed.) 531 at p534-535(1968) 
14 Brownlie, Ian, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility Part I (Clarendon Press, Oxford) p.132 
(1983); See Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, op. cit., p. 7  
15 Boyle, A. E., op. cit., p. 3; Smith B. D., supra note 8, p. 24; Articles 1 & 2 ILC Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001, ORGA, Supplement No. A/56/10    
16 Smith B. D., supra note 8, p.24 
17 Id at p. 8 
18 Oppenheim, L., International Law 8th ed., p. 338 (1955) 
19 Id.  
20 Id.  
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constitute a continuous threat to the environment even with the best of precautions taken and 
due diligence applied. These activities are embarked upon not only for the personal benefit of 
the individual licensee or operator but also for the benefit of the given society and even the 
international community, such as space exploration, nuclear energy development and offshore 
petroleum E&P, which are dangerous but still lawful.21 In practise they have the seal of the 
State as they are undertaken with the approval, licence or authority of the State within which 
they operate.22 
Outer space or offshore petroleum E&P are not prohibited by international law and as such 
undertaking these activities within a State does not constitute a breach of an international 
obligation.23 Similarly, States under international law are entitled to exploit the resources in 
their territorial waters, EEZ and the continental shelf.24 However, considering the provisions 
of Article 235(1) of UNCLOS a State that does not prevent marine pollution from these 
activities might be failing in its international obligation and held responsible. 
While it is established that there is an international law duty of States to prevent harm to the 
territory of other States and areas beyond state control, what is not settled is the extent to which 
a State may be held liable when transboundary pollution does occur.25 The concept of 
responsibility of a State for damage caused to areas beyond national jurisdiction has been 
asserted but issues of who and by whom claims for damage is to be made, the measure of 
                                                          
21 Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, op. cit., p.9 
22 Id., Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt postulates that in view of the fact that states benefit from these activities 
through royalties, taxes and promotion of the domestic economy the state should also share in the “burden of 
their disadvantages”. But these issues are not sufficient to hold a State liable in international law.  
23 Id., p.10 
24 See UNCLOS, Art.77; Art. 2 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf  
25 Brunnee, J., op. cit., p.353  
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damage and whom it should be paid to are some of the technical difficulties of the application 
of the concept.26  
Generally, it is a State’s duty to ensure that there is a process for compensation and that 
effective liability regime exists in domestic law. Holding the State liable for environmental 
harm resulting from activities within the State does not exist in practice. For instance, under 
the 1992 Civil Liability Convention a Contracting State is obligated to ensure that its courts 
are competent to handle claims. Except in cases of judgment obtained by fraud or a breach of 
the rules of fair hearing a decision of a competent court in a Contracting State is recognised 
and enforceable by the courts of other Contracting States.27  
Under UNCLOS, State liability as stated in Article 235 is in general terms and as such governed 
by the international law of State responsibility.28 By providing that liability is to be “in 
accordance with international law” leaves open the question of strict liability, whether of a 
State or of an international organisation, as part of general international law.29 In the absence 
of definitive State liability rules in international law and the failure of States to expeditiously 
formulate such rules, there is a rare resort to State responsibility to hold a State liable and 
subject to payment of compensation for environmental harm resulting from activities within 
territories under its control.     
 
                                                          
26 Australia’s working paper on preservation of the marine environment (Source 1) at the 1973 session of the 
Sea-bed Committee, quoted in Nordquist, Myron H., op. cit., p. 402 (1991); see also Patricia Park, International 
Law for Energy and the Environment, 2nd ed. (CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group) 96 2013 
27 Art. IX of 1992 CLC 
28; see art. 235(1) of UNCLOS which provides, that “States are responsible for the fulfilment of their 
international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be 
liable in accordance with international law.” Similarly, 2006 ILC Draft Principles on the allocation of loss in the 
case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities only noted in the preamble that States are 
responsible for infringements of their obligations of prevention under international law. The main principles of 
the draft did not address state liability. 
29 Nordquist, Myron H., supra note 9, p.12  
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6.1.1 State Responsibility for Accidental Pollution from Offshore 
Petroleum Operations 
 
The notion of state responsibility can be advanced through the ‘objective’ or ‘risk’ theory and 
the ‘subjective’ or ‘fault’ theory. In the ‘objective’ or ‘risk’ theory responsibility is not fault 
based. It attaches responsibility where a causal connection can be established or attributable to 
the State. On the other hand, the ‘subjective’ or ‘fault’ theory accords responsibility based on 
proven fault of the State by way of either intent or negligence on the part of the State.30 
Indications from State practice31 and the decisions of arbitral tribunals and of the International 
Court of Justice32 show a wider acceptance of the theory of objective responsibility. Which 
promotes protection of the international marine environment by ensuring that responsibility is 
not avoided for lack of fault. The theory enjoys the support of the ILC, publicists and 
commentators.33 
Under the objective standard, a State will be responsible where an international obligation has 
been breached unless due diligence is proved.34 Brownlie argues that the determining factor of 
breach is the amount of control which ought to have been exercised in the particular 
circumstances and not the extent of actual control.35 The reality, as Boyle observed, is that 
“accidents may happen even in the best regulated and managed installations” and as such not 
                                                          
30 Brownlie, Ian, supra note 11, pp. 436-440 
31 Id, pp 437 - 438 
32 In the Neer Claim (1926) 4 RIAA 60, 61 the Commission held that: “the propriety of governmental acts 
should be put to the test of international standards”. This was reinforced in the Roberts Claim (1926) 4 RIAA 
77, 80 where the test applied was “whether aliens are treated in accordance with ordinary standards of 
civilization” and in the Caire Claim (1929) 5 RIAA 516, 529 where Presiding Commissioner Verzijl applied the 
doctrine of ‘objective’ responsibility of the State, that is, the responsibility for the acts of the officials or organs 
of a State, which may devolve upon it even in the absence of any ‘fault’ of its own. 
33 Neither the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility nor the Declaration of United Nations Conference on 
Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration) indicate need for fault; Starke, J., Introduction to International 
Law (Butterworths, 9th ed,) 301 (1984); Brownlie, Ian, supra note 11, pp. 437-438. In any case, as Judge 
Azevedo noted in the Corfu Channel case (1949) ICJR 4, ‘the notion of culpa is always changing ... it tends to 
draw nearer the system of objective responsibility’ 
34 Brownlie, supra note 11, p.455. 
35 Id, 453 
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an indication of failure of due diligence or breach of duty by the State.36 Moreover, in the 
absence of a precise legal meaning of ‘due diligence’ the standard for its determination would 
vary according to circumstances.  
Accordingly, except in the area of strict liability, the responsibility of the State with respect to 
marine pollution from offshore facilities must be assessed by determining whether the State 
has acted with due diligence in the circumstance. Due diligence is not easy to administer as 
clearly accepted international standards that define the content of the duty are absent in 
international treaties.37 This places heavy burden of proof on the State which must establish a 
failure of due diligence. 
Also, making States responsible for transboundary harm may have implication on the essence 
of the polluter pays principle. If a State is made the responsible and liable party for harm caused 
by activities of mostly private actors, it would amount to government subsidising such 
industries. If operators must be made to improve on safety of offshore operations, then a direct 
claim against the operators would do more to promote the implementation of a ‘polluter pays’ 
principle to the allocation of transboundary pollution cost instead of making States guarantors 
for operators.38  
The issue of legal standing of an individual to institute claims against a State and the forum in 
international stage might create difficulties for such an approach. Hence, State responsibility 
and liability should be more of residual sources of redress. International legal framework 
should be focused on ensuring that States create the requisite legal environment in its domestic 
laws for persons affected by transboundary pollution to be adequately compensated within a 
reasonable time. The domestic law would provide for the responsible party in the event that 
                                                          
36 Boyle, A. E., op. cit., p. 7  
37 An example of such provision is in the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety 
38 Boyle, A. E., op. cit., p.8 
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regulations are breached. The law must make clear who is responsible for any accident in which 
third parties are affected in the course of the E&P activities.39  
States have a duty to have in place a legal system that provides prompt and adequate 
compensation for victims of marine pollution from natural or juridical persons within their 
jurisdiction.40 Such legal regime would bring to relevance the issue of exhaustion of local 
remedies as provided in Article 295 of UNCLOS, especially where a State chooses to exercise 
its right of diplomatic protection with regard to such damage. The duty imposed by paragraph 
2 of Article 235 would be inapplicable in cases where the damage is caused by the State and a 
claimant State is not required to subject itself to the respondent State legal system before 
invoking international procedures.41 
Without making specific provisions, UNCLOS urges States to cooperate in the implementation 
of existing international law and further develop international law of responsibility and liability 
“for the assessment of and compensation for damage and the settlement of related disputes, as 
well as, where appropriate, development of criteria and procedures for payment of adequate 
compensation, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds.”42 
UNCLOS while being unequivocal on the obligation of States to take proactive measures aimed 
at preventing marine pollution,43 does not determine the nature of liability. In essence, 
UNCLOS only establishes the existence of liability for environmental damage in international 
law. However, the wordings of Article 235 suggests that the State is not primarily liable for 
any damage but has an obligation to ensure that there is prompt and adequate compensation for 
victims. This suggests that when a States fails in that primary duty it could be held responsible 
                                                          
39 For instance, in the case of the Macondo well where more than one company was involved in its development, 
BP the, the operator was the responsible party for the blowout based on the provisions of the US Clean Water 
Act 
40 UNCLOS, Art. 235(2) 
41 Nordquist, op. cit., p. 413 
42 UNCLOS, Art. 235(3) 
43 See Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, op. cit., p.43 
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in international law.44 But in the absence of a developed international law of liability, it might 
be impossible to hold such a State liable. Whatever the arguments for or against State 
responsibility for accidental pollution, the fact is that States rarely resort to it. 
It follows that in the absence of any other convention to the contrary, on the issues of 
compensation for damage caused to the marine environment, access to justice would be 
determined by the municipal legal regime of the State in whose jurisdiction the operations are 
based. In which case victims of transboundary pollution may go through intricate processes, 
both diplomatic and legal to get remedy. For, instance, in Ixtoc I spill, slick extended along 
parts of Texas coast and caused damage. The United States government could not sue the 
Mexican government which refused to admit any breach of international rules.45 Also, liability 
issues arising from the transboundary impact of the Montara oil spill are still unresolved.46 
Indonesia is faced with difficulty in its effort to getting adequate compensation for its citizens. 
These incidents exposed the challenges of the continued absence of provisions on liability for 
marine pollution resulting from offshore petroleum E&P, especially in a transboundary 
context. This prompted Indonesia’s proposal to the IMO Legal Committee for a new work 
programme to address the liability issue.47 
Concern about this lacuna in international law has been expressed long ago. For example, Ross 
observed that “while international law recognises the responsibility of States for extraterritorial 
                                                          
44 This is based on the collective reading of articles 194(2) and 235(1) and (2). See Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 
op. cit., p.44 
45 See Handl, Gϋnther, The case for Mexican Liability for Transnational Pollution Damage Resulting from the 
Ixtoc I Oil Spill, Hous. J. Int’l L. 229, pp.230&237 (1979-1980); Cates, Melissa B., ‘Offshore Oil Platforms 
Which Pollute the Marine Environment: A Proposal for an International Treaty Imposing Strict Liability’ 21 San 
Diego L. Rev. 691, 692 (1983-1984); Fender, James E., ‘Trouble Over Oiled Waters: Pollution Litigation or 
Arbitration-The Ixtoc I Oil Well Blow-Out’ 4 Suffolk Transnat’l L.J. 281, 282-283 (1980) 
46 There has been unsuccessful meetings between the operators and Indonesian government officials over claims 
for damage to Indonesian waters from the Montara spill. See The Jakata Post, Probe on Montara oil spill 
urgent: Experts, 27 July 2012, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/27/probe-montara-oil-
spill-urgent-experts.html and D Borthwick, Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, Montara 
Commission of Inquiry, 17 June 2010, p. 302-303 http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/Documents/MIR/Montara-
Report.pdf      
47 LEG 97/14/1, of 10 September 2010, p.1 
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damages, international judicial processes do not provide adequate means for obtaining 
compensation for damages and securing ‘the dis-continuance of the injurious activity or its 
prevention even before actual damage is suffered’.”48 Hence, an international legal framework 
that establishes a minimum acceptable standard of equal access to justice in cases of 
environmental harm is desirable. 
 
6.1.2 Liability for Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous 
Activities 
 
The fact that activities undertaken in one State may have impact on another State has been 
acknowledged by international legal doctrine. But not much has been achieved in State practice 
to develop a clear and coherent legal framework to address this problem. The ILC work on 
State liability for acts not prohibited by international law started in the 1970s. it made an 
attempt to fill the legal lacuna by preparing draft Articles on issues of liability of States for acts 
not prohibited by international law in 1990.49 These first articles were intended to supplement 
the rules on State responsibility and establish principles to address State and civil liability 
concerning transboundary harm arising from activities that are not prohibited but the principles 
were controversial and incomplete.50 
In 1992 the topic of international liability was divided into prevention and remedial measures 
but the ILC focused first on developing draft articles on prevention. A final draft Article on the 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities was adopted in 2001 by the 
                                                          
48 Ross, William M., Oil Pollution as an International Problem: A Study of Puget Sound and the Strait of 
Georgia (University of Washington Press, Seattle and London) p.77 (1973); see also Legault, L. H. J. The 
Freedom of the Sea: A License to Pollute? 1970 Seminar paper cited by Ross at p.77  
49 J. Barboza, Sixth Report, UN Doc.A/CN.4/428, 39 (1990), cited by Sands, Philippe, et al. Principles of 
International Environmental Law, op. cit.,  p.734  
50 Sands, Philippe, et al. Principles of International Environmental Law, op. cit.,  p.734  
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Drafting Committee of the ILC. A return to liability topic was made in 2002 and in 2006 the 
ILC came up with Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the case of Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities (2006 ILC draft Principles).51 Both of these ILC 
draft Principles are focused on hazardous activities that are not prohibited under international 
law.52 
The 2006 draft Principles acknowledged the relevance of Principles 13 and 16 of the Rio 
Declaration and notes that irrespective of compliance by a State with its obligation of 
prevention of transboundary harm, incidents involving hazardous activities may still occur.53 
However, States are responsible for infringements of their obligations to prevent harm under 
international law.54 The draft explains “damage” to mean significant damage caused to persons, 
property or the environment. It includes loss of life or personal injury; loss of, or damage to, 
property, including property which forms part of the cultural heritage; loss or damage by 
impairment of the environment; the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the 
property, or environment, including natural resources; and the costs of reasonable response 
measures. “Hazardous activity” means an activity which involves a risk of causing significant 
harm.55 By the nature of damage caused by accidental pollution from offshore petroleum 
operations the draft Principles would be applicable to offshore installations. 
The essence of the draft Principles is to ensure that victims of transboundary damage get 
prompt and adequate compensation.56 States must in their domestic law provide for this or other 
                                                          
51 UN Doc. A/61/10 available at  http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/english/a_61_10.pdf last visited 25 April 2015; 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_10_2006.pdf (accessed on March 27, 
2012 
52 Principle 1 of 2006 ILC draft Principles  
53 Preamble of 2006 ILC draft Principles 
54 Id; see art. 235(1) of UNCLOS which provides, that “States are responsible for the fulfilment of their 
international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. They shall be 
liable in accordance with international law.”  
55 Principle 2 of 2006 ILC draft Principles,  
56 Principle 3. Also, in the event of transboundary damage the environment should be preserved and protected 
through mitigation of damage and its restoration or reinstatement. Similar obligation has been adopted under the 
law of the sea as provided in Art. 235(2) thus:  “States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with 
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relief for damage to the marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their 
jurisdiction. Similarly, Chapter IV of the 1990 draft addressed the issue of liability for 
transboundary harm with a focus, in principle on harm being fully compensated.57 But States 
were at liberty to negotiate reductions.58 The Articles granted locus and access to justice to 
States, individuals or legal entities to sue in the State of origin or the affected State and non-
discrimination in the application of national laws.59 It also provides for recognition of 
judgement and limitation of State immunity, save in relation to enforcement measures.60  
However, in view of the inevitability of harm in hazardous activities,61 the ILC also focused 
on issues of prompt payment of adequate compensation to victims of transboundary damage. 
The 2006 ILC Draft Principles urges States to preserve and protect the environment through 
mitigation of damage and restoration or reinstatement of the environment.62  
The draft Principles provide for imposition of strict liability on the operator and prompt 
payment of compensation to victims of transboundary pollution. Furthermore, operators and 
entities should be made to provide financial security such as insurance and encouraged to 
collectively establish industry wide fund. Where such measures are still inadequate the State is 
urged to make funds available for compensation and address the environmental damage.63 This 
may involve providing financial assistance through the specific industry and State fund to 
supplement the financial security provided by the operator.64 
                                                          
their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by 
pollution of the marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.”  
57 Art.21 of 1990 ILC Draft Articles 
58 Art.23 of 1990 ILC Draft Articles 
59 Id, Arts.28(b), 29(a), 29(b) and 29(c) and 30 
60 Id., Arts.31 and 32 
61 Preamble to the 2006 ILC draft Principles 
62 Principle 3, 2006 ILC draft Principles 
63 See generally Principle 4 
64 Principle 7(2) of 2006 ILC draft Principles 
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States are to grant legal standing and access to justice and environmental information to any 
victim of incidents from hazardous activities irrespective of whether the victim is from the 
State of origin.65 The draft Principles call for adoption of global, regional or bilateral 
agreements to address hazardous activities to provide effectively for compensation, liability 
and emergency response.66  
Though these principles address transboundary damage for hazardous activities, it does not 
specifically make reference to offshore petroleum activities. Moreover, it is not obligatory on 
States to implement them as the draft is not a binding instrument. However, it will influence 
international tribunals and provide some guide on what should be expected of a binding 
instrument that may be negotiated at international levels - global, regional or bilateral- to 
regulate accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations.  
  
6.2 International Civil Liability Regime for Dangerous Activities  
 
There are good examples of civil liability regimes in international law in respect of some 
activities that are dangerous and entail high risk of damage. There is no doubt that offshore 
petroleum E&P is a dangerous activity. While there is no global international civil liability 
regime governing them, certain areas such as nuclear power generation and transportation of 
dangerous substances have civil liability regimes that could serve as a guide to what may be 
appropriate for the offshore petroleum industry. 
  
                                                          
65 Principle 6 of 2006 ILC draft Principles 
66 Principle 7(1) of 2006 ILC draft Principles provides that “Where, in respect of particular categories of hazardous 
activities, specific global, regional or bilateral agreements would provide effective arrangements concerning 
compensation, response measures and international and domestic remedies, all efforts should be made to conclude 
such specific agreements.”  
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6.2.1 Civil Liability in Maritime Transportation Activities 
 
Civil liability regime in maritime transportation is robust with conventions and protocols 
adopted under the auspices of the IMO. The regime has evolved over time in response to major 
shipping hazards and the need to fully apply the polluter pays principle by ensuring that 
adequate compensation is paid to victims and polluted marine environment is restored.     
A primary regime for civil liability for accidental oil pollution damage in maritime 
transportation is the 1992 protocol to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention (CLC) now 
reconstituted and referred to as the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage 1992 (1992 CLC).67 The initial 1969 CLC was adopted following the Torrey Canyon 
accident of March 1967 and has been amended by three protocols. 
In addition to the 1992 CLC, there are the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds 
(IOPCF) made up of the 1971 Fund, 1992 Fund and the 2003 Supplementary Fund. The IOPCF 
is made up of contributions from persons who received within a specific calendar year in excess 
of 150,000 tonnes of crude oil and heavy fuel oil transported by sea to State parties to the Fund 
Convention.68 This by implication transfers some of the economic consequences of the damage 
to the owners of oil cargo.69 
The 1992 Civil Liability regime covers pollution damage in the various maritime zones of a 
State party, including the EEZ.70 While the definition of ship includes sea going vessels and 
any sea borne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo,71 it excludes 
vessels used exclusively for carrying oil in lakes or rivers and fixed or mobile oil rigs.72 The 
                                                          
67 973 UNTS 3 (hereafter 1992 CLC), This was further amended in 2002 
68 Art. X of the 1971 Fund Convention as amended by art. XII of the 1992 Protocol 
69 The 1971 Fund Convention ceased to be in force on May 24, 2002 due to its denunciation as provided for 
under the 1992 protocol to the fund.      
70 Id 
71 Article I(1) of 1992 CLC  
72 Id  
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Convention covers only persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil73 as non- persistent oils were 
unlikely to cause real damage to the environment. Any other damage it is likely to cause may 
be addressed under the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 
(LLMC).74 While clean-up cost and cost incurred in restoring the damaged environment can 
be compensated, damage to the environment per se cannot be compensated. 
The Convention imposes strict liability on the owner of a ship for pollution damage,75 covering 
cost of clean-up, loss to fishermen and measures taken to prevent or minimize damage to the 
environment.76 Liability is channelled to the tanker owner who is solely liable for damage 
caused by any oil pollution.77 Where it can be proved that such other persons as the ship master 
and crew, operators or salvors wilfully or recklessly caused the damage they may be held liable. 
The ship owner may also be free from liability if it is proven that the discharge or escape 
resulted from war and other natural disasters of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
character; wholly caused with intent to cause damage by a third party or wholly caused by 
failure of the coastal State to meet her obligation of providing navigational aid to the maritime 
community.78 For the ship owner to rely on it as a defence, the third party or State must have 
wholly caused the damage. Where damage is caused by spills from more than one vessel their 
owners shall be jointly and severally liable.79 
                                                          
73 Art. II(2) of 1992 CLC Convention defined oil as “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude oil, 
fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a 
ship”. Earlier definition in art. I(5) of the 1969 CLC did not use the phrase “hydrocarbon mineral”  
74 Kiran, R. Bhanu Krishna, ‘Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: An examination of IMO 
Conventions’, 3 NUJS L. Rev. 399 at 403 (2010); see also Art.2 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims 1456 UNTS 221 (1976) 
75 Art. I(6) of the 1992 CLC define ‘pollution damage‘ as “(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by 
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge 
may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the environment other than losses of profit from such 
impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatements actually undertaken or to be under 
taken; (b) the cost of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.” 
76 Art. II of 1992 Civil Liability Convention; See also Sands, P., et al, supra note 55, pp.746-747 
77 Art. III(1) of 1992 CLC 
78 Art III(2)(c) of 1992 CLC.  
79 Art. IV of 1992 CLC. 
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The owner of the ship is allowed to limit his liability. However, the ship owner may not be 
entitled to limit his liability where it is proven that he was responsible for the damage or loss.80  
Where the owner is entitled to limit his liability, a limitation fund in the amount of the liability 
cap is established in a competent court in a member State to settle proven claims.81 Whenever 
the claims are more than the limitation fund, the payment is made to claimants on a pro rata 
basis.82A Contracting State is obligated to ensure that its courts are competent to handle claims 
under the convention and except in cases of judgment obtained by fraud or a breach of the rules 
of fair hearing a decision of a competent court in one Contracting State is recognised and 
enforceable by the courts of other Contracting States.83  
As part of the safeguards provided by the Convention, there is compulsory insurance applicable 
to all owners of vessels carrying 2000 tons or more oil as cargo. This could be insurance or 
other financial security up to the limit of liability applicable to the vessel.84 A person who 
suffers damage may sue the vessel owner’s insurer directly for compensation.85 The insurer 
being a guarantor and exposed to direct action is also entitled to limit his liability even where 
the owner has lost his right to limitation. The insurer also enjoys all defence that the vessel 
owner could have invoked against a claimant (assured).86 Moreover, contrary to the interest of 
the ship owner, the insurer may raise as a defence to the effect that the damage resulted from 
the wilful misconduct of the owner.87 
Though the 1992 CLC addresses issues of environmental and related damage from oil tankers 
in the marine environment, it is applicable only to oil tankers carrying oil as cargo. No pollution 
                                                          
80 Art. V (2) of 1992 CLC. Under Article V(2) of the 1969 CLC the owner was not entitled to limit his liability 
if the accident or incident was caused by his actual fault or he was privy to it. 
81 Art. V(3) of the 1992 CLC  
82 Art. V(4) of the 1992 CLC 
83 Art. IX of 1992 CLC 
84 See generally Art VII of the 1992 CLC  
85 Art. VII(8) of the 1992 CLC 
86 Id  
87 Id  
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damage arising from offshore E&P activities is accommodated in the convention. In keeping 
with limitation of time in civil law, claims under the CLC cannot be brought later than 3 years 
from when the cause of action arose and not later than six years from the date of the incident 
that caused the damage.88   
The 1992 Fund Convention provides additional compensation for victims of oil pollution as 
the Compensation Fund it established is used to settle victims not fully compensated under the 
1992 Civil Liability Convention. Furthermore, a 2003 protocol to the Fund89 created a 
supplementary Fund and increased the available sum in a single incident to US$1 Billion.    
State parties are responsible for ensuring that individuals liable to contribute to the Fund do so 
or the State may on its own assume the obligation on behalf of such individuals within its 
territory to contribute to the IOPCF.90 The IOPCF entertains claims of damage to property, cost 
of clean-up operations and measures taken to prevent or minimize pollution damage. 
Furthermore, unlike the Civil Liability Conventions the IOPCF entertains claims on alleged 
loss of earnings suffered by property owners and users as a result of a spill. Also, subject to 
certain conditions pure economic loss without actual pollution damage is recoverable.91  In 
respect of claim for cost of measures taken to minimize or prevent pollution damage, the 
measures taken must be reasonable, real expense actually incurred and there must be direct link 
between the expenses and the incident.92 
                                                          
88 Art. VIII of the 1969 CLC 
89 Protocol to the International Convention on the establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage, London, 92FUND/A.8/4, Annex I, 16 May 2003, in force 3 March 2005 
90 Art. XIV of the 1971 Fund Convention 
91 In terms of purely economic losses the IOPCF will take into consideration (a) the geographic proximity 
between the contamination and the activity of the claimant (b) extent of claimant’s economic dependence on the 
affected activity (c) the extent of availability of alternative sources of business supply for the claimant (d) the 
level to which the claimant’s business is an integral part of the economic activity of the area. Guidelines on Oil 
Pollution Damage, available at http://www.comitemaritime.org/cmidocs/rulesoil.html ; Kiran, R. Bhanu 
Krishna, supra note 74, p.417  
92 IMO, Claims Manual of International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, 13 (1998) in Kiran, R. Bhanu 
Krishna, supra note 74, p. 417. However, in IOPCF v. M. Gouzer, Tevere Shipping and Steamship Mutual 
Underwriting, the French Court observed that the criteria set by the IOPCF for the settlement of pollution claims 
are not binding on the court but at best a reference of ‘indicative values’, see 2006 DMF 1014 
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The 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 
couched similar to the Civil Liability Convention made provision for bunker oil pollution in 
the territory, territorial sea and EEZ of the State parties.93 A significant difference is that the 
limitation of liability is as applicable under the 1976 LLMC as amended.94  
There are also additional voluntary funds set up to indemnify the 1992 Fund Convention and 
the 2003 Protocol on Supplementary Fund, for compensation paid above the liability limit of 
ship owners under the 1992 CLC.95 These are the 2006 Small Tanker Oil Pollution 
Indemnification Agreement (STOPIA) entered between owners of small tankers and their 
insurers. Under it liability of its members is increased to 20 million Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR). Second is the 2006 Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement (TOPIA) 
applicable to tankers entered in the protection and indemnity insurance (P&I) clubs, being 
members of the International Group of P&I clubs reinsured through a polling arrangement. 
Basically, it indemnifies the Supplementary Fund for 50 per cent of compensation paid by the 
Fund for incidents involving covered tankers.96 
 
 
6.2.2 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
 
In the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the 1960 Paris OECD Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy97 and the global 1963 IAEA Vienna Convention 
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage98 govern civil liability for damage.  
                                                          
93 Art. II, 2001 Bunker Convention 
94 1456 UNTS 221 (1976) 
95 Agreements reproduced in IOPC Funds Assembly, SUPPFUND/A/ES.2/7 1 February 2006; IOPC Fund, 
STOPIA and TOPIA 2006, available at http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal-framework/stopia-2006-and-
topia-2006/ last visited 25 April 2015 
96 Sands, P., et al, supra note 55 at p.756 
97 956 UNTS 251 adopted on 29 July 1960 and in force 1 April 1968 (hereafter 1960 Paris Convention)  
98 1063 UNTS 265 adopted 21 May 1963, in force 12 November 1977 (hereafter 1963 Vienna Convention) 
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The Paris Convention harmonises national legislation with regard to third party liability and 
insurance against risk, provides minimum standards for liability and compensation in the event 
of a nuclear accident. It is applicable to nuclear incidents and damage that occur in the territory 
of contracting parties99 but silent on transboundary harm to non-contracting States. The Paris 
regime is supported by the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention, the 1982 Protocol to the 
Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Conventions that increased available amount 
of compensation.100 Following the 1986 Chernobyl incident negotiations on a new instrument 
on State liability for nuclear damage, led to the adoption of the 1997 Protocol to the 1963 
Vienna Convention101 and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation.102 The 1997 
Protocol extended the application of the regime to damages that occur in the EEZ.103 Similarly, 
a 2004 Protocol to the Paris Convention extends its application to all territories and maritime 
zones of parties. There is a 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna 
Convention and the Paris Convention104 that linked the operative parts of both regimes.105 
The Paris Convention provides for strict liability for injury to persons and loss of life or 
property but not in respect of damage to the environment. The restrictive application of liability 
was further eroded in the UK with the judicial exclusion of ‘pure economic loss.106 But some 
parties such as the Netherlands and Germany extended the application of the treaty to 
‘environmental’ damage.107 Liability is absolute with some exceptions and defences in the 
                                                          
99 1960 Paris Convention, Art.2 
100 Paris, 16 November 1982, IELMT 963:101B; Further revision through two 2004 Protocols aims to amend 
Article 1(a)(vii) to increase the heads of damage to take into consideration, inter alia, cost of preventive 
measures and measures of reinstatement of impaired environment. These 2004 Protocols also extend the 
application of the Paris Convention to damage caused to non-Convention States including maritime zones. Also 
the limitation of time is extended to 30 years. But they are not yet in force. 
101 36 ILM 1454, in force on 4 October 2003 
102 36 ILM 1473 (1997) (not in force) 
103 1997 Protocol, Art.12, establishing a new Art. XI (1bis) to the 1963 Convention 
104 Vienna, 21 September 1988, in force 27 April 1992, 42 Nuclear Law Bulletin 56 (1998), cited in Sands, 
Philippe, et al. Principles of International Environmental Law, op. cit.,  p.745  
105 1988 Protocol, Art II and IV 
106 See Merlins v. British nuclear Fuels Plc (1990) 3 All ER 711 
107 Sands, Philippe et al, supra note 49, p.739   
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Vienna Convention.108 Like the Paris Convention, liability for damage to environment is not 
covered but the law of the competent court in a State may recognise other forms of damage.109  
The 1997 Protocol expanded damage that will give rise to liability to include economic loss, 
cost of preventive measures and measures of reinstatement of impaired environment.110 
Environmental damage per se is not to be compensated but loss of life or personal injury or 
damage to property attract damages. While the Vienna regime is applicable to nuclear damage 
suffered anywhere, application of liability provisions are restricted to within the nuclear power 
owning States.111 
In both regimes liability is channelled to the operator who may limit liability.112 Operators are 
required to maintain insurance or other financial security.113 However, where the security is 
inadequate to satisfy a claim, the installation State is expected to take care of the deficiency up 
to the liability limit.114 Such contribution by the State may be viewed as subsidising pollution 
which the polluter-pays principle does not encourage. 
The 1997 Protocol allows Parties to establish liability limit for nuclear damage in their 
territories but the liability cap must not be lower than 300 million SDRs.115The concern is that 
an increased liability cap would make the acquisition of insurance almost impossible in many 
countries and limit further development of nuclear power.116 The 1997 Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation, among others, provides detailed rules on a supplementary 
funding once it appears that damage caused by an incident exceeds the liability cap.117  
                                                          
108 1963 Vienna Convention, Arts IV 
109 1963 Vienna Convention, Art. I(1)(k)(ii) 
110 1997 Protocol, Art.2, amending Art. I(k) on the 1963 Convention 
111 1997 Protocol, Art.3, establishing a new Art. IA to the 1963 Convention 
112 1960 Paris Convention, Arts 4 & 9 and Art. 7; 1963 Vienna Convention, Arts. I(1)(k) and II(1). Here the 
liability cap is determined individually by each Member State 
113 1960 Paris Convention, Art.10 
114 1963 Vienna Convention, Arts. V and VII 
115 1997 Protocol, Art. 7(1), replacing Art. V of the 1963 Convention 
116 Sands, P., et al, op. cit., pp.743-744 
117 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation, Art. VI-XII and XIII-XIV 
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In the premise, the civil liability regimes in nuclear field and maritime transportation show an 
application of strict liability, channelled to the operator of a nuclear plant or owner of a vessel. 
A responsible party is expected to have insurance or other financial security. But liability is 
capped to such amounts that are likely to be exceeded by claims in the event of a serious 
catastrophe. Perhaps, in recognition of the deficiency of liability caps, fund and supplementary 
funds are established. Also, other sources of funding liability are suggested to help meet claims 
that may not be satisfied with a cap on liability.       
 
6.3 Channelling of Liability 
 
Channelling of liability clearly defines the responsible party in the event of any damage to the 
environment and third parties. This makes for easy identification of defendants by victims of 
any harm to direct their claims.118 Liability channelled, mostly on a non-fault basis, to the 
owner or operator of a dangerous activity has become a practical solution in some activities 
such as shipping and nuclear energy.119 There is no global convention that addresses this issue 
in offshore E&P.  
Some regional regimes channel liability for pollution to the operator of the offshore installation. 
For instance, in relation to liability and compensation in the Mediterranean Sea region, the 
parties are to individually formulate “appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of 
                                                          
118 Boyle, A. E., op. cit., p.14  
119 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (in force 1968); 1963 Brussels 
Agreement Supplementary to the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability (in force 1974); 1963 Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; 1992 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (in force 1996); 1992 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage (in force 1996); 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment; 1996 Convention on Liability and Compensation for the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances by Sea; 1997 Protocol on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation; 1999 Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Waste; 2001 Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage; 2003 
Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents on Transboundary Waters 
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liability and compensation for damages”.120 But until States formulate such rules and 
procedures, liability shall, in line with provisions of the Offshore Protocol, be channelled to 
the operator to make adequate and prompt payment of compensation.121  
In the North-East Atlantic, the issue of liability was not addressed in detail by the 1992 OSPAR 
Convention. But there is an element of liability as member States are obligated to enforce the 
polluter-pays principle, which could be applied to accidental pollution from offshore 
installations. Similarly, the Helsinki Convention for the Baltic Sea region provides for the 
mandatory application of the polluter-pays principle without an indication of who should be 
held liable in the event of accidental pollution of the marine environment.122 In the application 
of the polluter-pays principle, the operator might be held responsible for any incident that 
impact adversely on the marine environment and related interests.  
One early attempt to establish a liability regime for offshore oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation activities in the North Sea was made in 1977. The Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral 
Resources (CLEE)123 provides for liability in respect of pollution from an installation under 
the jurisdiction of one State party and suffered in the territory of another State party to the 
Convention.124 Under the Convention, liability is channelled to the operator of the offshore 
installation.125Where the installation has more than one operator, they shall be jointly and 
severally liable in the event of accidental pollution.126 There are various defences available to 
                                                          
120 Offshore Protocol, Art. 27(1); see also Art. 16 which requires parties to ensure that operators have a 
contingency  plan fashioned in line with the Contracting state parties contingency plan established in accordance 
with the Protocol concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other 
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency which they expected to implement mutatis mutandis.   
121 Offshore Protocol, Art. 27(2)(a) 
122 Helsinki Convention, Art.3(4) 
123 16 ILM 1451 (1977) Not in force 
124 1977 CLEE, Article 2 
125 Id, Art 3(1) 
126 Id, Art 3(2) 
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the operator to avoid liability.127 But, if the operator is liable he is entitled to limit his 
liability.128 However, a State party is free to, by its domestic law, provide for unlimited liability 
or higher liability limits.129 A significant feature of this Convention is its Article 9 that allows 
for possible amendment of the limit of liability from time to time based on changing 
circumstances and the reality of the moment through a simple committee process. But the 
Convention failed to get the requisite assents and is not in force. Another regional convention 
on the issue of liability, also not yet in force, is the 1993 Council of Europe Convention on 
Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment130 (The 
Lugano Convention) which aims to ensure adequate compensation for damage resulting from 
activities dangerous to the environment and provide ways of prevention and restoration.131 It 
channels liability to the operator of a dangerous activity.  
 
6.4 Nature of Liability 
 
The nature of liability that is imposed by law for a tortuous act is very important to the victim 
in a bid to get redress for damage suffered. The law may determine whether liability should be 
based on fault or the mere fact of damage. Where liability is based on fault or breach of duty, 
it necessarily follows that to hold any one liable for damage there must be proof of fault or 
                                                          
127 For instance, if damage results from acts of war, hostilities, civil war, a natural phenomenon of an 
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, the operator will not be liable. Also, where the victim’s own 
negligence caused the damage the operator shall not be liable.  Liability for damage resulting after a well has 
been abandoned for over five years shall not be the responsibility of the operator who abandoned the well, Id, 
Art 3(3) –(5) 
128 Id, Art 6(1) – (5), and in exercise of this right, the operator must constitute a fund for the total sum signifying 
the limit of his liability with a court or other competent authority in any one of the State Parties in which action 
is brought. 
129 Id, Art 15(1) 
130 32 ILM 480 (1993) 
131 Id, Art.1 
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breach of duty. If legal principles in the traditional law of tort were to be followed, there would 
be no compensation for the injured party without such proof. 
Bearing in mind that most of these activities are highly technical and dangerous and disaster 
may occur even with the best of caution and due diligence, it seems the attribution of fault 
might be inadequate and pose some difficulty for a potential claimant.132 Hence, some 
commentators have argued that in the traditional law of fault based liability or responsibility, 
in the event of a disaster, it is ‘tantamount to having the injured party bear the risk of the activity 
and thus engendering serious injustice’.133  
The dynamic feature of law is that it is never completely insufficient in addressing problems 
confronting society.134 Various legal regimes are making provisions that depart from the 
restrictive effect of fault based liability and allow injured parties to get redress without proving 
fault.135 Beyond the advantage to claimants, the task of setting the relevant standards of 
                                                          
132 Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, op. cit., p.9 
133 Niels-J. Seeberg-Elverfeldt, op. cit., pp.10-11. However, this has changed as the idea of strict liability is 
incorporated into international legislations to impute liability on the operators of such dangerous activities 
without proof of fault. Though many of them are not in force, example of such are 1960 Paris Convention on 
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (in force 1968); 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability 
of the Operators of Nuclear Ships (not in force); 1963 Brussels Agreement Supplementary to the 1960 
Convention on Third Party Liability (in force 1974); 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage (in force 1977, to be replaced by 1997 Protocol, not in force); 1971 Brussels Convention Related to 
Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material (in force 1975); 1977 Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral 
Resources (not in force). 1992 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (in force 1996); 1992 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (in force 
1996); 1993 Convention on Civil Liability for Activities Dangerous to the Environment; 1996 Convention on 
Liability and Compensation for the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea; 1997 Protocol on 
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and Convention on Supplementary Compensation; 1999 Protocol on 
Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste; 2001 
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage; 2003 Protocol on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary 
Waters  
134 Ubi jus ibi remedium which means, where there is injury there is remedy.  
135 In the field of civil aviation, nuclear energy outer space and maritime law (shipping) conventions have been 
adopted at global and regional levels to depart from the traditions fault based liability approach to impose strict 
liability on the undertakings of these activities described as abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous; see Jenks, 
‘Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities in International Law’, 117 Recueils des Cours 105 (1966) in Niels-J. 
Seeberg-Elverfeldt, op. cit., p.11. According to Jenks, characterising these activities as such “does not imply that 
the activity is ultra-hazardous (abnormally dangerous) in the sense that there is a high degree of probability that 
the hazard will materialize, but rather that the consequences in the exceptional and perhaps quite improbable 
event of the hazard materializing may be so far-reaching that special rules concerning the liability for such 
consequences are necessary if serious injustice and hardship are to be avoided” id at 107   
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reasonable care in very technical and complex workings of the oil and gas industry is relieved 
of the courts.136   
When liability is strict,137 culpability is not determined by fault or negligence but in undertaking 
the risk. In this way there is a fair spread of the possible consequences of improbable but 
potentially disastrous misadventure which makes “the burden of insurance or other provision 
of security for compensation in the event of misadventure a cost of the adventure”138  
Though the notion of “abnormally dangerous” activities expressed by Jenks may not have 
contemplated offshore petroleum exploration and exploitation, recent incidents provide 
compelling evidence for such strict liability approach to be extended to it. Article 235 of 
UNCLOS on responsibility and liability for marine pollution did not suggest the application of 
strict liability, though it developed from principles 7 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration that 
demand that States provide compensation for damage caused by human activities including oil 
and gas operations.139  
The provision in the various regional conventions is not different. For instance, in the North-
East Atlantic region, the OSPAR Convention while providing for application of polluter pays 
and precautionary principles in addressing marine pollution140 from fixed and floating offshore 
platforms141 made no indication of the nature of liability in cases of pollution incidents in 
offshore oil rigs.  Also, the Bonn Agreement negotiated pursuant to Article 21 of OSPAR 
                                                          
136 Boyle, A. E., supra note 7, at p.13 
137 Under the doctrine of strict liability, an injured party has no evidential burden of proving fault in the event of 
any injury or damage arising for an accident.   
138 Jenks, supra note 135, p.107  
139 See Nordquist, M. H., op. cit., p.401 (1991); Park, Patricia, supra note 26, p.96  
140 1992 OSPAR Annex I, Art. 2(2). These obligations are much more mandatory and binding than the 
provisions of UNCLOS in view of the use of the word ‘shall’.  
141 Id., Art. 5. See generally annex III that addresses prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore 
sources 
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Convention, in the event of transboundary marine pollution, did not address the issue of 
liability. 
Under the Offshore Protocol for the Mediterranean Sea region, the nature of liability is left for 
further development by the parties. But, unlike the case of channelling of liability which had a 
fall back provision in the Convention in case parties neglect or fail to develop and adopt such 
regulation on liability,142 there is no fall-back position in relation to the nature of liability in 
the Mediterranean Sea region. In the event of such lacuna, the applicable law might just be the 
traditional rules of tort applied in individual countries. 
Similarly, the Helsinki Convention for the Baltic Sea does not make provision for liability but 
there is an undertaking by parties to develop and accept rules concerning responsibility for 
damage resulting from offshore oil and gas E&P. Such rule would among others include the 
“limits of responsibility, criteria and procedure for the determination of liability and available 
remedies.”143 Presently, there are no such regional rules on the nature of liability for accidental 
pollution from offshore petroleum E&P within the Baltic Sea. 
 
6.5 Limitation of Liability for Damage from Offshore Operations 
 
Liability may be used as a means of ensuring prevention of pollution and remedying damage 
but most regimes dealing with dangerous but lawful activities make provision for its 
limitation.144 This is due to the fact that the vulnerability of companies in the face of unlimited 
liability could become disincentive for private capital investment. Especially in dangerous 
activities of general societal necessity and desirability such as shipping, nuclear energy and oil 
                                                          
142 Barcelona Offshore Protocol, Art.27(1)&(2)(a) 
143 Helsinki Convention, Art.25 
144 In the maritime industry we have example of 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims (LLMC) and in Nuclear we have the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage as 
amended by the 1997 Protocol Art. V providing for limitation of liability 
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and gas. Moreover, the financial uncertainties created by unlimited liability could make it 
difficult for such ventures to secure insurance.145 
However, all three regional regimes under discussion- the Barcelona Convention, OSPAR 
Convention and the Helsinki Convention- do not deal with liability and as such made no 
provision for limitation. Subject to any other convention that may be applicable to these 
regional seas, like an EU regulation or directive, it is individual municipal laws of States that 
may be applicable in the event of a liability claim. 
Had the 1977 CLEE come into force the situation would have been different. That convention 
had provided that when the operator is liable he is entitled to limit his liability. In exercise of 
this right, the operator is to constitute a fund for the total sum signifying the limit of his liability 
with a court or other competent authority of any one of the State Parties in which action is 
brought.146 However, a State party is free to, by its domestic law, provide for unlimited liability 
or higher liability cap.147 These liability provisions are commendable as they create a minimum 
liability cap for the region while providing for stricter or more effective commitment through 
domestic legislation. As noted earlier, the liability cap is low but this concept of regulation is 
needed and could be replicated at the global level and all regional regimes. That is, a framework 
that creates minimum standards and obligations for States while granting liberty to States with 
higher capacity to set higher standards and rules suitable to their circumstances.  
 
 
 
                                                          
145 Niels-J-Seeberg-Elverfeldt, op. cit., p.16 
146 Id, Art 6(1) – (5) 
147 Id, Art 15(1) 
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6.6 Compensation 
 
One of the essential features of liability regime is its reparative function.148 Where a liable party 
is unable to pay compensation, the goal would be defeated. Therefore, a functional liability 
regime, at least for risky and dangerous activities with potential serious environmental impact, 
should provide for guaranteed payment of prompt and adequate compensation.   
The Mediterranean Offshore Protocol enjoins contracting States to grant offshore exploration 
and exploitation authorisation (licences) to only operators on the principle that they, inter alia, 
have the “technical competence” and “financial capacity” to undertake such activity.149 Such 
financial capacity may, in view of present realities in offshore petroleum operations include 
the capacity to employ the best available technology and equipment for offshore operations. 
This is especially crucial in deep water and ultra-deep water operations.  Also, application for 
such authorisation must be supported by insurance or other financial security to cover liability 
relating to compensation for possible damage caused by such offshore activity,150 thus 
introducing the notion of compulsory insurance.151 Where there is pollution damage, operators 
“shall be required to pay prompt and adequate compensation.”152  
Financial capability, though not specifically tied to liability, has been a requirement for 
authorisation for exploration and exploitation of mineral resources.153 OSPAR and Helsinki 
Conventions for the North East Atlantic and the Baltic Sea respectively do not have such 
                                                          
148 Wetterstein, Peter, ‘Environmental Liability in the Offshore Sector with Special Focus on Conflict of Laws 
(Part 2)’, Vol.23 Issue 6, The Journal of Water Law,  207, 208 
149 1994 Offshore Protocol, Art. 4(1)  
150 Id., Arts. 7 and 27(2)(b) 
151 Raftopoulos, Evangelos, ‘Sustainable Governance of Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the 
Mediterranean: Revitalizing the Dormant Mediterranean Offshore Protocol’, p.6, 2010 available on line at 
http://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=4&ArticleId=29&Article=Sustainable-
Governance-of-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Development-in-the-Mediterranean:-Revitalizing-the-Dormant-
Mediterranean-Offshore-Protocol accessed on 15 Jan. 14; see also UNCLOS Art.235(2)  
152 Mediterranean Offshore Protocol, Art.27(2)(a) 
153 For instance, financial standing is one of the qualifications for applicant seeking to explore the Area. See 
Art.4(2) of the Basic Conditions for Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation, Annex III to UNCLOS 
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specific provisions requiring financial security as condition for granting authorisation for 
offshore exploration and production. This may change for EU countries in the three regions 
following the adoption of EU Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore operations. 
The 2006 ILC draft Principles enjoin States to ensure that compensation is promptly paid to 
victims of transboundary pollution. Furthermore, operators and entities should be made to 
provide financial security like insurance and encouraged to collectively establish industry wide 
fund; and where such measures are still inadequate the State is urged to make funds available 
to compensate victims and address the environmental disaster.154   
 
6.7 Liability and Legal Standing 
 
Once there is an accident it will raise different liability related issues - the party responsible for 
the accident, the liability of various actors in the E&P venture such as the well owner or 
licensee, the operator and contractors. There is also the issue of who has legal standing to 
institute action. In the event of an accident there are two points of liability- liability for breach 
of safety regulations and liability for harm caused to the environment, individuals and 
businesses.  
The issue of whether liability is held by the operator or the owner of the block is determined 
by law and the terms of the license agreement. In most cases the responsible parties are the 
operator and the owner of the well. In cases where the block is owned by a single company that 
is also the operator, there will be no dispute on where liability lies as same company is both 
owner and operator. It could be complicated where the block is owned by several companies. 
The general practice in the industry is that the operator takes full and total control of operations 
                                                          
154 See generally principle 4 
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and by implication is responsible for safety of the operations. Therefore, liability for the 
consequences of any breach of safety rules and pollution rests on the operator subject to being 
indemnified in deserving cases by co-owners of the block in line with their joint ownership 
agreements. Indemnity may also flow between operator and contractors.155  
The liability issues might be different where the State is the owner of the block. State ownership 
of oil blocks is usually held through a National Oil Company (NOC). Most of these NOCs are 
incorporated as separate legal entities with power to sue and be sued in their names. Hence, it 
is the NOC that may be held liable for any accidental pollution, especially when it is the 
operator. In case of transboundary pollution, it is the State that may be held responsible for 
breach of its international obligation to prevent pollution, but as noted earlier States hardly 
resort to that. As international law stands, States are subjects of international law and cannot 
be compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of domestic courts in another State. Hence without 
development of international law of responsibility and liability it would be difficult to hold a 
State liable for environmental pollution arising from activities with the State. 
In relation to breach of safety regulations, it is the regulator that has the legal standing to 
investigate if there has been any breach of safety regulations and apply sanctions or sue to 
enforce penalties for breach. For instance, in the Macondo blowout, the regulators sued BP for 
gross negligence in ignoring several safety precautions in the days preceding the blowout. But 
once there is accidental pollution everyone affected would have standing to seek redress and 
be compensated by the responsible party, be it a State owned corporation or a private 
company.156  
                                                          
155 This was clearly demonstrated in the Macondo spill cases, see Offshore Energy Today, ‘BP, Halliburton and 
Transocean settle Macondo claim’,  available at http://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/bp-halliburton-
transocean-settle-macondo-claims/ last visited 8 September 2015; Halliburton Press Release, ‘US Court Rules 
on Macondo Liability’, 4 September 2014 available at 
http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press_release/2014/corpnews-090414.html  
156 Various persons affected by the Macondo spill made claims against BP and were paid. See The Guardian, 
‘Judge Orders BP to Stick by Deepwater Horizon Pay out Agreements’ 24 September 2014, available at 
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In the case of abandoned offshore installations the owner of the installation and not the operator 
would usually be responsible for accidental pollution resulting from incidents such as collision 
and hurricane. Ordinarily it is the responsibility of the owner to remove disused or abandoned 
installation and any environmental damage resulting from failure to fulfil such obligation 
would attract liability to the owner. The argument exists of a possible liability of States for the 
removal (decommissioning) of disused offshore petroleum installations. This liability is said 
to arise from old-styled Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) that failed to make provisions 
that place liability on the IOCs with ownership of offshore oil and gas installations resting with 
the State.157  Interestingly, international law places the obligation to decommission on the State 
that often moves it to IOCs by way of contract. Accordingly, where there is an accidental 
pollution from a disused offshore petroleum installation owned by the State as envisaged 
above, the State responsibility is not in doubt. In reality, IOCs may not rely on the strength of 
this legal position where this arises especially where a country still has abundant hydrocarbons 
for E&P, but may in the interest of continuing good relations, be willing to negotiate aimed at 
a reasonable solution to liability for decommissioning.158  
However, the issue of responsible parties, possible liabilities in any given circumstance and the 
legal standing to sue may be made uncontroversial through the channelling of liability 
provisions in treaties, national laws and operational licenses and agreements.  
   
                                                          
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/24/bp-ordered-deepwater-horizon-payouts-agreement last 
visited 8 September 2015 
157 Cameron, Peter, “Tackling the Decommissioning Problem”, Natural Resources & Environment, 14(2), 1999. 
Cameron notes at page 121 that this is usually a surprise to governments that the much valued title to 
installations also brought liability. See also, Ayoade, Morakinyo Adedayo Disused Offshore Installations and 
Pipelines: Towards Sustainable Decommissioning, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International) pp.82-83 (2002). 
158 Martin, Tim “Decommissioning of International Petroleum Faculties: Evolving Standards and Key 
Issues”, OGEL 5 (2003), available at: www.ogel.org/article.asp?key=765 last visited 8 September 2015   
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6.8 Equal Access to Justice in Transboundary Pollution from 
Offshore Petroleum Operations 
 
UNCLOS, without providing any detail, makes it mandatory for States to make provision in 
their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief for damage caused by 
pollution of the marine environment by persons under their jurisdiction.159 But it provides no 
benchmark for prompt and adequate compensation nor a mention of any other reliefs that may 
be granted. 
Principle 6 of the 2006 ILC draft Principles urges States to grant legal standing and access to 
justice and environmental information to any victim of incidents from hazardous activities 
irrespective of whether the victim is from the State of origin. Most significantly, the draft calls 
for adoption of global, regional or bilateral agreements to address specific hazardous activities 
to provide effectively for compensation, liability and response measure.160 The idea of making 
adequate funds available through the specific industry and State fund as supplementary fund to 
the financial security provided by the operator is emphasized by the draft.161 Similar suggestion 
on increased funding with contributions from industry to supplement any liability or security 
that may be provided by an offshore operator was made by Russia.162   
In relation to access to justice for victims of pollution from offshore petroleum E&P activities, 
especially of transboundary impact, the Mediterranean Offshore Protocol strongly recommends 
that Parties “grant equal access to and treatment in administrative proceedings” to such persons 
in other States either in accordance with their legal systems or on the basis of an agreement.163 
                                                          
159 UNCLOS, Art.235(2) 
160 Principle 7(1) of 2006 ILC Draft provides that “Where, in respect of particular categories of hazardous 
activities, specific global, regional or bilateral agreements would provide effective arrangements concerning 
compensation, response measures and international and domestic remedies, all efforts should be made to conclude 
such specific agreements.”  
161 Principle 7(2) of 2006 ILC draft 
162 The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, ‘Press Release, Global Marine Environmental Protection’ 
26 July 2010, available http://www.rusembassy.ca/node/439 last visited 02 November 2014 
163 Id., Art.26(4) 
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Conventions governing marine activities in North-east Atlantic and the Baltic Seas do not have 
similar provisions as the Mediterranean Sea regime.  
 
The implication is that in the absence of a global convention requiring such mandatory 
provisions in domestic laws and regulations, a uniform level of access to justice in the case of 
a transboundary pollution from offshore petroleum operations is not guaranteed even in the 
developed regions such as the North Sea. However, if States adhere to the provisions of Article 
235 of UNCLOS, there would be better access to justice and possibly adequate compensation 
for victims of transboundary harm resulting from offshore petroleum operations in virtually 
every region of the world.  
 
6.9 Liability for Offshore Petroleum Operation under European 
Union Law 
 
Most coastal countries in the Mediterranean, Baltic and North-East Atlantic regions are 
members of the European Union and thus subject to EU legislation.164 Hence, in addition to 
the provisions of the various regional sea conventions, offshore oil and gas E&P activities are 
governed by EU acquis communautaire. In terms of liability there are two directives directly 
applicable to offshore oil and gas E&P namely Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental 
liability and Directive 2013/30/EU on safety of offshore oil and gas operations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
164 EU Offshore Safety Directive, Point 50 of the Preamble 
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6.9.1 Directive 2004/35/CE on Environmental Liability 
 
For the purpose of prevention and remedy of environmental damage, Directive 2004/35/CE on 
environmental liability provides that environmental liability shall be based on the polluter pays 
principle.165  To this end preventive and remedial costs are to be borne by operators.166 
However, it does not vest right on private parties to compensation as a consequence of 
environmental damage or an imminent threat of such damage.167 Also, it is inapplicable to 
claims for damage to private property, personal injury or economic loss.168 Considering the 
extent of damage to both public and private property and business interests that are adversely 
affected by accidental pollution from offshore petroleum installation, the EU environmental 
liability Directive may not be of great help to victims of accidental pollution from offshore 
petroleum installations such as the Macondo accident.   
Annex III of the Directive specifies the various activities covered by the Directive and offshore 
oil and gas operation is not listed as one. Nevertheless, the Directive may still be applicable to 
offshore oil and gas E&P when the activities cause damage to protected species and natural 
habitat and whenever the operator is at fault or acted with negligence.169 Moreover, by 
incorporating the Directive on environmental liability in the 2013 Directive on safety of 
offshore oil and gas operations the former applies directly to liability issues in offshore oil and 
gas E&P.170  
The environmental liability Directive is not applicable to circumstances covered by existing 
international instruments on liability for pollution like the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, 
                                                          
165 EU Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35/CE, Art.1 
166 Id., Art.8(1) 
167 Id., Art.3(3) 
168 Id., Point 14 of Preamble 
169 Directive 2004/35/EC Art.3(1) and Annex III 
170 See Offshore Safety Directive, Arts. 7 and 38 
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1992 Fund Convention and the nuclear conventions.171 However, limitation of liability by 
operators under the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC) 
as amended by the 1996 Protocol and the 1988 Strasbourg Convention on Limitation of 
Liability in Inland Navigation (CLNI) are sustained under the Directive.172 This does not 
necessarily mean that operators of offshore installations can limit their liability because the 
LLMC is not applicable to offshore installations engaged in oil and gas E&P activities.173 
Nonetheless, member States may adopt more stringent measures in prevention and remedying 
of environmental damage.174 
Where a State has responded to an incident of environmental damage, the Directive provides 
for cost recovery by the competent authority within a 5 year limitation period.175 However, it 
failed to provide for general access to justice which is subject to provisions of individual 
municipal laws.176 In essence, the extent to which an individual may be able to get redress for 
pollution arising from environmentally harmful activities like offshore petroleum E&P is 
dependent on national laws that would determine standing of claimants, the burden and 
standard of proof required for a liability claim to succeed. Though the EU Directive on offshore 
safety amended the Directive on environmental liability it was specifically on its territorial 
coverage.177   
 
                                                          
171 Directive 2004/35/EC Art.4(2)&(4) 
172 Id., Art.4(3)  
173 See LLMC as amended, Art.1 lists shipowner and salvors as persons entitled to limitation under the 
convention while Art.2 provides the type of claims covered by the convention. There is no mention of offshore 
oil and gas installations or operations  
174 Id, Art. 16 
175 Id., Art.10 
176 Id., Art.13 
177 EU Directive 2013/30/EU, Art.38 
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6.9.2 Liability under the EU Directive 2013/30/EU on Safety of 
Offshore Petroleum Operations 
 
The issue of possible damage and the ability to settle such liability must be a big consideration 
of States from the moment an application for authorization to undertake offshore petroleum 
E&P is submitted. The EU Offshore Safety Directive provides that when considering 
applications for offshore oil and gas E&P, States are to examine the financial capability of the 
applicant, as required under Article 5(1) (a) of Directive 94/22/EC.178 States must also verify 
the availability of evidence of adequate financial provisions made to cover possible liabilities 
from major accident. In so doing, there should be some level of certainty that such provisions 
would be effective from the start of operations before licences should be granted.179  
The financial capability to settle liability resulting from possible accidental pollution is to be a 
sine qua non for the grant of licenses for offshore oil and gas E&P in all EU waters. This was 
unequivocal in the Directive which provides that “Member States shall require the licensee to 
maintain sufficient capacity to meet their financial obligations resulting from liabilities for 
offshore oil and gas operations.”180 The critical issue that may confront interested parties is the 
determination of sufficient capacity to meet financial obligations from liabilities. The Directive 
failed to provide the parameters for such determination and it is left entirely to the discretion 
of individual Member States.  
In such circumstance, it will be difficult to guarantee uniform standard of financial capacity to 
meet liability obligations for all licensees of offshore E&P within European waters. That being 
the case, the intention of the Offshore Safety Directive to provide a relatively uniform 
                                                          
178 Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and using authorization for the 
prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon 
179 Directive 2013/30/EU Para. 10 of Preamble and Art.4 (3). This has been a requirement under  Article 5(1)(a) 
of  EU Directive 94/22/EC of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for granting and issuing authorization for the 
prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbon 
180 Id., point 5 of  Art.4(3)  
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operational standards within European waters to prevent major accidents, ensure effective 
response to emergency where accident still occurs and make available adequate compensation 
to pollution victims181 may not be realized under the present Offshore Safety Directive.  
The key provision on liability for environmental damage in the Offshore Safety Directive is 
Article 7 which mandates Member States to, without prejudice to the Environmental Liability 
Directive, ensure that the licensee is financially liable for prevention and remediation of 
environmental damage resulting from offshore oil and gas operations. 
Thus Member States are to channel liability to the licensee or the operator whether the act 
concerned was done by the licensee or the operator or by other parties- contractors and 
subcontractors, equipment manufacturers and suppliers. However, the nature or form of 
liability is not classified in the Directive.  This is a critical omission that is capable of creating 
varying standards for offshore petroleum operations in various regions of the EU. Making the 
licensee or operator the responsible party for any accidental pollution is not sufficient in itself 
in ensuring the polluter pays if the required level of proof of liability makes it difficult for 
victims to successfully claim damages and secure compensation. 
Liability appears unlimited as there is no direct provision that places caps on liability. 
International conventions like the 1976 LLMC and the 1988 Strasbourg Convention on 
Limitation of Liability in Inland Navigation (CLNI) sustained under Directive 2004/35/CE182 
are not applicable to accidental pollution from offshore oil and gas E&P activities. However, 
with no clear directive on liability being limited or unlimited, States are at liberty to determine 
such in their municipal laws and regulations.  
                                                          
181 Directive 2013/30/EU in point 17 of the Preamble lamented the good but inconsistently applied rules in the 
Union without integration of these rules. But the failure of 2013 EU Offshore Safety Directive to set parameters 
in the circumstances of liability will not change that situation.  
182 Directive 2004/35/CE Art.4(3)  
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The absence of detailed provisions on liability is particularly of great concern when one 
considers the possibility of a transboundary impact of a major hazard within EU waters. While 
there appears to be robust provision on transboundary emergency preparedness and response 
to accidental pollution,183 the issue of liability in such circumstances is not addressed. 
Apparently it is left to individual EU Member to figure out. The Directive which was initiated 
and adopted as an EU legislative response in the aftermath of the 2010 Macondo disaster, 
focuses more on prevention and emergency response than liability issues. 
Similarly, the provision on penalties for infringements of measures adopted pursuant to the 
offshore safety Directive are to be determined by individual Member States. They are expected 
to make the “penalties effective, proportionate and dissuasive”.184  
Individual Member States are to adopt legislations, regulations and administrative measures 
necessary to give effect to the directive by 19 July 2015.185 
 
6.10 Industry Scheme on Liability for Offshore Accidental 
Pollution 
 
Along with public international law frameworks there is the industry’s response to the question 
of liability in offshore oil and gas E&P through a private scheme which is called Offshore 
Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL).186 Though it started as an agreement that applied only 
in the United Kingdom, it has been extended to other European Union countries and Norway. 
OPOL involves only private companies and currently has 133 members, 118 of which are UK 
based. The other companies are in the Faroe Islands, Greenland, the Netherlands, Norway and 
                                                          
183 See Chapter VII of EU Offshore Safety Directive on transboundary effects 
184 EU Offshore Safety Directive, Art.34 
185 Id., Art.41 
186 It currently has the 2010 version. First came into force on May 1, 1975 
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the Republic of Ireland. Thus, all major petroleum operators in EU waters are parties to the 
agreement.187 But offshore installations in some designated locations in the Mediterranean Sea 
or Baltic Sea are expressly excluded from the application of OPOL.188  
Though OPOL is a private initiative and its membership is voluntary, signing on to the OPOL 
agreement is a condition precedent to the issuance of offshore exploration and exploitation 
licences in relevant countries including the UK.189 This to some extent increases its potency 
and operators’ willingness to sign on could be indicative of their willingness to take 
responsibility for consequences of their dangerous activities.  
The agreement ensures that parties accept strict liability for pollution damage and cost of 
remedial measures. But OPOL does not cover remedial measures involving well control and 
measures taken to protect, repair or replace the offshore installation.190   
The financial commitment of members is guaranteed by their provision of evidence of financial 
responsibility. OPOL rules for establishment of financial responsibility allow members to 
provide financial responsibility via insurance, guarantee or self-insurance. Any change in 
circumstance of the evidence of financial responsibility that undermines the credibility of the 
insurance must be reported to OPOL. Such insurance must be promptly replaced.191 Self-
insurance is acceptable from only companies having “one or more of the following credit or 
financial strength ratings: “A-” or higher from Standard & Poor’s; “A-” or higher from A. M. 
Best; “A3” or higher from Moody’s; “A” or higher from Fitch; and/or the equivalent from 
                                                          
187 Allen, Jacqueline, op. cit., p. 94  
188 OPOL, Clause I(8)(c) 
189 Oil and Gas: Operatorship, available at https://www.gov.uk/oil-and-gas-operatorship#offshore-operators last 
visited 02 February 2015 
190 OPOL, Clause I(15) 
191 OPOL Form B Clause (1), (2) and (3) 
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another internationally recognised credit rating agency acceptable to the Association”192 and 
every form of insurance provided by members must be verified.193 
By Clause IV of the agreement, it makes available per incident a limit of $125 million for 
remedial measures and $125million for pollution damage. It also added an annual cap of 
US$500 million per party.194 The annual limitation cap means that a party may not be able to 
rely on OPOL if it had been involved in two major incidents in a year. In essence, there may 
be times when claimants after a second major incident may not get the benefit of OPOL.  
The liability provided by OPOL is limited to the amount pledged in OPOL. This does not 
necessarily mean that OPOL Members’ liability for offshore accidental pollution is for all 
intents and purposes limited to the pledged amount. Claims which OPOL is unable to satisfy 
may be settled by the responsible operator through other means of civil liability settlement. In 
other words, despite the liability cap contained in OPOL, its members’ liability for major 
hazard could be unlimited depending on other international or domestic regulations that may 
be applicable to the offshore installation. Where a claimant chose to benefit from the strict 
liability of OPOL, the claimant must accept the OPOL payment as full and final settlement of 
all claims even where the claim is more than OPOL liability cap.195 Payments are made on the 
condition of claimant executing “necessary releases and other documents” and assignment of 
any right of action against a third party.196 The implication is that where a claimant is not 
willing to accept and discharge the operator of any liability upon receipt of payment under 
OPOL, he may have to institute civil proceedings under municipal law. In which case the 
operator’s liability would be determined by a national civil liability regime.   
                                                          
192 OPOL Form B Clause (3)(i) 
193 OPOL Forms FR1-FR2, FR3 and FR4  
194 Oil & Gas UK, Mandatory Financial Requirements for Oil Industry Operations in the UKCS, p.3, available 
at http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/templates/asset-relay.cfm?frmAssetFileID=1170 last accessed on 20 June 2014 
195 OPOL, Clause VII 
196 Id. 
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Claims under OPOL may be brought by an individual, private or public institution or agency 
against the operator. It is the responsibility of the operator to settle such claims in the first 
instance in line with the terms of OPOL agreement.197 However, where a member of OPOL 
defaults in settlement of proven claims, the other members of OPOL will make proportionate 
contributions to settle such claim. However, there are defences, similar to those contained in 
the 1977 CLEE that are open to an operator. For instance, there shall be no OPOL obligation 
if the damage is as a result of war or other natural disaster that is exceptional, inevitable and 
irreversible in character.198 Also, where damage is wholly the result of actions or omissions by 
third parties, Government or its agency or the claimant there would be no OPOL obligation.199 
Moreover, if damage resulted wholly due to compliance with conditions and instructions 
imposed by the authorising State, no liability against the operator will arise.200  
Claims must be made timeously as the operator’s liability under the terms of OPOL is valid for 
one year from the time the cause of action arose.201 Disputed claims are usually settled via 
arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce in London.202 
 
6.11 Conclusion  
 
The only comprehensive global convention on maritime issues - the UNCLOS - failed to make 
detailed provisions on liability. There is still no global regulatory regime addressing liability 
in offshore petroleum operations. Article 235 only provides for general State responsibility and 
liability in case of failure to protect and preserve the marine environment. States are mandated 
                                                          
197 OPOL, para 3, see Budiman, Arief, ‘Liability for Offshore Oil Spillage: Strictly Settled’ 
198 OPOL, Clause IV(B)(1) 
199 OPOL, Clause IV(B)(2)&(3) 
200 OPOL, Clause IV(B)(4) 
201 OPOL, Clause VI 
202 Id, Clause IX 
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to have a legal system that provides for prompt and adequate compensation for victims of 
marine pollution from natural or juridical persons within their jurisdiction and cooperate in 
further development of international law of responsibility and liability. This provision does not 
actually create an international rule that holds States liable to pay compensation for any damage 
to the marine environment nor does it establish norms on liability and compensation for marine 
pollution. Rudiger Wolfrum refers to the liability provision in UNCLOS, Arts 232, 235 and 
263 as embryonic in nature, and requiring further development. According to him it is an 
overstatement to say that UNCLOS provides for individual or state liability for environmental 
damage.203  
 
While there is no global liability regime for accidental pollution some developments have taken 
place at regional and domestic levels prior and after the Macondo disaster. The EU Directive 
2013/30/EU on safety of offshore operation being a good example of such developments.   
 
At the international level there seems to be no political will to have an effective international 
instrument on liability from offshore petroleum E&P activities. This is demonstrated by the 
failure to enter into force even of accepted instruments such as the 1977 CLEE.204  This creates 
uncertainty for victims and the industry when the harm is transboundary. For instance, the 
liability issues arising from the transboundary impact of the Montara oil spill are still 
unresolved.205  
                                                          
203 Wolfrum, Rudiger, op. cit., p.130 
204 Basma, Shane, The Regulation of Marine Pollution Arising from Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities – An 
Evaluation of the Adequacy of Current Regulatory Regimes and the Responsibility of States to Implement a New 
Liability Regime, 26 A&NZ Mar. L.J 89, p.95-95 (2012). Other conventions that failed as a result of lack of 
political will includes the draft Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft. See Kashubsky, Mikhail, ‘Marine 
Pollution From the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Review of Major Conventions and Russian Law (Part I)’, 
152 Maritime Studies 1, p.3 (2007) noted that only few provisions on offshore oil and gas E&P can be found in 
international conventions.   
205 There has been unsuccessful meetings between the operators and Indonesian government officials over 
claims for damage to Indonesian waters from the Montara spill. See The Jakata Post, Probe on Montara oil spill 
urgent: Experts, 27 July 2012, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/27/probe-montara-oil-
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The private initiative, OPOL reflecting most of the key ideas of the 1977 CLEE, is an example 
of what a liability regulation should address in the offshore petroleum industry. It channels 
liability to the operator, provides for strict liability and establishes a cap on liability. There is 
insurance by third party or self-insurance to guarantee prompt settlement of claims. It 
recognises the inadequacy or limitation of members’ liability cap to satisfy all possible claims. 
As such, claimants may recover, whatever is unsettled by OPOL outside the OPOL mechanism, 
using civil liability rules provided by domestic laws.  Whether or not to place cap on liability 
for damage resulting from major hazards in offshore petroleum operations is a crucial issue 
that needs serious consideration in any liability regime at both the international and domestic 
levels in view of possible implications on operators and the industry.  
 
Incidents like Montara and Ixtoc I exposed the challenges of this continued absence of 
provisions on liability for marine pollution resulting from offshore petroleum E&P, especially 
in a transboundary context. This provoked Indonesia’s proposal to the IMO Legal Committee 
to address issues of liability.206 Similar desire for urgent coordinated and comprehensive 
regulation of offshore E&P at the international level was expressed by the Mediterranean 
Offshore Protocol Working Group following the Macondo incident of 2010.207 
 
In the premise, the issue is how best international law can make provision for liability arising 
from accidental pollution from offshore petroleum E&P activities, especially when it is 
                                                          
spill-urgent-experts.html and Borthwick, D., Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, Montara 
Commission of Inquiry, 17 June 2010, p. 302-303 http://www.ret.gov.au/Department/Documents/MIR/Montara-
Report.pdf      
206 LEG 97/14/1, of 10 September 2010, p.1 
207 A Legal Discussion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Offshore Oil Rigs in the 
Light of the Recent Deepwater Horizon Incident, 1st Offshore Protocol Working Group Meeting, Valletta, 
Malta, 13-14 June 2013, UNEP(DEPI)/MED WG.384/INF.6, P.37-39 (6 June 2013) 
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transboundary. The liability regime should implement the polluter pays principle and also serve 
as incentive to achieving better safety culture in offshore petroleum E&P.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF ACCIDENTAL POLLUTION 
FROM OFFSHORE PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND 
EXPLOITATION: THE NEEDED ADJUSTMENT 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
Offshore operations are associated with significant risks to the environment, coastal businesses 
and biodiversity. While accidents of great magnitude such as the Deepwater Horizon and 
Ixtoc1 gained global attention, the reality is that oil spills occur on regular basis around the 
globe. Unfortunately, even serious accidents in developing countries do not receive enough 
international publicity. For instance, between 2001 and 2011 the Gulf of Mexico is said to have 
experienced 948 fires and explosions, 1550 human injuries and 60 human deaths.1 The present 
state of affairs is that the advent of deep water petroleum operations increases the risk of 
accidental pollution even more.2 Also, there is increased exploration activities in the Arctic 
with its peculiar environmental challenges.   
 
Thus, the need to reduce risk and prevent major accidents is imperative. Major accidents in 
maritime activities such as deep water petroleum operations have possible international 
implications as the impacts could go beyond the territory of one state. Hence, there is need to 
further develop international regulations in addition to municipal legislation.  
 
                                                          
1 Graham, Bob, et al., National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Deep 
Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, p.3 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/deepwater/deepwater.pdf.  
2 Ross, William M., op. cit., p.7; Jayakumar, Shunmugam, ‘The Continental Shelf Regime under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: Reflections after Thirty Years’ in  Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, 
Aldo Chircop, Ronán Long (eds.) The Regulation of Continental Shelf Development: Rethinking International 
Standards (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 3 (2013) 
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The shipping industry has sufficiently matured with the existence of comprehensive legal 
frameworks focused on preventing marine pollution, emergency preparedness and response, 
and liability for maritime accidents. More specifically, tankers are regulated mostly through 
global instruments adopted under the auspices of the IMO. On the contrary, accidental pollution 
arising from offshore petroleum operations suffer from inadequate global regulations, even 
where transboundary impact is involved.    
 
Presently, there is a consensus among scholars, regulators, industry operators and even the 
political class on the need for improved regulation of offshore petroleum operations at the 
international level.3 What appears not to be settled is whether such international regulation 
should be limited to regional instruments or there should also be global legal framework. The 
analysis of the present state of events and international law on regulation of accidental pollution 
from offshore petroleum operations allow identification and evaluation of possible options 
available to the international community. This work suggests what an effective international 
regulatory approach for prevention of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations, 
emergency response and liability and compensation for marine pollution and associated 
damage should be.  
 
 
                                                          
3 Following the 2009 Montara incident, Indonesia submitted proposal at the 97th session of the IMO Legal 
Committee for a global convention on liability for transboundary pollution arising from such incidents offshore, 
see LEG 97/15, of 1 December 2010, p. 28; The EU in Directive 2013/30/EU pledged to support global effort 
for safety of offshore operations; White, Michael, op. cit., pp.23&26; The Proposal by President Dmitry 
Medvedev is presented by The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada, ‘Press Release, Global Marine 
Environmental Protection’ 26 July 2010, available online at http://www.rusembassy.ca/node/439 ; Rares, Steven 
‘An International Convention on Off-shore Hydrocarbon Leaks?’ 26 A & NZ Mar L. J 10, 16 (2012) 
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7.1 A Workable Legal Framework for Accidental Pollution from 
Offshore Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation 
 
The primary goal of a legal framework for offshore petroleum operations is to minimise risks 
of accident and prevent oil spills, as well as provide adequate response mechanisms to minimise 
the consequences in the event an accident still occurs. There must also be a workable liability 
regime, especially in cases of a transboundary damage. While the goal of such a venture is 
clear, it is necessary to find a regulatory scheme that would best address the issues of 
prevention, emergency response and liability for accidental pollution from offshore petroleum 
operations.4 Having exposed the inadequacy of binding global norms, regulations and 
standards, for offshore operations, an unresolved issue is the international organisation that 
would be best suited to develop such global rules. Also, the question whether international 
regulation of offshore accidental pollution should be limited to regional agreements or also 
include a global treaty is fundamental.  
  
7.2 Regional Regulation of Offshore Accidental Pollution 
 
Offshore petroleum operations and installations are located within the continental shelf where 
huge unexplored petroleum reserves are mostly found and coastal States exercise jurisdiction 
over such maritime zones.5 But coastal States have an international obligation to prevent 
pollution of the marine environment, including from seabed oil and gas activities. In most 
maritime regions coastal States have, in a bid to collectively protect their common sea, adopted 
conventions and protocols aimed at preventing pollution of the marine environment. However, 
                                                          
4 Bush, Brittan J., ‘Addressing the Regulatory Collapse behind the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Implementing 
a “Best Available Technology” Regulatory Regime for Deepwater Oil Exploration Safety and Cleanup 
Technology, 26 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 535, 548 (2011)   
5 Gavouneli, M., op. cit., p.3; Brown, Chester, ‘International Environmental Law in the Regulation of Offshore 
Installations and Seabed Activities: The Case for a South Pacific Regional Protocol’ 17 Australian Mining & 
Petroleum L. J. 109, 136 (1998) 
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as was demonstrated, only few regions have instruments specifically governing pollution from 
offshore petroleum operations.  
 
The Helsinki Convention for the Baltic Sea, the Barcelona Convention and its Offshore 
Protocol for the Mediterranean Sea and OSPAR Convention all have provisions for prevention 
and control of marine pollution from seabed activities. But it is only the Offshore Protocol for 
the Mediterranean Sea that contains detailed provisions for regulation of offshore oil and gas 
operations. This too, needs amendments to meet the present and future challenges of offshore 
operations. Similar instrument outside the three regions under consideration is the 1978 Kuwait 
Regional Convention6 and its 1989 Protocol concerning Marine Pollution resulting from 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf. 
 
Obviously, the four sea regions in the EU are not at par in terms of regulation of offshore oil 
and gas operations, especially with regard to prevention, emergency response and liability for 
accidental pollution. It is expected that with the EU Directive on Safety of Offshore Operations, 
the disparity in the regulation of offshore activities in these regions would be bridged to a large 
extent. Improvement can be ensured by either amendments to the regional conventions or 
adoption of protocols on offshore safety because not every country in these regions is a member 
of the EU and as such not bound by the relevant EU directives. On the other hand, many oil 
rich regions and sub-regions such as the Gulf of Guinea and the Gulf of Mexico lack detailed 
regional or sub-regional instrument regulating offshore oil and gas operations. 
 
While it is understandable that different sea regions have their peculiar problems and States 
within these regions need to co-operate and collaborate in the prevention of pollution, the basic 
                                                          
6 1978 Kuwait Convention, 1140 UNTS 133 
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elements of legal framework necessary for prevention of accidents in offshore petroleum 
operations are similar. For instance, technical capability and financial capacity of operators, 
the need for installation of effective equipment, requirements for well cementing and trained 
personnel need not vary from region to region. Regions may choose to harmonise their policies 
with regard to the granting of licenses and a firm requirement for environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) especially in a transboundary context.7  
 
Over the years scholars opined that because offshore installations are situated under the 
jurisdiction of States there was no need to regulate offshore petroleum activities using global 
instruments.8 This approach was based on the premise that it is better for States that share same 
regional seas to adopt regional conventions and protocols to regulate marine activities within 
such regions. Even at that, it is only the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian (Arabian) Gulf 
areas that have protocols on offshore oil and gas operations.  
 
The EU Directive on Safety of Offshore Operations is a bold effort to establishing a coherent 
legal regime for offshore oil and gas operations in the EU. As a post-Macondo instrument, the 
Directive is quite detailed in providing measures for prevention of major hazards or accidents 
and calls for a collaborative emergency preparedness and response mechanism. However, it 
failed to make any provisions on liability that are tailored to offshore oil and gas operations. 
Liability issues are to be resolved on the basis of the 2004 EU Directive on environmental 
liability.9 
 
                                                          
7 Brown, Chester supra note 5, pp.135&137 
8 See Gavouneli, M., op. cit., p. 43 
9 See Art.7 of EU 2013 Directive on Safety of Offshore Operations 
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The EU Directive on safety of offshore operations will be applicable to most countries in the 
Northeast Atlantic, Mediterranean and Baltic Sea regions.10 However, its provisions could have 
wider impact if EU members in each of these regions initiate review and amendment of the 
regional sea conventions to bring them, at the least, at par with the benchmark of the Directive. 
Also, now that the consequences of the Macondo blowout are still fresh, it is time for regions 
without multilateral agreements on offshore petroleum operations to negotiate and adopt 
similar instruments.11  
 
In essence, an expansion of regional sea regimes is essential in international regulation of 
offshore petroleum operation. However, where the transboundary impact of an offshore 
accident is on the high seas beyond State jurisdiction a regional instrument would not address 
the damage and liability implications. Unfortunately, the question of possible impacts of 
offshore activities on the high seas has never been addressed as States are more concerned with 
damage to their territories or jurisdiction. 
  
Some scholars assert that “improving offshore safety through relevant regime building at the 
regional level seems to be the most practical and realistic option.”12 Accordingly “such 
regionalization will allow countries sharing the same maritime area and usually with similar 
economic potential to jointly develop regulatory regimes that reflect their interests and 
capabilities.”13 However, irrespective of the level of regulation at the regional level it may not 
provide uniformity of standards in health, safety and environment issues on a global scale. If 
                                                          
10 Id., Para.50 of Preamble  
11 UNEP could help coordinate the process to encourage development of such regional instrument on offshore 
petroleum operation. 
12 Vinogradov, Sergei, ‘The Impact of the Deepwater Horizon: The Evolving International Legal Regime for 
Offshore Accidental Pollution Prevention, Preparedness, and Response’ Ocean Development & International 
Law, 44:4, 335-362, at 352 (2013) 
13 Id.  
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nations and regions are left to regulate offshore operations to “reflect their interest and 
capabilities” the implication would be that less developed regions and nations might have 
ineffective regulations. In such circumstances safety may be compromised; there will be 
inadequate response to emergency and the polluter may escape payment for preventive 
measures and compensating environmental damage. Uncontrolled pollution of the marine 
environment in any sea region could potentially harm the biodiversity of the oceans and that 
should be a concern for all nations.   
 
Regional instrument on regulation of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations 
remain relevant with or without a global regulation in this regard. Where there is global 
regulation, regional instruments would be used to amplify and tailor provisions of global 
regulations to the circumstances and peculiarities of the region. But in the absence of a global 
regulation, a regional instrument should set effective standards necessary for prevention of 
accidental pollution in offshore petroleum operations.  
 
7.2.1 Enforcement of EU Directive 2013/30/EU and the Regional 
Conventions 
 
EU directives are binding as to the result to be achieved but allow member States to decide the 
form and methods of achieving the set goal. However, directives have some level of direct 
effect that enables individuals to rely on them, especially in cases against the State.14 In essence 
once a directive is validly enacted every EU member is bound to take steps to regulate its 
national activities aimed at achieving the result stipulated in the directive.  
                                                          
14 Craig, Paul and de Burca, Grainne, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials  5th Edition (Oxford University Press) 
p.106 (2011); Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
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In relation to the EU Directive on safety of offshore operations which “establishes minimum 
requirements for preventing major accidents in offshore oil and gas operations and limiting the 
consequences of such accidents”,15 Member States are to bring into force all legislative 
instruments and administrative process necessary to comply with the Directive not later than 
19 July 2015.16 
In recognition of the fact that not all countries within the four marine regions covered by the 
Directive are members of the EU, the Offshore Directive urged the Union as a matter of priority 
to cooperate and strengthen coordination with third States that have sovereignty or sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction over marine waters in such marine regions. Such cooperation should 
include regional sea conventions.17 
Provisions of the Directive are applicable in a large number of countries which are parties to 
the OSPAR Convention, Helsinki Convention and the Barcelona Convention. This creates 
possible overlap between the provisions of the regional regimes and the Directive. The EU 
Member States in those regions would, in line with the Directive, update their national 
regulations and administrative provisions to meet the demands of the EU Directive. This will 
definitely impact positively on the regions, especially the Baltic Sea and the North East Atlantic 
regional sea regimes where EU Member States form the majority of contracting parties. 
However, this may create disparity in the regulation of offshore operations within the regions 
between EU Member States and other States in the regions that are not EU members.   
With the commitment of the EU to encourage safe offshore oil and gas operations in and outside 
EU waters it is expected that its members will champion changes to the existing legal regimes 
                                                          
15 Directive 2013/30/EU, Article 1(1) 
16 Id, Art.41. Though by virtue of Art.41(3)-(5), some Member States which have not licenced offshore 
operations and those that are landlocked are exempt from most obligations of the directive save Article 20, 32 
and 34  
17 EU Directive on safety of offshore operations, Preamble para.50 
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in the Baltic Sea, North-east Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea regions. Anything short of 
that could be counter-productive to the overall goal of the Directive.   
 
 
7.2.2 The Impact of EU Directive 2013/30/EU on Global Offshore 
Operations 
 
The provisions of Offshore Directive indicate what is expected of European oil and gas 
companies in other regions of the world. Paragraphs 36, 37 and 38 of the Preamble give an 
indication of the intentions of the Directive. They provide that best global practices require 
licensees, operators and owners to take primary responsibility for controlling risks in their 
activities, including actions or omissions of contractors. While activities are to be conducted 
worldwide in accordance with best practices and standards, licensees, operators and owners 
must have a corporate major accident prevention policy that should be implemented 
consistently in and outside of the Union.  
However, there are no binding obligations to this effect. “Responsible operators and owners 
should be expected”, “it would be desirable for operators and owners” and “as far as possible” 
are all clauses that do not elicit compulsion. Moreover, their actions are expected to be “within 
the applicable national legal framework” which in many cases are standards lower than those 
set by the Directive. Curiously, Paragraph 41 of the Preamble goes to state that Member States 
are not able to enforce rules outside the Union. This does not help the desire to make European 
companies act responsibly in operations outside the EU. Member States should be required to 
put in place mechanism for ensuring that parent and subsidiary companies linked to their States 
keep to the relevant international best practice expected of a responsible operator at all times 
in and outside Union waters. 
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Instead, the substantive rule of the Directive titled “offshore oil and gas operations conducted 
outside the Union” provides that “Member States shall require companies registered in their 
territory and conducting, themselves or through subsidiaries, offshore oil and gas operations 
outside the Union as licence holders or operators to report to them, on request, the 
circumstances of any major accident in which they have been involved.”18 This duty has little 
to do with the standard of operation. In essence, the Directive does not impose an obligation 
on Member States to require companies registered in their territory and conducting, by 
themselves or through subsidiaries, offshore oil and gas operations outside the Union to apply 
same international best practice as in EU waters.  
The European Commission is expected to promote cooperation and coordination with third 
countries within the same marine regions as Member States, as well as encourage high safety 
standards for offshore oil and gas operations in relevant global and regional fora, including 
those involving Arctic waters.19 But how does the Union support high safety standards globally 
when it fails to make it mandatory for Companies registered in the EU to observe high safety 
standards in all their operations in and outside EU waters irrespective of low national standards 
in some third countries?  The Commission may need to see to the adoption of a global treaty 
that calls for high safety standards for offshore operations, including those in Arctic waters.  
 
 7.3 OPOL and Global Offshore Petroleum Operations 
 
The Oil Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL) which involves all offshore oil and gas 
operators in the UK and North Sea is the only existing regulatory framework dealing with 
liability for accidents from offshore operations. OPOL establishes strict liability for any 
                                                          
18 Directive 2013/30/EU, Article 20(1) 
19 Directive 2013/30/EU, Article 33 
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incident, thus taking away requirement for proof of fault. Burden of proof has always been the 
undoing of many victims of pollution, especially in developing countries where there is lack of 
industry knowledge and capacity even on the part of the regulatory agencies. 
 
OPOL members’ pledge of USD250 million liability per incident may not be sufficient to 
address liability arising from major offshore incidents like the Deepwater Horizon.20 OPOL 
can improve and seems willing to improve as the current liability cap was a response to the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico following an emergency meeting in 
August 2010.21 It also added an annual cap of US$500 million per party.22 Presently OPOL 
coverage is limited to the North Sea.23 OPOL definitely needs to open up membership and 
expand its coverage. 
 
As part of the industry’s contribution to safety of offshore oil and gas operations OPOL would 
have a better international impact if it expands its membership and coverage, first to other 
European waters and then beyond Europe. Such a move should be welcomed by most oil and 
gas producing countries, especially developing ones that find it difficult to enforce pollution 
regulations. An acceptance of a strict liability regime by offshore operators would entice them 
to adopt safer technology and operational standards regardless of the location of the installation 
and irrespective of applicable domestic regulations.  
 
                                                          
20 Smith, Marissa, ‘The Deepwater Horizon Disaster: An Examination of the Spill’s Impact on the Gap in 
International Regulation of Oil Pollution from Fixed Platforms’ 25 Emory Int'l. L. Rev. 1477, 1493-94 (2011) 
21 Energy & Climate Change Committee, UK Deepwater Drilling - Implications of the Gulf Of Mexico Oil 
Spill, 2010-1 H.C. 450-1, at 4.5.3 (UK) 
22 Oil & Gas UK, Mandatory Financial Requirements for Oil Industry Operations in the UKCS, p.3, available at 
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/templates/asset-relay.cfm?frmAssetFileID=1170 last accessed on 20 June 2014 
23 Id. Only applications from operators of offshore facilities located in Denmark, Germany, France, the Republic 
of Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the Isle of Man, the Faroe Islands and Greenland are entertained. OPOL 
membership and coverage is so restricted that within Europe it does not apply to any offshore facilities located 
in the Baltic or Mediterranean Seas 
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On the other hand, although most operators in developing countries are usually subsidiaries of 
companies which are already members of OPOL, OPOL may not be willing to admit such 
operators whose technical capacity cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, parent companies from 
Europe may be reluctant for their subsidiaries to join the OPOL regime because of a high 
liability cap. It is interesting to note that all operators in the UK and North Sea are members of 
OPOL not necessarily by choice but it is a required condition for operational license in the UK 
continental Shelf.24 
 
In developing countries where legal process is slow and high burden of proof under traditional 
tort law is placed on victims, huge claims could be avoided by powerful IOCs. Also, 
considering the lack of capacity on the part of regulators, most IOCs operating in developing 
countries escape proper sanctions for breach of environmental regulations and standards that 
cannot go unpunished in developed regions like the North Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. For 
example, the actual amount of oil that escaped into the sea in the Bonga oil field accident in 
the Gulf of Guinea off the coast of Nigeria in December 2010 could not be identified by the 
government agency, the Directorate of Petroleum Resources. The figure stated is that reported 
by Shell, the operator.25 This claim was never verified by the Nigerian regulators and 
environmental agencies including the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
(NOSDRA).  
 
While BP voluntarily pledged and made available USD20 billion to settle claims in the 
Macondo blowout few weeks into the incident, Shell has not paid any sum for pollution from 
                                                          
24 Membership of OPOL is required of all operators who apply for licences for offshore oil blocks in the UK.  
25 Shell reported that about 40,000 barrels of oil were lost to the environment in the Bonga spill of December 20, 
2012. A figure that is disputed. See ‘More Oil Spilled in Bonga than Shell Reported’ Premium Times, 29 
December 2011,c  available at http://premiumtimesng.com/business/3250-More-oil-spilled-Bonga-than-Shell-
reported.html  last visited on 20 June 2014 
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the Bonga field accident after more than three years.26 In such circumstance it is unlikely that 
IOCs would be willing to extend their financial commitment under OPOL to operations by 
their subsidiaries in developing countries, more so, when the profit level of their subsidiaries 
would reflect in the balance sheets of the parent companies in Europe and America. 
Nevertheless, in line with its 2013 Directive on safety of offshore operations that urged 
European IOCs to employ same level of safety measures in their operations outside EU waters, 
EU Member States can encourage OPOL to expand its membership beyond the North Sea. 
Though OPOL’s present liability cap of US$250 million is not entirely adequate,27 its 
membership would instil some level of high safety culture in all operators that sign up to it 
globally. Thus, an increase in the liability cap will do much more.  
 
However good OPOL provisions might look, the agreement remains a private arrangement 
among operators to the benefit of potential victims of their high risk venture. It ordinarily does 
not confer any right on a third party in the way a binding legal instrument would do.28 Where 
OPOL fails to implement its agreement it will be an uphill task for a victim to successful seek 
its enforcement. Hence, though the expansion of OPOL’s membership would have positive 
effect on safety of offshore oil and gas operations, an international binding agreement with 
global spread appears to be the best guarantee of a liability regime that would act as a 
preventive measure against serious environmental damage caused by an offshore accident.  
 
                                                          
26 The Guardian Newspaper, Bonga Oil Spill: NOSDRA Orders Shell to Pay $3.6bn to Affected Communities, 
26 August 2015, available at http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/08/bonga-oil-spill-nosdra-orders-shell-to-
pay-3-6bn-to-affected-communities/ last visited 27 August 2015 
27 Smith, Marissa, supra note 20, p. 1505 
28 Some have argued that private compensation schemes like OPOL and IOPC conflict with domestic liability 
laws that make them less effective as global agreements. See Smith, Marissa, supra note 20, p 1505; de 
Gennaro, Michael A., ‘Oil Pollution Liability and Control under International Maritime Law: Market Incentives 
as an Alternative to Government Regulation’ 37 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 265, 269, 272 (2004) 
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7.4 Regulation of Offshore Accidental Pollution through Global 
Instruments  
 
In international practice global conventions have been negotiated to address environmental 
challenges that are perhaps considered to be of global concern that need common, collective 
and global action. These include multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention 
on Biological Diversity,29 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,301985 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer31 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.32 There are maritime activities that are regulated by 
global instruments under the auspices of the IMO, prominent among which is MARPOL 73/78. 
Following the Macondo blowout of 2010 there has been a renewed call for a global binding 
instrument to regulate offshore petroleum operations. However, there is no consensus that a 
global regime is required to address the challenges of prevention, emergency preparedness and 
response, and liability for accidental pollution from offshore activities. This scepticism is 
coupled with the fact that States more often than not fail to anticipate international ecological 
needs and address them. Committed negotiations and adoption of requisite agreements take 
place only after a major disaster. There was one- Macondo, but no negotiations on agreements. 
Presently, national efforts alone are not capable to provide effective regime of preventing and 
controlling offshore accidental oil pollution globally. Domestic regulations may at best control 
conduct of its nationals worldwide,33 and establish environmental liability for damage within 
the State’s territorial waters, EEZ and continental shelf. But when accidental pollution from an 
                                                          
29 31 ILM 822 (1992), adopted on 5 June 1992 and entered into force on 29 December 1993    
30 1771 UNTS 107, adopted on 9 May 1992 and entered into force on 24 March 1994 
31 26 ILM 1529 (1985) entered into force on 22 September 1988 
32 26 ILM 154 (1987), entered into force on 1 January 1989 
33 In reality, the nationals and IOCs from developed countries when operating in other countries, especially in 
developing countries, rely on the domestic laws of their operating country in defence of most of their actions 
that fall below best practice and that is not the standard acceptable in their home countries. In cases of bribery, 
human rights abuse, the US under the Alien Torts Act could hold their companies accountable for wrong doing 
outside the US. Unfortunately, it does not translate to holding them responsible for accidental pollution and 
other negative impacts of the activities they engage in. 
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offshore installation in one State impacts on the high seas or territorial waters of another State, 
emergency response and liability can only be addressed through some form of international 
agreement or arrangement.34  
By its very nature, business wants favourable investment climate.  In cases of natural resource 
exploitation some multinational companies seek to operate in jurisdictions where they not only 
make profit but, where possible, maximize profit at the expense of the environment. In the 
absence of global regulation of offshore operations, IOCs may apply different standards in their 
offshore operations, especially in developing countries with lax regulations and inadequate 
technical and institutional capacity to monitor and effectively regulate the activities. The need 
for uniform global standards in the exercise of the obligation to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment from any source is provided for in Article 194(1) that 
mandate States to “endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connection.” UNCLOS did 
not provide details and as such a new global instrument on safety of offshore operations would 
be ideal. 
The OPRC provides a global minimum for emergency preparedness and response to accidental 
pollution from offshore operations. In view of the magnitude of spill that could result from 
accidents in offshore petroleum installation, as experienced in the Macondo incident, an 
improvement should be made to the OPRC. While improvement is needed in the global regime 
it does not necessarily have to be a new treaty. An amendment to the OPRC through the IMO 
or Conference of the parties as provided in Article 14 of the Convention may improve 
emergency preparedness and response at the global level. Such an amendment should be based 
on research on the state-of-the-art of oil pollution preparedness and response as demanded by 
                                                          
34 Ross, William M., supra note 2, p.23  
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Article 8 of OPRC and take into cognisance current technology in the offshore petroleum 
industry.  
In recent years there has been a growing expression of a need for global regulation of offshore 
operations to address liability arising from accidental pollution. For instance, following the 21 
August 2009 Montara blowout in the Australian EEZ, Indonesia submitted at the 97th session 
of the IMO Legal Committee a proposal to add a new work programme to address liability and 
compensation for oil pollution damage resulting from offshore petroleum operations.35 With 
Montara and the Deepwater Horizon as reference points, Indonesia contended that an 
international convention on such liability was the best solution. Indonesia proposed a regime 
of strict liability channelled against the owner or operator of the platform or installation and 
possibly a supplementary fund. In considering the proposal, the Committee was divided. 
Countries in support of the proposal admitted the existence of an international regulatory gap 
and contended that prompt measures were needed to fill the lacuna. They noted that such oil 
pollution knows no borders and global regulation was needed.36 But the Norwegian delegation 
expressed doubts about the relevance of any international regime dealing with the issue.  
The Norwegian delegation opined that since offshore oil and gas operations are undertaken 
within the continental shelves under the jurisdiction of coastal States they differ from shipping 
where vessels move from one jurisdiction to the other. But this argument is not sufficiently 
persuasive. Offshore operations have moved from shallow waters into ultra-deep waters 
possibly outside the EEZ of coastal States. In any event, while offshore installations are usually 
static, oil spills in case of accidents moves as it wills. There is always a possibility of such spill 
spreading beyond the coastal State boundaries to the high seas or areas under the jurisdiction 
                                                          
35 LEG 97/14/1, of 10 September 2010, p. 1. 
36 Malaysian delegation emphasised the gap in relation to transboundary pollution and expressed need to fill 
such gap; Australia that had the Montara incidents gave her support to the proposal ; see LEG 97/15, of 1 
December 2010, p. 28; 
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of neighbouring countries. Moreover, the fact that an activity is undertaken only within national 
boundaries has not stopped the global community from regulating such activities by adoption 
of universally applicable rules in such areas as biodiversity, climate change or nuclear energy. 
The global regulation with generally acceptable international standards of operation should be 
adopted to promote global protection of the marine environment and its biodiversity that would 
be impacted by accidental pollution from uncontrolled or unilaterally chosen levels of safety 
in offshore petroleum E&P.    
Unfortunately, no decision was taken to begin a process of developing global regulations.37 
Some comments at the IMO Legal Committee meeting suggested that in order to undertake 
work based on the Indonesian proposal it had to consider international and regional instruments 
already in existence as well as the Russian proposal on a global initiative to protect the marine 
environment submitted by the Russian Federation in the 2010 G20 Summit held in Canada.38 
During the G20 summit President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation announced a 
proposal to establish an international mechanism for preventing and liquidating offshore 
accidents. He suggested that major international companies involved in oil production should 
pay a percentage of their profits into a special consolidated fund and make payments that would 
be used to insure against these kinds of risks.39 
The Committee further noted that Strategic Direction 7.2 of the Organisation’s Strategic Plan 
refers only to “shipping” and does not cover pollution caused by offshore oil exploration and 
exploitation activities.40 A recommendation was then made to accommodate pollution for 
offshore operations in the following terms:  
                                                          
37 Id., p.29 
38 Report of the Legal Committee on its Ninety-Seventh Session, LEG\97\15.doc, para 14.8 
39 The Proposal by President Dmitry Medvedev, supra note 3 
40 LEG\97\15.doc, para 14.11 
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“IMO will focus on reducing and eliminating any adverse impact by shipping or by 
offshore oil exploration and exploitation activities on the environment by ... developing 
effective measures for mitigating and responding to the impact on the environment 
caused by shipping incidents and operational pollution from ships and liability and 
compensation issues connected with transboundary pollution damage resulting from 
offshore oil exploration and exploitation activities.”41 
 
Despite the above recommendation, at the 99th and 100th meeting of the IMO Legal Committee 
the Indonesian proposal was set aside as the Committee was much more disposed to 
encouraging bilateral and regional arrangements as it saw no compelling reason for developing 
a global convention on liability and compensation relating to offshore oil and gas operations.42  
Subsequently, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia promoted discussion of a 
convention within the IMO. They held an International Conference on Liability and 
Compensation Regime for Transboundary Oil Damage resulting from Offshore Exploration 
and Exploitation Activities in Bali in September 2011. Presently, the IMO is not keen on 
pursuing this objective43 as there is no agenda before the IMO to initiate such global instrument.  
However, the regulatory gap is acknowledged by both scholars and politicians. The ultimate 
challenge is the political will to initiate processes for the adoption of relevant instrument to 
regulate offshore operations globally. Most global instruments on environmental protection are 
negotiated with consideration accorded to developing or poorer nations through the application 
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Such approach could be adopted 
                                                          
41 LEG\97\15.doc, para 14.12 
42 IMO, Report of the Legal Committee on its ninety-ninth session, LEG 99/14, 24 April 2012, Paragraph 13.17 
IDDRI Report ‘Seeing Beyond the Horizon for Deepwater Oil and Gas: Strengthening the International 
Regulation of Offshore Exploration and Exploitation’ Study No 01/14 February 2014 by Julien Rochette (IDDRI), 
Matthieu Wemaëre (Attorney at Law), Lucien Chabason, Sarah Callet (IDDRI), P.26  
http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/ST0114_JR%20et%20al._offshore%20EN.pdf last 
visited on 12 October 2014 
43 Rares, Steven , supra note 3, p.11  
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in this case. The thesis will next briefly highlight some possible odds against a global 
instrument and how to address those odds and achieve an effective international regime for 
accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations. 
 
7.4.1 Odds against Global Regime for Offshore Accidental 
Pollution  
There are obvious challenges to negotiation and adoption of a global instrument to regulate 
offshore petroleum operations. First is the existence of variable geographical contingencies of 
regions of the world. This is the basis for some, like O’Connell, not to see reason why global 
regulations, rules and standards should govern pollution from offshore petroleum operations. 
He observed that it was obscure for UNCLOS to have made reference to international 
regulations, rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures in Article 208(3) since 
at the time of the adoption of UNCLOS the only rules and standards existing were regional.44 
But the reference was made in view of Article 208(5) that imposes obligation on States to 
further develop international regulations, rules and standards.  
Similar sentiment was expressed by Gavouneli who argued that “great geographical differences 
between various regions make global cooperation complicated and unnecessary”.45 Gavouneli 
is of the opinion that UNCLOS seems biased in favour of regional regulation due to existing 
regional efforts.46 But it was also an acknowledgement of the absence of global regulations. 
Hence, UNCLOS being an umbrella instrument, urges parties to develop international 
                                                          
44 O’Connell, D. P., The International Law of the Sea, Shearer, I. A. (ed), Vol.II (Clarendon Press Oxford), 
p.1017 (1984) 
45 See Gavouneli, M., op. cit., p. 43  
46 Id. 
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regulations, standards and rules through competent international organisations for prevention, 
control and liability for pollution arising from seabed activities.47 
Another argument against a global instrument is the presumption that it is easier for States in a 
region to take collective action due to the level of understanding that enable parties to agree on 
terms suitable for the limited number of States in the region. Admittedly, global conventions 
are very difficult to negotiate given the multitude of States necessary to agree on complex 
standards on subjects that their full ramifications may at times not be completely understood.48 
This involves compromises that may water down the essence of such regulations. Moreover, 
no organised constituency exists at the international level to press for these regulations as 
neither IMO nor UNEP has taken it as part of their work plan. Also, countries are reluctant to 
agree on international regulation of activities conducted within their national borders due to 
concerns that they may lose significant proportion of control over such economic activities.  
Despite these and other valid concerns about a global regime, it is still possible, if there is a 
will, as exhibited in other international environmental concerns. As White, rightly observed, 
“there are numerous but complex issues that an international convention can address and as it 
has been done with other complex international issues this is also achievable.”49 A good 
approach would be adoption of two global instruments: First should be a framework convention 
on safety of offshore petroleum operations for the prevention and control of marine pollution. 
The convention may contain obligations similar to those undertaken by parties to the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety.50  While the Convention on Nuclear Safety might not be the 
                                                          
47 UNCLOS, Arts.194(1), 199 and 208(4)&(5) 
48 Rose, William, op. cit., p. 5; see Livingston, D. “Pollution Control: An International Perspective,” Scientist 
and Citizens, No.10 (September 1968)pp 172-182; Wolman, A “Pollution as an International Issue”, Foreign 
Affairs, No.47 (October 1968) pp 164-175; Ross, W. “The Management of International Common Property 
Resources”, Geographic Review, No.61 (July 1971) pp 325-338  
49 White, Michael QC, op. cit., p.26   
50 Legal Series No. 16, IAEA, Vienna (1994) 
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best of regimes or that successful51 it contains fair binding obligations on safety of nuclear 
installations to prevent nuclear accidents. With increase in offshore petroleum E&P, a 
commitment to high safety standards by all nations is essential for the protection of the marine 
environment. Therefore, a global consensus to adopt similar binding obligations on safety of 
offshore petroleum operations to prevent major hazards would be a good start for a global 
instrument on offshore petroleum E&P. The other instrument should focus on liability to ensure 
that the polluter pays and victims of accidental pollution have their claims fully and promptly 
settled. Interestingly, there are regional instruments that look forward to the existence of global 
regulation as the next section will demonstrate.   
 
7.4.2 Regional Support for a Global Action 
 
States sharing the same region are usually able to put in place conventions and protocols for 
the protection of their regional seas but they are quite aware that regional efforts alone might 
not effectively address the issues of prevention and control of marine pollution. For instance, 
parties to the OSPAR Convention resolved that “further international action to prevent and 
eliminate pollution of the sea should be taken without delay, as part of progressive and coherent 
measures to protect the marine environment.”52 Also, the Mediterranean Offshore Protocol 
calls for the adoption of international rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures.53 It is envisaged that the Parties will cooperate either directly or through UNEP or 
other competent international organizations to establish appropriate scientific criteria for 
formulation and elaboration and then formulate and elaborate international rules, standards and 
                                                          
51 See Birnie, P., Boyle, A. and Redgwell, C., op. cit., pp. 500-503 for analysis of the Nuclear Safety Convention 
and its challenges 
52 Preamble to 1992 OSPAR Convention. Though the provision is not specifically in relation to offshore oil and 
gas activities. 
53 Offshore Protocol, Art.23, Barcelona Convention, Art.17   
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recommended practices and procedures.54 They are expected to harmonize their laws and 
regulations with these international rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures once they are in place.55  
 
While there seems to be a realisation of the need for global action to combat marine pollution 
some countries will always demonstrate lack of will to support a global initiative.  
 
In the wake of the Macondo accident, the EU also called for globalized efforts to implement 
uniform control technology in offshore oil exploration.56 The European Commission 
specifically urged the European Union to join forces with the United States, Norway, Russia, 
and OPEC members to set safety benchmarks57 that implement strict rules on safety and 
accident prevention in all jurisdictions with offshore oil exploration activities, as well as ensure 
coordinated individual national efforts in accordance with UNCLOS provisions to implement 
safety standards beyond a nation’s jurisdiction.58 This is probably one of the most important 
recommendations of the Commission in response to the Deepwater Horizon59 which reflects 
the desired approach if major offshore accidents are to be prevented. The EU Commission’s 
communication noted:  
“Oil and gas exploration or production also takes place in the close vicinity of the EU, 
off the coasts of Algeria, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Libya, Tunisia, Turkey and 
Ukraine…The EU needs to pay close attention to offshore areas adjacent to its territory 
                                                          
54 Offshore Protocol, Article 23(1) 
55 Id, Art.23(2) 
56 See generally, Facing the Challenge of the Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities, SEC (2010) 1193 final 
Dec. 10, 2010 p.13  
57 Id., p.13 
58 Id. 
59 See Bush, Brittan J., supra note 4, p.555  
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where offshore drilling is growing and where an accident with any consequent oil spill 
could damage the environment and economies of several coastal Member States.”60  
 
Similar views are shared by industry groups who believe that, in the circumstance of offshore 
petroleum operations, it is sensible to seek international agreement on oil pollution damage 
from offshore installations with priority on prevention.61 This to a large extent is possible if 
countries think a little more about general global interest and not concerned solely about their 
national economic interests. 
 
In Article 33(3) of the EU Directive on Safety of Offshore Operations the European 
Commission made commitment to promote high safety standards for offshore oil and gas E&P 
at international level in relevant global and regional fora. It also urged European IOCs engaged 
in offshore operations to maintain the same safe operational standards both within and outside 
EU waters. Though, the provisions in the Directive were not firm and mandatory.62  
 
The EU Council also made it clear that one of the objectives of the environment policy of the 
Union is promoting measures at international level to deal with regional environmental 
                                                          
60 European Commission’s Communication “Facing the challenge of the safety of offshore  
oil and gas activities”, Com(2010) 560 final, published 12 October 2010 
61 See ‘Public Consultation: Improving Offshore Safety in Europe’, Joint response by Lloyd’s, the Association 
of British Insurers and the International Underwriting Association, pp.2-3 available on line at 
http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Files/The%20Market/Operating%20at%20Lloyds/Regulation/GPA/EC_offshor
e_liability_consultation_response_final1.pdf last visited 19 October 2014 
62 Para.36 of preamble underlines the need for operators to take responsibility for risk management in all 
operations of the corporation both within and outside the European Union. In para 41 of same preamble, it states 
that “Members States are not able to enforce rules outside the Union” but could request operators to report safety 
concerns that occurs in operations outside their territories. Furthermore, Article 20 provides that “Member States 
shall require companies registered in their territory and conducting, themselves or through subsidiaries, offshore 
oil and gas operations outside the Union as licence holders or operators to report to them, on request, the 
circumstances of any major accident in which they have been involved” 
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problems.63 To meet that objective the EU countries should consider initiating processes in 
global institutions such as UNEP and IMO or through the UN to put in place global legal regime 
on offshore operations. A global legal framework would improve safety of offshore petroleum 
operations and contribute to the prevention and control of marine pollution and ultimately 
safeguard marine biodiversity.  
 
Presently, offshore petroleum operations are being carried out in various maritime regions 
including developing countries and regions such as Nigeria, Ghana, Algeria, Libya, Angola, 
Congo, Egypt and Equatorial Guinea. These are countries with weak institutions and regulatory 
regimes and administrative and judicial systems that need serious improvement. Global 
conventions would help them considerably, especially when such treaties provide for capacity 
development and technical assistance.   
 
7.5 Achieving Global Regulation of Offshore Operations 
 
Admittedly, having an international regulation through two instruments with global coverage 
is desirable in addressing accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations. With that 
option arises the issue of how to go about achieving such a global convention. This thesis will 
next explore possible options open to the international community at the global level of 
regulation. Realistically, there are few options which include IMO, UNEP and UN.  
 
 
                                                          
63 Para.12, COUNCIL DECISION of 17 December 2012 on the accession of the European Union to the Protocol 
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil (2013/5/EU) 
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7.5.1 Global Regulation under the Auspices of the IMO  
 
The regulation of offshore oil and gas operations by the IMO has been suggested64 and some 
proposals regarding such global regulation have been made at various times. However, these 
were more in respect of regulation of rigs used in offshore oil and gas operation as opposed to 
actual activities of offshore E&P. For instance, CMI international working group adopted 
principles for the development of a draft convention on offshore units. The principles as 
contained in the 1996 CMI Yearbook are that the regime should, inter alia, be compatible with 
UNCLOS. The expansion of offshore activities into areas with no adequate regional regimes 
emphasizes the need for general rules of uniform application. Recognizing the rapid 
commercial and technological evolution of the international offshore industry, an international 
offshore regime should be flexible enough to accommodate future commercial and 
technological developments. Rather than set out detailed prescriptive rules it should focus on 
the objectives and standards.65 The Canadian Maritime Law Association (CMLA) supported 
the possible adoption of a comprehensive international convention on offshore units.66  
 
The IMO is a specialised agency of the UN. Offshore operations must fall within the 
competence of the IMO for it to be regulated by the organisation. More specifically, the issue 
of classification of offshore installations engaged in offshore operations, whether they are ships 
carrying out maritime activity is relevant to IMO’s regulation of such activities. For instance, 
floating offshore storage units often converted from oil tankers or purpose built vessels and 
modern-day jack-up rigs, which are similar to floating barges fitted with long support legs may 
                                                          
64 Rares, Steven, supra note 3, p.16 
65 This is a suggestion of safety net and self-regulation by operators. See Comite Maritime International, “The 
Origins of the CMLA Draft Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the 
Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources” CMI News Letter, No.1 
January/April 2004, p.3 
66 Id, p.2 
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be classified as vessels. It is suggested by some that these floating units and their off-shore 
activities appear to be proper subjects for the IMO to provide global regulation for their safe 
construction and operation as well as the consequences of pollution from these installations.67 
Such regulation under the auspices of the IMO was viewed both practicable and sensible.68 The 
frustration for such advocates is that the IMO is currently not taking the initiative seriously.69 
This is compounded by the uncertainty in the classification of offshore installations in terms of 
whether they are ships under applicable international law. 
 
The category of “Offshore installations” is broader than rigs. They include platforms and other 
production and storage facilities temporarily or permanently affixed to the ocean floor. In any 
event, while in transit and self-propelled like a vessel they do not engage in exploration and 
production activities. MODUs might be within the ambit of MARPOL 73/78 while in transit 
and in relation to operational pollution. Some international instruments, such as the 2013 EU 
Offshore Directive, accept the classification of MODU as ship when in transit.70 It is still not 
settled that rigs stationed and engaged in drilling activity be considered as vessels for the 
purpose of determining applicable legal regime in the event of an accident.71  This study is not 
focused on the issue of classification of MODU: whether a MODU is a vessel/ship or not but 
deals with offshore installations for the consideration of accidental pollution from offshore 
petroleum operations. 
 
The mandate of the IMO, as summarized in Article 1(a) of the IMO Convention, are “to provide 
machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental regulation and 
                                                          
67 Rares, Steven, supra note 3, p.16 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Para.32 of the Preamble to EU 2013 Directive on Offshore Safety. 
71 For a detailed consideration of the legal status of offshore oil rigs see Esmaeili, Hossein, op. cit., p.116 
(1997); Kashubsky, Mikhail, (Thesis) op. cit. 
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practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international 
trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in 
matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of 
marine pollution from ships…”72 It seems that as far as the definition of offshore installations 
as ships is not clearly established, the IMO is not formally required to deal with their activities.  
 
The issue of offshore petroleum operations and their safety is not exactly “shipping engaged in 
international trade,” neither does it directly concern “maritime safety” and efficiency of 
navigation. Abandoned installations which are no longer in use may constitute hazard to 
navigation and thus become a concern for the IMO. Expectedly, the IMO is reluctant to deal 
with offshore activities that do not relate directly to navigational issues. However, it addressed 
the question of decommissioning of offshore platforms and installations by adopting in 1989 
Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the 
Continental Shelf and in the EEZ.73  
 
Its mandate of “general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning 
maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from 
ships” does not include offshore installations. Furthermore, unless it is accepted that offshore 
installations (platforms, rigs, production and storage facilities) can be defined as a “ship”, the 
IMO might not be required to take on the regulation of offshore petroleum operations.  
Presently, the IMO despite a few proposals to regulate offshore petroleum operations has 
avoided undertaking this task. It seems that an instrument through the IMO Legal Committee 
is presently not feasible. However, global instrument to address safety of offshore operations 
                                                          
72 Convention on the International Maritime Organisation 289 UNTS 48 (1948), Art.1(a) 
73 According to Shunmugam Jayakumar this appears to be the “generally accepted international rules and 
standards” referred to in Article 60 of UNCLOS, see Jayakumar, Shunmugam, supra note 2, p.9  
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and liability issues respectively is desirable and possible with the right political will. It remains 
to be seen which international organisation would undertake this task. International institutions 
may have implied competence, for example, IMO may take on certain issues related to 
prevention and control of marine pollution in the absence of other competent organisation. 
 
7.5.2 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
 
The UNEP being a special body of the UN on environmental matters has a mandate “to be the 
leading global environmental authority that sets the global agenda, that promotes the coherent 
implementation of the environmental dimensions of sustainable development within the United 
Nations system and that serves as an authoritative advocate for the global environment.”74 
Since its creation in 1972 UNEP has been involved in developing binding conventions and 
non-binding environmental guidelines and principles. UNEP functions as a secretariat to a 
number of multilateral agreements and can serve as a platform for drafting rules on various 
environmental matters, including pollution from offshore operations and their safety.75  
The regulation of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations would dwell much 
on technical standards of operations and the conditions that a prospective operator should fulfil 
before a grant of licence for offshore E&P. Some have suggested a joint initiative between 
UNEP as a special body on environment and the IMO to formulate global regimes on offshore 
operations.76 The needed collaboration might be a major uphill task as both organisations show 
no enthusiasm in filling this regulatory gap. 
                                                          
74 UNEP website available at http://www.unep.org/About/ last visited 18 June 2014 
75 See UNEP Environmental Law Guidelines and Principles ‘Offshore Mining and Drilling’ 
76 Stefankova, Iveta, ‘International Regulation v National Regulation on Offshore Oil Exploitation – The USA 
as an Example’ ELSA Malta Law Review, Edition III 126, 138 (2013) available on line at 
http://www.elsamaltalawreview.com/sites/elsamaltalawreview.com/files/imce_uploads/10b.pdf accessed on 30 
April 2014  
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7.5.3 The United Nations General Assembly  
 
The United Nations could suggest convening an intergovernmental conference on offshore oil 
and gas exploration and exploitation with a view to developing two instruments. First 
instrument on safety of offshore operations and a second on liability and compensation. Similar 
initiative resulted in the adoption of the 1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks under the auspices of the United Nations.77  
Countries such as Indonesia have expressed concern about the absence of global regime on 
offshore oil and gas operation and suggested need for a regime. Perhaps, an agreement could 
possibly be reached. Especially, with the present political will among developed countries 
urging global effort, following the Macondo accident. Though these operations occur mostly 
within the continental shelf of a coastal state, the gradual increase in the activities and the 
absence of minimum operating standards pose a much greater risk of accidents than ever.  
 
7.6 International Regulation and National Imperative 
 
A global instrument should emphasise safety case approach to place the onus on operators and 
industry to reduce to minimum the risk of major accidents and consequential pollution. With 
international global regulation in place, various governments would be obligated to acquire 
requisite regulatory knowledge and build capacity to regulate petroleum activities. In 
recognition of the difference in capacity between developed and developing countries/regions, 
                                                          
77In the 1990 following conflict between coastal States and distant-water fishing States over straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks in the areas adjacent to the 200 nautical-mile exclusive economic zones an 
intergovernmental conference under United Nations auspices was convened with a view to resolving the 
conflict. This Conference adopted the 1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks which introduces a number of innovative measures, particularly in the area of environmental and 
resource protection obliging States to adopt a precautionary approach to fisheries exploitation and giving 
expanded powers to port States to enforce proper management of fisheries resources. See UN, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm last visited 06 May 
2014 
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the first could be obligated to provide assistance to developing countries in building their 
capacity. This is very important in achieving the much desired global standards of operations 
regardless of their location. Essentially, a global regulation would ensure that all operators 
apply same standard of safety at all times but the regulations would be subjected to abuse where 
the regulator lacks capacity to monitor operations and enforce standards. 
 
From the foregoing, a global instrument could be negotiated to set the template for more 
regional sea conventions and protocols. This will ultimately reflect in municipal laws of coastal 
States which exercise control over offshore petroleum operations.78 Moreover, the judicial 
process which could be used by victims of accidental pollution to seek redress is subject to 
municipal authority. The procedural rules, access to justice, general enforcement of civil claims 
are mainly national laws. Therefore, the adequacy of municipal law is as important as the global 
regulation. Considering the economic power that IOCs command globally, political weight of 
the government is also essential. In the Deepwater Horizon accident President Barak Obama’s 
involvement made BP not only comply with legal requirements relating to liability but also 
waive their right to limitation of liability. In contrast, Shell, the operator of the Bonga oil field 
offshore Nigeria refused to pay a USD$3.6billion fine imposed on her for pollution caused by 
the 2011 Bonga oil spill.79 
 
 
                                                          
78 By Art. 77 of UNCLOS coastal States have sovereign rights over their continental shelf, independent of 
occupation, for the purposes of exploring and exploiting their natural resources. These natural resources include 
mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil 
79 The Guardian Newspaper, Bonga Oil Spill: NOSDRA Orders Shell to Pay $3.6bn to Affected Communities, 
26 August 2015, available at http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/08/bonga-oil-spill-nosdra-orders-shell-to-
pay-3-6bn-to-affected-communities/ last visited 27 August 2015 
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7.7 Achieving a Robust International Legal Regime for 
Accidental Pollution from Offshore Petroleum Operations 
 
Offshore petroleum operation touches on the issue of energy security and economic prosperity 
of oil-producing nations, as well as regional and national environmental concerns. Coastal 
States exercise control of such activities. However, without taking away the direct control of 
the exploration and exploitation of these resources, it may be possible to regulate the 
international players engaged in offshore petroleum E&P in order to achieve the goal of 
prevention of accidental pollution.  Global regulation of IOCs is particularly important because 
they could apply ‘double standards’80in their operations in different countries.81 Such actions 
are usually to the detriment of the environment and people in countries with weak institutional 
and legal safeguards coupled with the lack of political will to confront powerful multinational 
corporate interests like IOCs.82 The impact of powerful commercial interests on environmental 
regulations cannot be over emphasised as developed countries also have their experiences. The 
                                                          
80 Double standards involves, inter alia, use of different safety wears and equipment in different regions or 
countries; non application of best available technology and best environmental practice in all operations of the 
company in various locations; different treatment of staff based on the country of operations; and disparity in 
levels of concern for the environment    
81 In response to abuse of human rights by businesses in parts of the world the UN in 2011 Human Rights 
Council endorsed the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“protect respect and remedy” Framework. It is a soft law instrument and Principle 23 is very instructive. It 
provides: “In all contexts, business enterprises should: (a) Comply with all applicable laws and respect 
internationally recognized human rights, wherever they operate; (b) Seek ways to honour the principles of 
internationally recognized human rights when faced with conflicting requirements; (c) Treat the risk of causing 
or contributing to gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate.” Available on 
line at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf last visited 30 
January 2015  
82 Double standards could be found in the operations of IOCs in Africa. For an insight of the Angolan situation 
please see Silva, Ricardo, ‘Environmental Compliance in the Angolan Offshore Industry’, Available on line at 
http://www.mirandalawfirm.com/uploadedfiles/38/35/0003538.pdf last visited on 23 May 2014 
Application of different operational and safety standards in different regions has been observed 
not only in Africa but also in other less integrated and less developed regions like South America, see 
Henningham, Stephen, The Pacific Island States - Security and Sovereignty in the Post-Cold War World 76 
(1995); see also Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, ‘The Local Politics of Resource Development in the South Pacific: 
Towards a General Framework of Analysis’ in Stephen Henningham, R May and Lulu Turner, Resources, 
Development and Politics in the Pacific 258 (1992); See also Brown, Chester, supra note 5, p.136 ; Richardson, 
Ben, ‘A Study of the Response of Transnational Environmental Law and Policy to the Environmental Problems 
of East Asia and the South Pacific’ 7 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 209, 216 (1990) suggesting 
necessity for regional cooperation to protect the environments in dependent Pacific island territories “which lack 
the resources to administer detailed environmental regulations and enforce them on transnational mining 
companies”  
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National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling noted on 
impediments to safety regulations that: 
“The root problem has instead been that political leaders within both the Executive 
Branch and Congress have failed to ensure that agency regulators have had the 
resources necessary to exercise that authority, including personnel and technical 
expertise, and, no less important, the political autonomy needed to overcome the 
powerful commercial interests that have opposed more stringent safety regulation.”83 
  
An effective regulation of offshore operations would require a robust set of international 
regulations at the global and regional levels with a responsive regulatory system at the 
municipal level to implement and enforce compliance with international standards.  
 
7.7.1 Focus of a Global Regime  
 
It was suggested earlier that the global regime should consist of two instruments: A framework 
convention on safety of offshore petroleum operations and a treaty on liability and 
compensation.  
 
7.7.1.1 Framework convention on safety of offshore 
petroleum operations 
 
A framework convention on safety of offshore petroleum operations may be tailored along the 
lines of the binding obligations adopted in the 1994 Convention for Nuclear Safety for several 
reasons.84 First, both nuclear and petroleum E&P are potentially hazardous activities, they may 
                                                          
83 See Deepwater Horizon Report to the President, op cit., p. 67 (Emphasis mine) 
84 It is important to note that the Nuclear Safety Convention has serious challenges in its implementation and 
enforcement and may not be adjudged as a very successful regime. It is only used as a reference point for its 
creation or adoption of binding obligations in a treaty on hazardous activity that is conducted within State 
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cause severe impact on the environment in the event of a major hazard. Second, the objectives 
of a global treaty on offshore safety would be similar to those of the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety. That is, to achieve and maintain a high level of safety of offshore petroleum operations 
worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation 
including safety-related technical co-operation. Two, to ensure the establishment of effective 
safety management systems for all offshore installation and three, to prevent accidents with 
severe environmental consequences and create mechanism to respond and minimise such 
consequences should they occur.85  
 
Third, the Convention on Nuclear Safety is not too detailed. It is a framework instrument setting 
out relevant obligations aimed at ensuring that States do their best to prevent nuclear accident. 
For instance, it mandates parties to take “within the framework of its national law, the 
legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing 
its obligations under this Convention.”86 States are to establish and maintain legislative and 
regulatory framework to govern safety of nuclear installations; ensure application of national 
safety requirements and regulations and a system of licensing.87 
 
Parties are required to have national authorities with sufficient competence and financial and 
human resources, responsible for implementation of the legislative and regulatory 
framework.88 Similar to the experience learnt by the US from the Macondo accident, the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety requires that a regulatory body should be separate from any 
                                                          
territory. A successful negotiation and adoption of binding obligations in a global treaty on safety and 
prevention of accidental pollution, even if not completely perfect, would be a good start in the regulation of 
offshore oil and gas operations. See Birnie, P. et al, op. cit., pp. 500-503 for detailed critique of the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety 
85 See Nuclear Safety Convention, Art. 1 for similar objective. 
86 Id., Art.4  
87 Id., Art.7 
88 Art.8(1) 
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other body concerned with promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.89 Also, to encourage 
self-regulation, prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation shall be placed on 
the holder of the relevant licence.90   
 
Other notable areas addressed by the Convention on Nuclear Safety are emergency 
preparedness entailing on-site and off-site emergency plans,91 siting of installations,92 safety in 
design and construction.93 Design must also take into consideration human factors and man-
machine interface.94 Parties are to ensure all safety measures are available and in place 
throughout the lifetime of the nuclear installation.95 
 
In addition to having similar obligations as the Convention on Nuclear Safety above, a global 
treaty on safety of offshore petroleum operations should go a step further. For example, there 
should be obligation on capacity building, training and technology transfer to developing 
regions to adequately respond to major hazards. Beyond the other preventive environmental 
principles, the treaty should incorporate the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility in some of the obligations that will be imposed on States. For instance, in terms 
of research and development, the US and States in advanced regions such as Western Europe 
                                                          
89 Art.8(2), The Deepwater Horizon report observed that the Minerals Management Service (MMS) had 
conflicting missions and focused more on collecting money for the U.S. Treasury than on enforcing 
environmental and safety regulations. Almost immediately following the Deepwater Horizon incident, the U.S. 
government renamed MMS to Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE).  
Shortly thereafter, it divided BOEMRE into three independent entities within the Department of Interior: 1) the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) promotes development of offshore energy sources, including oil 
and gas; 2) the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) is responsible for ensuring 
comprehensive oversight, safety, and environmental protection in all offshore energy activities; and 3) the 
Office of Natural Resources Revenue is responsible for royalty collections, auditing and related tasks.  The 
reorganization did not happen by statute, but internally through a “reorganization order” issued by the U.S. 
Secretary of the Interior.  (See Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3299 (available at 
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475) 
90 Art.9 
91 Art.16 
92 Art.17 
93 Art.18 
94 Art.18(iii) 
95 Arts.11, 12, 13 & 19 
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should take the lead. Also, regulatory institutions in the US and countries operating in the North 
Seas should endeavour to assist developing countries develop their regulatory capacity. Such 
capacity is necessary for proper monitoring and implementation of a global treaty. The idea of 
mandating developed countries to render support to developing countries has been expressed 
by Russia, although, it mainly advocated for transfer of technology to developing nations that 
could be affected by offshore oil spills.96 
 
7.7.1.2 Offshore Liability Treaty  
 
A global instrument may be required to address the issue of liability with particular emphasis 
on transboundary pollution. Such liability should be strict with reasonably high liability cap 
and channelled to operators of offshore operations. Furthermore, victims should be conferred 
with locus to bring action against parent companies for actions of subsidiaries that result in 
major hazard where damages would be beyond the capacity of a subsidiary.  
 
Strict liability that does not require proof of fault or negligence is said to be more effective in 
protecting the environment, as fault (or negligence) is difficult to prove in environmental 
damage cases.97 A right of access to justice to be guaranteed by all nations in the event of a 
disaster with transboundary impact would ensure that the polluter is held accountable and pays 
for the negative consequences of his economic venture.  
 
Another value of liability provision is the element of deterrence. Such strict liability for 
environmental damage caused by accidental pollution will be an incentive for operators to 
                                                          
96 The Embassy of the Russian Federation in Canada Press Release, supra note 3 
97 Beder, Sharon, op. cit., p. 41  
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undertake actions to improve safety and reduce the risk of their actions.98 In essence, it can be 
used as an effective preventive tool against major hazard.  
 
The degree to which the BP compensation fund for settlement of claims for the Deepwater 
Horizon exceeds the present liability caps of IOPC and OPOL places doubts on the feasibility 
of liability caps for oil pollution from tankers and fixed platforms.99 Economists are of the view 
that when liability is limited, violators are not provided with an “appropriate (economic) 
incentive for prevention” of environmental disasters like the Deepwater Horizon.100 They 
advocate for the removal of limitation of liability provisions to meet all possible claims in any 
incident so victims do not bear the difference.101 Also, requirement for compulsory insurance 
should be retained. But the fear has always been that where liability is unlimited it will be 
difficult to secure insurance for such operations. This may affect offshore petroleum 
development as some competent independent companies may be driven out of the market.102 
 
Some expressed opinion that unlimited liability will not strike a balance that recognises the 
necessity for enterprises to seek and find petroleum which is much needed globally. They argue 
that there should be a commercially realistic amount that rig owners should be made to pay.103 
Limitation of liability in maritime law is calculated using the tonnage of the ship/vessel,104 in 
which case the possible amount of oil it could spill can be estimated. The case of a drilling rig 
                                                          
98 Segerson, Kathleen, ‘An Assessment of Legal Liability as a Market-Based Instrument’ in Moving to Markets 
in Environmental Regulations: Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience Freeman, Jody and Kolstad, Charles 
D. (eds) (Oxford University Press) 250, 251 (2007)  
99 Smith, Marissa, supra note 20, p.1497  
100 Faure, Michael & Hui, Wang, ‘The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: 
Are They Effective?’12 Rev. Euro. Community & Int’l Envi. L. 242, 249 (2003). 
101 Id., 
102 Deepwater Horizon Commission Report to the President pp.283-284 
103 Rares, Steven, supra note 3, p. 21 
104 See 1992 CLC, Art. V; 1976 LLMC, Art.6 provides for limitation with reference to the tonnage of the vessel 
while Art.7 on passenger claims is based on the number of passengers the ship is authorised to carry. 
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is completely different105 but it is still possible to place a cap on liability for accidental pollution 
from offshore petroleum operations. 
 
The amount of oil that could flow from the well in one incident cannot be easily determined. 
If liability limitation is to be calculated based on the volume of oil in the reservoir the limitation 
amount may be very high. This too may make it difficult or impossible for small operators to 
get insured for offshore operations. The liability cap established in the Deepwater Horizon case 
is an indication that there are operators that can bear the cost of an unlimited liability in the 
event of a similar major accident. However, in placing cap on liability there must be a balance 
to avoid situations where increased amount of protective regulations bring about unexpected 
consequences that work against the regulatory goal.106 
 
7.7.2 Regional Agreements on Offshore Petroleum Operations 
 
Regional instruments should be adopted to, inter alia, do the following: 
1. Adopt the standards and requirements in global treaties but with variations in details to 
take into consideration the specific geographical conditions and needs of the region. Such 
variations must not be less stringent and less effective than the global standards. Regional 
instruments that have very high standards of safety and good provisions on protection of the 
marine environment against pollution from offshore petroleum E&P and other activities might 
be confronted with a global treaty that provides for less stringent regulations. States in such 
regions should be able to maintain the higher standards of the regional agreement without 
                                                          
105 White, Michael, op cit., p.25 
106 Bardach, Eugene and Kagan, Robert A., op. cit.  
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conflict as the global treaty would usually provide for such circumstances, by encouraging 
more stringent rules in regional agreements and national laws. 
2. Provide for regional cooperation, especially in the area of emergency preparedness and 
response. 
3. Address liability issues in transboundary context and guaranteed access to justice. 
Especially, grant individuals legal standing to bring claims against IOC at regional courts if the 
coastal State lacks the political will to effectively enforce global and regional regulations.  
For regional regulations to provide the relevant international impact that will result in adequate 
global offshore petroleum safety there should be regional agreements in all regions with 
offshore petroleum activities.107  While the above highlights some pertinent issues to be 
addressed, the Mediterranean Offshore and Kuwait Protocols contain robust provisions that 
can serve as a model for other regional treaties. 
 
7.7.3 National legal framework on safety of offshore operations 
 
A national legal regime in an international context is essential for several reasons. 
1. International law can hardly be effective without the adoption by States backed by 
national laws. It is the national legal regime that determines the success of such international 
regulation of a purely economic activity conducted within territories of sovereign States. 
Therefore, the municipal institutions must be strengthened and the authority/regulator 
                                                          
107 Following the Macondo incident and the prospect of offshore oil and gas operations by their Gulf of Mexico 
neighbour, Cuba and Mexico, the US government has been advised to negotiate with them. See the Deepwater 
Horizon Commission Report to the President, p. 300 where the Commission made it clear that “it is in our 
country’s national interest to negotiate now with these near neighbors to agree on a common, rigorous set of 
standards, a system for regulatory oversight, and the same operator adherence to the effective safety culture 
called for in this report, along with protocols to cooperate on containment and response strategies and 
preparedness in case of a spill.”  
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adequately staffed with trained personnel and financed to acquire requisite capacity to regulate 
offshore operations. The State authority/regulator would be responsible for the enforcement of 
safety standards set by international treaties and domestic regulations. Therefore, technical 
expertise and capacity of the authority/regulator are very fundamental to the effective 
regulation of offshore petroleum operations and ensuring the highest level of standards 
necessary to prevent major accidents.108 
2. Licensing of offshore operations remains the prerogative of coastal States that may 
grant operating licences to any company. States would be required and expected to demand 
and enforce fulfilment of minimum requirements adopted in global and regional instruments. 
Such requirements must be met in order to undertake offshore operations, especially in deep 
water areas of the continental shelf.  
3. The national regime must provide framework for easy access to justice for victims of 
transboundary impact of accidental pollution from offshore installation within their jurisdiction 
to enable them exercise their rights under global and regional treaties.109 For instance, victims 
should be able to enforce through civil liability claims their rights to compensation for loss of 
income, injury and damage to property. 
4. States should in their domestic legislations allow for easy movement of rescue 
personnel and equipment in the event of accident requiring multinational effort to contain the 
pollution.    
International cooperation and a global instrument are essential for the protection of marine 
environment and its biodiversity as a common concern of all nations. Like most UNCLOS 
                                                          
108 Deepwater Horizon Commission Report to the President, pp. 67 & 126-127   
109 This obligation is already imposed and expected of them by virtue of Art.235 of UNCLOS. Perhaps it is time 
to demand enforcement of each and every obligation relating to protection of the marine environment under the 
UNCLOS. Perhaps, the absence of an enforcement mechanism within the convention for its continuous 
development as a framework convention has rendered some provisions unproductive in addressing the very 
problems or issues they were meant to address. 
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provisions, such a global instrument should make provision for and encourage regions and 
coastal States to enact much more stringent regulations where need be in line with the 
peculiarities of that region or State. While developed countries may not have difficulties with 
law enforcement, developing countries with weak institutions may find it challenging to 
enforce such standards.  
A global regulation should apply the principle of common but differentiated responsibility to 
accommodate countries that might need help in resolving her regulatory challenges.110 For 
instance, performance-based approach imposes challenges on the regulator, particularly at the 
transition phase. Field inspectors must possess or learn management and systems-design skills 
of sophistication equal to those of their industry counterparts who create the systems, the 
adequacy of which the inspectors are required to assess and audit.111 In such circumstances, 
developed countries would be required to give needed training and technical assistance to 
developing countries.  
 
7.8 Enforcement of a Global Treaty 
 
The proposed convention may have treaty enforcement challenges in the absence of a workable 
mechanism and an international organisation responsible for offshore petroleum activities to 
monitor implementation of the treaty obligations. Nevertheless, the effect of naming and 
shaming for non-compliance with treaty obligations could propel State action. Also, with a 
binding treaty in place, UNEP and the IMO that have mandates relating to environment and 
maritime safety respectively could play more active roles in the prevention of accidental 
                                                          
110 Similar view was expressed by President Dmitry Medvedev who expressed the need for technology transfer 
to developing countries that could be impacted with oil spill from offshore operations, see The Embassy of the 
Russian Federation in Canada Press Release, supra note 3 
111 Rob Grant, Q.C., Will Moreira, Q.C. and David Henley, op. cit., p. 32  
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pollution from offshore petroleum operations, especially when one of them or the United 
Nations is designated as the secretariat for the treaty.  
At the national level safety standards and other operational requirements of the treaty are to be 
enforced by the regulator. States must demand adherence to international standards from 
operators and hold them accountable for any breach. In the event of accidental pollution which 
causes damage to the marine environment, property and businesses, every affected person 
would be able to bring civil liability action against the operator. Where the regulator fails to 
implement and enforce the treaty provisions, there would be legal basis for private individuals 
including civil society to demand that the regulator discharges its duty. Moreover, the treaty 
may specifically provide for the institution of legal proceedings by private persons and groups 
in the event of failure of the regulator to act.  
Moreover, the mere existence of binding treaty obligations and standards would propel IOCs 
to conduct their activities in any region of the world in line with international standards, 
irrespective of its domestication or otherwise as they would be shamed for any action to the 
contrary. Also, IOCs may feel responsible for the actions of their subsidiaries in any part of the 
world and ensure their actions do not fall short of the treaty standards to avoid naming and 
shaming. This would ultimately help global protection of the marine environment. 
 
7.9 General Conclusion 
 
Offshore petroleum operations are dangerous, the operating environment is challenging and 
the risk of accidents is ever present. While industry players are conscious of the dangers of 
their activities and are involved in setting standards for best practices for operations, the 
responsibility still rests on governments to provide effective regulations. 
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Offshore operations have experienced major hazards in various regions of the world and caused 
considerable damage to the marine environment and businesses dependent on it, as well as loss 
of human lives and biodiversity. As operations progress further to deep and ultra-deep waters 
the safety of these operations has become a global concern. Issues of prevention of major 
hazards, preparedness and response to pollution and liability and compensation are major 
responsibility of governments as well as the industry.  
 
Offshore petroleum activities are conducted within coastal States maritime jurisdiction, and 
their authorisation, monitoring and law enforcement are primarily the responsibility of national 
governments. The petroleum industry have assumed global status both in terms of the work 
force and their relevance to energy supply. There are also international rules and regulations at 
both regional and global levels concerning offshore petroleum operations. Despite the levels 
of regulations available to the industry, offshore petroleum operations have witnessed 
catastrophic incidents that call to question the adequacy of the legal regime or regulatory 
system in place.  
 
This thesis focused on accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations to the exclusion 
of operational pollution. The legal analysis was mainly concerned with international 
regulations on offshore accidental pollution at global and regional levels. The three sea regions 
of North-East Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea together with the EU 
Directive on Safety of Offshore Operations that cover a good part of these regions were the 
focus of analysis for regional regulation of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum 
operations. This was simultaneously done with the examination of the global normative 
framework.  
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After the Deepwater Horizon and Montara accidents the safety of offshore petroleum 
operations, emergency preparedness and response and liability and compensation, especially 
in the case of transboundary pollution became issues of concern for both regulators and 
industry operators. Hence, the main question considered was whether the extant international 
legal regime adequately provides for prevention of accidental pollution, response to 
emergencies and liability and compensation arising from offshore petroleum exploration and 
exploitation activities? If not, what form of international legal framework might be deployed 
to remedy this gap in the legal regime on offshore petroleum exploration and production?  
The study proceeded on the assumption that international law seems not to adequately address 
issues of accidental pollution from offshore petroleum exploration and exploitation. Therefore, 
there is a need to put in place an international framework that will substantially and effectively 
address these challenges of offshore operations. 
The thesis examined relevant international legal instruments to determine the extent to which 
they provide for safety and prevention of accidental pollution, emergency preparedness and 
response mechanism and liability and compensation, especially in the case of transboundary 
pollution. In examining the above questions, the thesis used the principles of prevention, 
precautionary and polluter pays as tools for the theoretical examination and analysis of offshore 
legal regimes of the three selected regions and the extant global legal framework on offshore 
petroleum operations.  
The research shows that at the international level UNCLOS and the OPRC are the only 
instruments which form the global legal framework on offshore oil and gas operations. Of the 
three regions under examination, it is only the Mediterranean Sea region that has protocol 
governing offshore oil and gas operations in regional waters. There are non-binding 
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international instruments such as Stockholm and Rio Declarations and guidelines and standards 
made by the World Bank group, UNEP and private institutions that influence the conduct of 
operators and government regulation of offshore activities.  
UNCLOS imposed obligation on States to prevent pollution without providing specific 
provisions as operational requirements for offshore operation needed to make the operations 
safe and prevent accidents. All three regional regimes imposed obligation on member States to 
prevent pollution of the marine environment. Because they were not adopted specifically for 
the purpose of preventing accidental pollution from offshore petroleum operations, they lack 
the requisite content that can guarantee safety, especially in deep water and ultra-deep water 
operations. States rely on municipal regulations and some industry standards which do not 
encourage uniformity in the approach to safety and prevention of accidental pollution in those 
regions. However, the EU Directive on safety of offshore operations contains comprehensive 
provisions on major hazard prevention. As such there is the possibility of achieving some level 
of uniformity of preventive measures among States in the regions covered by the Directive. 
In respect of emergency response at a global level UNCLOS provides no detailed provision on 
the subject. The OPRC addresses emergency response but seems inadequate in providing the 
requisite alertness and swift response needed to contain a catastrophic incident in the magnitude 
of the Deepwater Horizon. The legal regimes at regional levels seem more comprehensive in 
their approach to emergency preparedness and response. For instance, OSPAR urged parties to 
continuously review their emergency frameworks. A needed or required improvement, in a 
post-Macondo era, was provided by the EU Directive on safety of offshore operations.  
It is argued that a global approach to emergency preparedness and response is needed as all 
countries should be involved in combating offshore accidental pollution. This work argues that 
while improvement is needed in the global regime it does not necessarily have to be a new 
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treaty. That an amendment to the OPRC through the IMO or Conference of the parties as 
provided in Article 14 of the Convention may improve emergency preparedness and response 
at the global level. Based on lessons learnt from recent incidents, such an amendment should 
be founded on research on the state-of-the-art of oil pollution preparedness and response as 
demanded by Article 8 of OPRC and take into cognisance current technology in the offshore 
petroleum industry. Also, emergency response may be improved through regional regimes that 
would be tailored to the circumstances of each region. The EU Offshore Directive may provide 
useful guide to such regional approach. 
The research shows absence of binding global treaty on liability and compensation. Though 
UNCLOS imposes responsibility on States to protect and preserve the marine environments it 
did not provide details on their liability. For instance, how liable a State will be, the type or 
level of liability and the basis on which any compensation may be determined are not 
provided.112 Generally, it is a State’s duty to ensure that there is a process for compensation 
and that effective liability regime exist in domestic law. But, State responsibility, as in making 
the State liable for environmental harm resulting from activities within the State does not exist 
in practice. With the CLC and Fund conventions not applicable to offshore petroleum 
operations the absence of a global treaty on the subject is clear. States appeared to have ignored 
their obligation under UNCLOS to cooperate and adopt international rules, standards and 
regulations on liability in respect of offshore oil and gas operations. 
The analysis indicates that regional instruments, especially the Mediterranean Offshore 
Protocol, made detailed provisions on liability. While the traditional treaties forming the 
regional regimes did not adequately address liability for pollution from offshore petroleum 
operations, especially transboundary impacts, the EU Directive on offshore safety has brought 
                                                          
112 See UNCLOS Arts.194(3) 197, 204, 208 and 235 
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offshore oil and gas operations under the 2004 Environmental Liability Directive. By 
implication liability within the EU is channelled to the operator who has right to limit his 
liability in line with provisions of the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime 
Claims and other related conventions as implemented by national laws.113 But this thesis argues 
that the determination of liability limitation under LLMC does not really fit for all offshore 
petroleum installations and operations as the basis for calculation of the limitation amount is 
uncertain. Considerations would be different if it were a case of fixed liability cap. 
In the premise, it was clear that there is no global treaty for the regulation of accidental pollution 
from offshore petroleum operations. The victims of such accidents in an international context 
of transboundary pollution are not protected and guaranteed means of settling liabilities and 
prompt payment of adequate compensation. The thesis therefore argues that accidental 
pollution from offshore petroleum operations could be prevented and victims of accidental 
pollution would be better protected in an international legal framework consisting of two global 
treaties. One on safety, the other on liability and supported by regional agreements taking into 
consideration special circumstances specific to each region. Such international regime must 
ensure that all States have competent, effective and functional regulators to implement and 
enforce compliance with global standards. That an international consensus for a global treaty 
could be achieved with the application of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility.  
 
7.10 Contribution 
 
This study makes contribution to the existing literature by first making a novel strong case for 
two global treaties to regulate offshore petroleum operations. Secondly, it makes a strong 
                                                          
113 Directive 2004/35/CE, Art.4(3) 
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argument that unlike the shipping industry where international regulations may solely be used 
to address safety of shipping and maritime claims, independent of the flag State, offshore 
petroleum E&P activities are different. They need cooperative and effective domestic legal 
regime backed by capable and credible domestic institutions with highly skilled and motivated 
personnel to guarantee safety of offshore petroleum operations and prevent accidental 
pollution. The legal regime must ensure adequate and prompt settlement of liabilities in the 
event of accidental pollution, even in a transboundary context. Finally, it argues that a robust 
international legal regime would require all three levels of legislation- global, regional and 
national- to be effective to be effective in addressing accidental pollution in a growing global 
industry and ultimately guarantee protection of the marine environment and preserve its 
biodiversity. 
 
7.11 Directions for Further Research 
 
This study has argued that for there to be safety in offshore petroleum E&P globally and prevent 
accidental pollution two global treaties are needed. First on safety of offshore petroleum 
operations and a second on liability and compensation.  
 
While it is suggested that a framework treaty with binding obligations on safety and prevention 
of major hazard is desirable, detailed modalities for negotiation and detailed substantive 
content is not provided. This may need further research. In relation to a liability and 
compensation issue, strict liability and reasonably high liability cap is suggested in this study. 
However, a further research would be needed to provide best options on limitation of liability 
and contributors to a possible Compensation Fund. 
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In view of the difficulties that confronted Indonesia in her bid to secure compensation for 
Indonesian communities and citizens affected by the Montara spill in offshore Australia, a 
further research on the possible content of a liability treaty may also consider a robust 
mechanism for settlement of liability in cases of transboundary pollution arising from offshore 
petroleum E&P. 
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